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SUMMARY 
What role the law should play in encouraging the growth of trade 
unions is a matter of considerable controversy in Canada, the United 
States, and the United Kingdom. Limits to growth in other sectors of the 
economy coupled with heightened employer hostility to unionism have made 
the extension of collective bargaining to the tertiary sector the most 
pressing task for unions in the 1980s. In a limited way, the Canadian 
procedure for certifying and recognizing unions is being considered as a 
model for labour law reform. And there is much to recommend the Canadian 
system. It is far more efficient than its American counterpart. There 
are fewer delays, fewer unlawful interventions by employers, and a 
substantially higher likelihood that newly organized unions will be 
granted certification. Even so, unions have failed to break into the 
trade, finance, and services industries that are so critical to their 
future. 
Taken as a whole, Canadian labour law tends to block rather than 
promote the growth of unions in the unorganized sectors of the economy. 
The certification procedure is only one aspect of a legal regime that has 
as its primary purpose the preservation of industrial peace, not the 
encouragement of union growth. By shaping bargaining structure and 
regulating bargaining tactics, Canadian labour law tilts the balance of 
power in favour of employers. Small, fragmented unions are frequently 
pitted against large corporations and as there is nothing to stop anti-
union employers from using their overwhelming strength to frustrate the 
collective bargaining process, efforts to organize the tertiary sector 
have failed. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 1 
UNION RECOGNITION AND UNION GROWTH 
Labour law and policy have traditionally been accorded a decisive 
role in the growth of trade unions in Canada. The widely held view is 
that the absence of a 'positive' legal framework explains the small size 
of the trade union movement prior to the mid-1940s. And, conversely, the 
spectacular growth of union membership among industrial workers during 
and immediately after World War II is attributed to the policy of 
compulsory collective bargaining introduced in 1944. Also ascribed to 
the law is the rapid growth of union membership among public sector 
employees starting in the mid-1960s. Between 1939 and 1985 union 
membership in Canada increased more than ten-fold, from 359,000 to 
3,666,000 while union density, which stood at 17.3 per cent of the paid, 
non-agricultural labour force before the war, reached a peak of 40.0 per 
cent in 1983 (Kumar, 1986:108-9). 
This study explores the relationship between the law and union 
growth today when labour's challenge is to organize workers in the 
tertiary sector. Of principal interest are the finance, trade, and 
services industries where the growth of employment has been particularly 
strong while union density has remained extremely low: 2.5, 8.9 and 24.2 
per cent, respectively. Over half of these jobs are held by women and 
more than one-fifth by part-time employees, two categories of workers 
that unions have generally found difficult to organize (Labour Canada, 
Women in the Work Force, 1983). Fewer than 30 per cent of full-time 
working women and only 15 per cent of part-time employees are union 
members (Kumar, 1986:143). There are, in addition, many newly arrived 
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immigrants and young people employed in the service sector. For the 
former, jobs of any sort are difficult to find while the latter are often 
more interested in pursuing their eduction that improving their terms and 
conditions of employment. 
For unions, the problems are many but the potential for growth is 
enormous. Unorganized workers in the finance, trade, and service 
industries alone account for one-half of the paid labour force in Canadaa 
while the potential for union growth elsewhere in the economy is 
comparatively small. Over the last thirty years, unions have done no 
more than hold their own in the resource, manufacturing, and 
transportation industries. Nor is there much possibility of further 
growth in the public sector. b By some estimates, union density is 
already in excess of 90 per cent of those legally eligible to join 
unions. Sizeable gains in union membership, therefore, are likely only 
if employees in the tertiary sector organize in large numbers. 
The Role of the Law 
Whether the law should contribute to the growth of unions is a 
highly controversial issue. Recent efforts to extend collective 
bargaining to the retail and finance industries have brought workers into 
sharp conflict with employers. In almost every case, unions have 
suffered decisive defeats despite widespread support for collective 
8Not all of these workers are eligible for union membership, 
however, as labour laws generally exclude the self-employed, 
professionals, and persons who exercise managerial functions or are 
employed in a confidential capacity with respect to labour relations. 
bIncluded in the public sector are governments; schools, colleges, 
and universities; hospitals and nursing homes; fire and police departments. 
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bargaining among the employees themselves. Even so, there have been few 
signs of the eager anti-unionism of employers south of the border. ~or 
has there been much enthusiasm for dismantling the framework of legal 
rights and protections for workers that has been evident in the United 
Kingdom. For manual workers in large primary and secondary sector firms, 
the legitimacy of unions is reasonably well established in Canada: it is 
the extension of collective bargaining to unorganized white-collar and 
service workers, and any changes in the law that would- be necessary to 
encourage the growth of unions, that are the source of controversy. 
The debate about the role of unions in the United States, by 
contrast, has been much broader and the fight much uglier. Whatever 
consensus existed over the desirability of collective bargaining 
immediately after World War II has clearly broken down in the last ten 
years. 'Union-free' is the buzz word of the 1980s. Even companies with 
longstanding bargaining relationships are seeking to get out from under 
what they see as the crushing cost of union wages and restrictive 
practices. Highly paid consultants advise managers about how to abrogate 
their collective agreements through bankruptcy proceedings, where to 
locate new plants to avoid organizing drives, and how to utilize the 
latest 'union substitution' techniques (Kochan, 1980:183). 
Though much of the new labour relations strategy is patently 
unlawful, frustrated unionists often cite the law as one of their 
problems, not one of the solutions. Long delays in the processing of 
applications for certification and the high level of illegal interference 
by employers have been repeatedly linked to the inability of unions to 
win bargaining rights. Between 1955 and 1980 there was a six-fold 
~-.----.-----
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increase in unlawful dismissal complaints in the United States; a 
frightening one in twenty union supporters can now expect to be 
discharged during an organizing drive (Weiler, 1983:1781). The volume of 
refusal to bargain complaints has grown even faster, by 700 per cent 
since 1955 (Weiler, 1985:3). One result is that fewer than one-half of 
the unions seeking recognition are granted certification and a quarter of 
those failed to negotiate collective agreements (Cooke, 1985c). 
Reviewing the literature, Freeman and Medoff (1984:239) concluded that 
employer 'opposition, broadly defined, is a major cause of the slow 
strangulation of private sector unionism' . 
The failure of the recognition procedure to adequately protect the 
right to associate has been centred out as a critical weakness in 
American labour law and a focal point for reform. None the less, 
proposals to amend the legislation were soundly defeated in 1978, in 
spite of Democratic majorities in both houses. Labour's objective was a 
modest package of amendments to streamline the certification procedure, 
penalize employers for breaking the law by imposing double back pay 
awards for unfair dismissal, and provide equal time for unions to address 
employees at work on company time. One of the first issues dropped was a 
proposal to permit the certification of unions without representation 
votes when 55 per cent of the potential members have signed membership 
cards (ibid.:202-3). Widely used in Canada, so-called automatic 
certification is thought to be the crucial difference between the 
representation procedures in the two countries (Weiler, 1983:1818-9; 
Meltz, 1985:322). Because the Canadian method relies on membership 
evidence gathered early in the organizing drive there are fewer 
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opportunities for employers to interfere and intimidate workers. The 
American procedure, by contrast, has institutionalized the representation 
campaign which, the evidence suggests, is likely to be fraught with anti-
union tactics and innuendo. Accordingly, the value of outright 
certification has taken on almost mystical proportions in the debate over 
labour law reform. In Freeman's (1985:61) opinion, 'the principle 
difference between unionization in the United States and Canada is that 
U.S. laws allow management to conduct lengthy well-funded election 
campaigns against unions' whereas in Canada most provinces certify unions 
without any representation campaign at all. 'Result: growing 
unionization in Canada.' 
The debate over labour law reform in the United Kingdom also has at 
its core a fundamental disagreement over the role of unions and the 
importance of collective bargaining. The consensus that characterized 
the 1940s and 1950s has all but disappeared (Lewis and Simpson, 
1981:231). The present government is pursuing a step-by-step approach to 
labour law reform explicitly designed to curb the power of unions--
reforms it insists are vital for securing industrial peace, controlling 
inflation, raising profits, and increasing the number of jobs (ibid.: 
223). Meanwhile, union membership has fallen sharply, largely as a 
result of unemployment and industrial restructuring but also because of 
growing employer resistance to collective bargaining (Townley, 1987:177-
8). Some large firms have refused to recognize unions or even withdrawn 
recognition from established unions (Wedderburn, 1985:52). 
Clearly, labour law reform of the sort sought by trade unionists 
must await the election of a more hospitable government; in the meantime, 
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however, what direction the reform should eventually take is being I,o,'idely 
debated. One approach would be for Labour to nullify the Conservatives's 
recent initiatives. In 1974, the newly elected Labour government simply 
withdrew the unpopular Industrial Relations Act and strengthened the 
traditional immunities for persons acting 'in contemplation or 
furtherance of a trade dispute'. At the same time, the rights of 
individuals were expanded and a series of legal rights for trade unions 
introduced, a recognition procedure among them (Lewis and Simpson, 
1981:15). But a simple reversion to the past may no longer be possible. 
Times have changed, McCarthy (1985:8-9) has warned. The past is no 
longer retrievable. Some initiatives, like the election of union 
officers and the use of strike ballots, have already affected the 
behaviour of labour and management. There are, as well, the EEC 
directives to be considered. Tied to the larger issue is the question of 
a statutory procedure for union recognition. 'There is undoubtedly a 
need for positive rights in this area', McCarthy (ibid.:29) argued. High 
levels of unemployment, the rise of the 'hard-line' manager, plus the 
growth of employment in the traditionally hard-to-organize service 
industries mean that 'the problem of the recalcitrant employer, who 
fights the workers' attempts to organize and "match" his natural power in 
the labour market, has in no way diminished in recent years' . 
Established unions are affected as well. Because many of the rights 
accorded trade unions by the previous Labour government are contingent 
upon a union being recognized, they are lost when recognition is 
withdrawn (Clark and Wedderburn, 1983:210). 
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But how the recognition procedure might work raises several pressing 
problems. The procedures established under both the Conservatives's 
Industrial Relations Act and Labour's Employment Protection Act have been 
severely criticized. Citing the research of others. Townley (1987:179) 
reported that the law proved less advantageous than originally thought 
for a number of reasons. 'most notably employer recalcitrance and 
judicial control; the absence of effective reinstatement remedies for 
union activity and narrow judicial interpretations'. Finding the same 
problems with the recognition procedure in the United States. Townley 
concluded that certain 'unintended' consequences are unavoidable and 
'cannot be remedied by careful drafting but remain inherent to the 
introduction of law in this area' (ibid.:194). 
Townley's conclusion is reinforced by Canadian experience. Though 
promoted in a limited way as a model for reform in both the United States 
(Weiler. 1983) and the United Kingdom (Beaumont and Townley. 1987). the 
union recognition process in Canada is fraught with the same obstacles of 
delays. employer opposition, and ineffective remedies. The deleterious 
effects are less dire perhaps but the fundamental problems are there none 
the less. 
The apparent inevitability of these shortcomings does not mean. 
however. that voluntarism is the better policy. In one sense. 
voluntarism is not a policy at all but simply a willingness to permit the 
vagaries of the labour market and the caprices of employers to determine 
the fate of unions. Nodding acceptance of the right to associate and the 
right to strike are not much use. 'To be effective these rights need 
adequate legal support, more than ever in an economy where soaring 
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unemployment debilitates workers' bargaining strength in the labour 
market' (Wedderburn, 1985:38). Thus, even though statutory procedures 
are prone to develop deep flaws, Lewis and Simpson (1981:147) argued that 
'the risk may well be worth taking on a question of such fundamental 
importance as the establishment of collective bargaining'. In any event, 
voluntarism is no longer a viable option. Government intervention is a 
fact of modern economic life. Regulation of labour-management relations 
is Simply one facet of government regulation designed to achieve certain 
economic and social ends. The issue, therefore, is not whether there 
ought to be labour laws but what sort of labour laws there ought to be. 
For unions to grow, the right to bargain collectively must be a 
central objective of public policy. The legal form that the intervention 
takes, whether immunities from prosecution or statutory rights, is far 
less important than the objective itself. What matters most is that 
workers have an over-riding right to organize, a right that is clear to 
those who sit on courts and tribunals. An important lesson we have 
learned, von Prondzynski (1985:189) argued, is that 'labour law is 
inevitably frustrated in its purpose unless it is applied by and 
adjudicated in institutions which understand that they must implement a 
social policy rather than apply abstract legal constructs'. 
To date, support for collective bargaining has not been the sole 
objective of legislative intervention. In the United States, the 
institutionalization of conflict was the over-riding purpose of the 
Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts; in the United Kingdom, the reform of 
collective bargaining was the central purpose behind the legal 
intervention of the 1970s (Townley, 1987:191). In Canada, too, the 
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promotion of collective bargaining has been a secondary consideration. 
The government's primary concern has been industrial peace, a bias 
clearly reflected in the severe constraints imposed on the timing and 
scope of lawful strike activity. Yet, so long as the desire for union 
representation was confined to industrial workers, the growth of 
collective bargaining was possible within the legal framework established 
by Privy Council Order 1003 in 1944. The now familiar features of 
certification, duty to bargain in good faith, prohibition of unfair 
labour practices, and constraints on the right to strike established a 
legal system which saw the union movement grow from a small group 
representing mostly skilled workers to a mass organization. For workers 
in the tertiary sector, however, the legal framework of the 1940s is 
proving inadequate. Tough, sophisticated employers make organizing 
increasingly difficult. They use the law to ensure that certification is 
a long, drawn-out affair and even when unions are certified there is no 
guarantee that employers will bargain seriously. A much more aggressive 
policy of encouraging union growth will be necessary for the majority of 
women and part-time workers to gain the advantages of collective 
bargaining. 
Methodology and Data Base 
The focus of the thesis is the union recognition process in Ontario, 
both because recognition is a decisive juncture in the growth of unions 
and because recognition is the aspect of the collective bargaining 
process most directly affected by the law. In this study, a union is 
considered to be recognized if it has been certified as a bargaining 
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agent by the Ontario Labour Relations Board and has negotiated a 
collective agreement with an employer. Admittedly, the signing of a 
first agreement is no more than an indicator that collective bargaining 
will survive, nevertheless, it is a critical indicator: if not a 
sufficient condition, then a necessary one, and superior to certification 
alone. 
The study has benefited from the voluminous American research which 
has looked for the determinants of success in certification in the 
process itself.c The thrust of this work has been to correlate variables 
such as procedural delays and unfair labour practices with the outcome of 
representation votes, and the results illustrate nothing so much as that 
employer resistance to collective bargaining has grown rapidly in the 
United States and has been extremely effective in blocking workers' 
efforts to organize. But even though these studies have added to our 
understanding of the law, as attempts to discover the source of the steep 
decline union membership in the United States their focus has been too 
narrow. The researchers' vision has been fixed most firmly on the 
procedural elements of the law and, as a rule, the analysis has gone no 
further than the representation vote. More recent work has begun to 
correct these shortcomings. Voos's (1984) research, for example, has led 
her to conclude that part of the decline in union membership in the 
United States is attributable to the reduction in expenditures for 
organizing. Goldfield (1982) and Freeman (1985) have considered the 
shift of employment away from the historically well organized industries 
CFor a fairly complete list, see the studies reviewed by Fiorito and 
Greer, 1982; Heneman and Sandver, 1983; and Delaney, Lewin, and Sockell, 
1985. 
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such as manufacturing to the less well organized service industries and 
from the relatively well organized northern states to the predominantly 
non-union south-west. One study by Cooke (1985a, 1985c) has carried the 
analysis past the granting of certification to consider why some unions 
were able to negotiate collective agreements while others were not. And 
Weiler (1985) has considered how legal constraints on the organizing of 
secondary boycotts have affected the ability of unions to negotiate 
collective agreements. 
Following the lead of the American studies, data on certification 
applications in Ontario during the 1970s were collected and analyzed to 
determine whether the recognition process itself had an effect on the 
outcome of certification. Data on first agreements were also gathered 
and analyzed to determine whether various elements of the certification 
process were linked to the likelihood that unions granted bargaining 
rights would negotiate collective agreements. In so doing, statistically 
significant correlations were found between the length of the 
certification process, anti-union petitions, and unfair labour practice 
complaints, on the one hand, and the likelihood that a union would be 
granted certification and negotiate a collective agreement, on the other. 
There was, in addition, a considerable amount of bargaining failure 
apparently unrelated to employer interference. For this reason, the 
analysis was broadened to consider how the law shapes the bargaining 
process and, most particularly, the bargaining power of management and 
labour. 
To better understand the legal processes at work, the law and its 
application in the province of Ontario were analyzed. Most important is 
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the Labour Relations Act l which regulates the certification and 
bargaining processes. The Ontario Labour Relations Boardd is the agency 
which interprets and applies the Act and as its important decisions have 
been reported and made available in the series, OLRB Monthly Reports, 
since 1960, the Board's jurisprudence is readily assessable. To complete 
the legal analysis, decisions of courts and grievance arbitration panels 
were utilized when appropriate. Court decisions have been published in 
the series, Ontario Reports, Dominion Law Reports, and Supreme Court 
Review; a cross-section of the more important awards of grievance 
arbitration boards has been compiled and published in the Labour 
Arbitrations Cases series. 
The data base for the study includes all non-construction 
applications for certification disposed of by the Ontario Labour 
Relations Board under the Labour Relations Act during the twelve fiscal 
years from 1970-71 to 1981-82,e a total of 8,750 applications and 9,154 
bargaining units. Of the latter, 8,637 were newly organized and without 
union representation at the time of application. f Bargaining rights were 
granted for 5,981 (69.3 per cent) of the 8,637 newly organized groups and 
collective agreements negotiated for 5,033 (84.6 per cent) of the 5,947 
units for which the outcome of the first round of negotiations was known 
by the end of 1983. 
dLabour relations matters are a provincial responsibility in Canada. 
The issue of legislative jurisdiction is discussed in Chapter 2. 
eFrom 1 April, 1970 to 31 March, 1982. 
fThe remaining 517 bargaining units were involved in applications to 
displace one bargaining agent with another. 
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For each application information on industry, geographic location 
, 
name and application of the applicant union(s}, date of application and 
date of disposition, number of bargaining units applied for, and number 
of units for which the union was certified, was gathered. For each 
bargaining unit information on type (office, manual, professional and 
full- or part-time), number of employees, number of valid union 
membership cards, presence of a petition opposing certification, total 
number of ballots cast for and against certification in a representation 
vote, and date of disposition was collected where relevant. For those 
bargaining units for which unions were certified, the outcome of 
bargaining, including the date of ratification, the scope of the 
collective agreement, the stage at which the agreement was reached and 
whether or not a work stoppage was involved, and the current status of 
collective bargaining was recorded. When no agreement was negotiated, 
the only information consistently available related to work stoppages. 
Data on the level of male and female employment proved unreliable. 
Additional data on unfair labour practices were collected for a 
subset of 1,820 bargaining units, comprised of the 914 bargaining units 
for which certified unions were unable to negotiate collective agreements 
plus 906 units chosen randomly from the remainder. To obtain a 
representative sample, the two parts were weighted so that when combined 
the subset would exhibit the same proportion of bargaining success, 84.6 
per cent, as the file as a whole. As a result, the proportion of units 
for which unions were certified was somewhat lower, 68.5 per cent 
compared to 69.3 per cent. The information available respecting unfair 
labour practice complaints included the complainant (whether a worker, 
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union or employer), the union involved, the sections of the Labour 
Relations Act alleged to have been contravened, the date of application. 
and the date and method of disposition. Only complaints laid against 
employers (over 95 per cent of the total) were analyzed. Matching the 
Labour Relations Board's files of certification applications with unfair 
labour practice complaints and linking this information with the Ministry 
of Labour's data on collective agreements to create a single. continuous 
computer record for each bargaining unit proved to be the major challenge 
of the data collection process. 
Organizing in Ontario during the 1970s 
Organizing under the Labour Relations Act was most active and most 
successful in the tertiary sector during the 1970s, but least active and 
least successful in those tertiary sector industries where union 
membership was particularly low: trade, finance, and private services. 
Although three out of five of the applications for certification filed 
with the Ontario Labour Relations Board were for tertiary sector workers. 
over two-thirds of them were in the community, business and personal 
services industry where organizing was predominantly a public sector 
affair: hospitals and nursing homes, primarily. Applications for 
bargaining units in trade, financeg, and private services, by contrast. 
accounted for less than one-quarter of the total. 
gNot all of the employees in the finance, insurance and real estate 
group fall within the jurisdiction of the OLRB, however. Employees of 
the chartered banks are in the federal jurisdiction and are covered by 
the Canada Labour Code. 
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Outside of the tertiary sector, organizing was almost exclusively 
confined to the secondary sector where manufacturing was the predominant 
grouph. Thirty-two per cent of all the applications processed by the 
OLRB were for workers employed in manufacturing; another 7 per cent were 
for employees in transportation or public utilities. Fewer than 2 per 
cent of all applications for certification during the 1970s were for 
bargaining units in the primary sector. 
The importance of the tertiary sector units was even more pronounced 
in the distribution of unions certifiedi and certified unions with 
collective agreements although rates of success varied considerably from 
industry to industry. Overall, the proportion of unions granted 
bargaining rights was 72.1 per cent in the tertiary sector compared with 
59.1 and 65.6 per cent in the primary and secondary sectors, 
respectively. And while collective agreements were signed by 87.2 per 
cent of unions representing service workers, the likelihood of 
negotiating collective agreements was considerably lower among unions in 
the goods-producing industries: 80.7 per cent of newly certified unions 
negotiated collective agreements in the primary sector and 70.4 per cent 
in the secondary sector. Within the tertiary sector, rates of success in 
both certification and collective bargaining were higher than average in 
the services industry and public administration but lower than average in 
trade and finance. 
hThe construction industry was excluded from the study. 
iStrictly speaking, it is the union which is certified to r:present 
the workers in a designated bargaining and this is the construct~on used 
here. Terminology has become confused, however, so that many authors 
speak of the certified bargaining unit. 
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Table 1.1: Industrial ~istribution of Certification Applications#l 
F1scal Years 1970-71 to 1981-82 
Primary Sector#2 
Forestry 
Mining 
Secondary Sector#3 
Manufacturing 
Transportation 
and utilities 
Tertiary Sector 
Trade (retail and 
wholesale) 
Finance, insurance 
and real estate 
Community, business, 
and personal services 
Public administration 
Total 
Number of 
applications 
149 
3,387 
5,082 
14 
135 
2,771 
616 
1,444 
291 
3,343 
304 
8,637 
Percentage of 
applications 
1. 7% 
39.2% 
58.8% 
0.2 
1.6 
32.1 
7.1 
13.2 
3.4 
38.7 
3.5 
#11n fact, the numbers presented in all the tables are for bargaining units, 
not applications. On occasion, one application involves more than one 
bargaining unit; however, the difference is of no particular importance. 
#2Categorized as 'other' were 19 bargaining units, representing 0.2% of all 
applications. Due to rounding, the total does not add to 100.0% 
#3The construction industry was excluded from the study. 
#4Agriculture workers are specifically excluded from the Labour Relations Act. 
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Of the over 100 unions organizing in Ontario, only 7 filed more than 300 
applications in the period under study, 8 if the independent employee 
associations are counted as one. The most active unions, not surprisingly. 
included those whose jurisdictions take in the community, business and personal 
services industry and health and welfare in particular: the Canadian Union of 
Public Employees (CUPE) , the Service Employees International Union (SEIU), and 
the Ontario Nurses Association (ONA). These unions were also the most 
successful in bringing their newly organized workers under collective 
agreements. Overall, only 58.6 per cent of newly organized unions won 
recognition (that is, were certified and negotiated a collective agreement), 
whereas newly organized unions affiliated with CUPE were recognized for 71.5 
per cent of the 1,101 bargaining units for which applications were made and of 
the 682 applications filed by the SEIU, 70.4 per cent were recognized. Even 
more successful was the ONA which won certification and collective agreements 
for 91.1 per cent of the 402 groups for which bargaining rights were sought. 
Outside of the tertiary sector, the unions most active in organizing were 
those which claim to be general unions: the International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters, the United Steel Workers of America (USWA), and the Labourers 
International Union. Of the three, only the USWA was able to win recognition 
for more than half of its newly organized unions: 299 agreements (55.9 per 
cent) were signed out of the 535 applications for certification filed with the 
Board. The Teamsters Union was much less successful, covering only 383 (47.2 
per cent) of its 812 bargaining units with agreements; the Labourers fared 
worse still, bringing 143 (42.1 per cent) out of the 340 it sought to represent 
under agreement. Also in the group of most active organizers was the Canadian 
19 
Food & Allied Workers {CFAW).j The CFAW had slightly better than average 
success, negotiating collective agreements for 61.6 per cent of the unions it 
organized. Employee associations, on the other hand, won recognition for only 
141 (39.5 per cent) of the 357 bargaining units they sought to represent. 
The pattern of applications by bargaining unit type during the 1970s 
reflected the fact that collective bargaining in the private sector, whether in 
the goods or service prodUCing industries, remained a predominantly blue-collar 
phenomenon. Over two-thirds of the applications disposed of by the OLRB 
involved bargaining units of manual employees. Only one in four unions was 
seeking bargaining rights for white-collar workers, that is, office and 
clerical, technical, professional, or mixed groups. Sales units accounted for 
just over 6 per cent of the total. Other groups -- security guards, dependent 
contractors, and 'tag end' units--accounted for fewer than 2 per cent of the 
applications. 
None of the occupational groups was appreciably more or less likely 
to achieve certification or negotiate a collective agreement. Unions 
representing white-collar units were somewhat more successful than 
average in winning certification while unions representing manual and 
sales employees were somewhat less so, but the conclusion is based on 
incomplete data. Because information on bargaining unit type was missing 
for those applications dismissed or withdrawn before the bargaining unit 
was determined by the Labour Relations Board, certification rates cannot 
be accurately calculated. More reliable were the data on first 
agreements and from these it was evident that certified unions 
representing white-collar employees were most successful in negotiating 
jNow part of the United Food and Commercial Workers International Union. 
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agreements while those representing blue-collar and sales workers were 
less so. 
Table 1.2: Industrial Distribution of Bargaining Units Certified and 
with Collective Agreements 
Fiscal Years 1970-71 to 1981-82 
Number of Units Percentage of Number of Units Percentage 
Certified Certified Units with Agreements units ..... ·i th 
Agreements 
.ry Sector 88 1.5% 71 1. 4~~ 
'orestry 11 0.2 9 0.2 
lining 77 1.3 62 1.2 
ldar~ Sector 2,223 37.2% 1,764 35.1% 
lanufacturing 1,819 30.4 1,444 28.7 
'ransporta tion 
lI1d Utilities 404 6.8 320 6.4 
.ar~ Sector 3,665 61.3%#1 3,196 63.5% 
'rade 803 13.4 624 12.4 
'inance, etc. 170 2.8 125 2.5 
:ervices 2,446 40.9 2,226 44.2 
'ublic 
,dminis tration 246 4.1 221 4.4 
'otal 5,981 100.0% 5,033 100.0% 
ntage may not add to 61.3 due to rounding. 
of 
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lble 1.3: Number of Certification Applications by Union and Rates of Success 
in Certification and Collective Bargaining 
Canadian Union 
of Public Employees 
International Brotherhood 
of Teamsters 
Service Employees 
International Union 
United Steel Workers 
of America 
Onto Nurses Association 
Canadian Food & 
Allied Workers 
Independent Employee 
Associations 
Labourers International 
Union 
All Unions 
Fiscal years 1970-71 to 1981-82 
Number 
of Applications 
1,101 
812 
682 
535 
402 
391 
357 
340 
8,637 
Percentage 
of bargaining 
units certified 
76.5% 
63.9 
74.6 
72.7 
92.5 
76.0 
44.5 
57.7 
69.3 
Percentage of 
certified 
units with 
agreements 
93.5% 
73.8 
94.3 
76.9 
98.4 
81.2 
88.7 
73.0 
84.6 
22 
Table 1.4: Distribution of Certification Applications by Bargaining Unit Type 
Fiscal Year 1970-71 to 1981-82 
Number of Percentage of 
applications applications 
Blue-collarLmanual 4,502 67.7% 
White-collar 1,641 24.7% 
Office and Clerical 422 6.3 
Technical 147 2.2 
Professional 522 7.9 
Mixed white-collar 550 8.3 
Sales 414 6.2% 
Other 93 1.4% 
Security guards 47 0.7 
Dependent contractors 30 0.5 
Tag end 16 0.2 
Total 6,650#1 100.0% 
#lInformation was not available for 1987 bargaining units, primarily because 
the applications were withdrawn or dismissed before the unit was described by 
the Board. 
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Table 1.5: Distribution of Bargaining Units Certified and with 
Collective Agreements by Bargaining Unit Type 
Fiscal Years 1970-71 to 1981-82 
Number Percentage Number 
of units of of units 
certified certified with 
units agreements 
Blue-CollarLmanual 4,022 67.3% 3,287 
White-collar 1,518 25.4% 1,389 
Office and clerical 381 6.4 345 
Technical 136 2.3 124 
Professional 502 8.4 487 
Mixed white-collar 499 8.3 433 
Sales 355 5.9% 285 
Other 83 1.4% 70 
Security guards 40 9·7 35 
Dependent 24 contractors 30 0.5 
Tag end 13 0.2 11 
Total 5,978#1 100.1%#2 5,031#3 
#1Information was missing for 3 bargaining units. 
#2Percentage may not add to 100.0 due to rounding. 
#3Information was not available for 2 bargaining units. 
#4Percentage may not total 27.6 due to rounding. 
Percentage 
of units 
with 
agreements 
65.3% I 
27 . 6~~# 4 
6.9 
2.5 
9.7 I 
8.6 
5.7% 
1.4% 
0.7 
0.5 
0.2 
100.0% 
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Full-time groups were the majority seeking certification. Cnions of 
full-time workers represented 85.6 per cent of the applications filed 
with the OLRB, 85.5 per cent of the unions granted certification. and 
84.5 per cent of certified unions that negotiated collective agreements. 
Unions composed wholly or partially of part-time employees made up the 
balance. From the data (which were incomplete), the likelihood of 
certification appeared to be evenly balanced between unions representing 
full-time and part-time employees. On the other hand. unions of part-
time, or mixed full- and part-time, workers were somewhat more successful 
in negotiating collective agreements than were unions of full-time 
employees alone. 
Finally, the distribution of applications by size of bargaining unit 
described the marked degree to which organizing was concentrated among 
small groups. Over three-quarters of the units for which data were 
available were smaller than 50 employees; almost one-third was smaller 
than 10. At the other extreme, units of 500 or more workers numbered 
only 42 over the period of the study. Fortunately for unions, small 
groups were more likely to be granted certifications than larger groups, 
although these data were also incomplete. While the proportion of unions 
seeking bargaining rights for units smaller than 50 was 78.9 per cent. 
82.1 per cent of the unions granted certification were in this category. 
In bargaining, however, the experience was reversed. The very smallest 
unions, those representing fewer than 10 employees, were least likely to 
sign collective agreements, whereas unions certified as bargaining agents 
for units of 100 or more workers had above average success in bargaining. 
Overall, however. success in certification appeared to weigh 
PAGE NUMBERING AS IN THE 
ORIGINAL THESIS 
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Table 1.8: Distribution of Certification Applications by Bargaining Unit Siz 
Fiscal years 1970-71 to 1981-82 
Number of Percentage of 
Applications of Applications 
Fewer than 
10 employees 2.443 31.2% 
10 - 49 3.734 47.7% 
50 - 99 981 12.5% 
100 
- 499 630 8.0% 
500 or more 42 0.6% 
Total 7.830#1 100.0% 
#1Data for 807 bargaining units were missing. 
Table 1.9: Distribution of Bargaining Units Certified and with Collective 
Agreements by Bargaining Unit Size 
Fiscal Years 1971-72 to 1981-82 
Number Percentage Number Percentage 
of of of of 
units certified units with units with 
certified units agreements agreements 
Fewer than 
10 employees 2.020 33.8% 1.594 31. 7% 
10 - 49 2.889 48.3% 2.450 48.7% 
50 - 99 674 11.3% 615 12.2% 
100 - 499 375 6.3% 352 7.0% 
500 or more 23 0.4% 22 0.4% 
Total 5.981 100.1%#1 5.033 100.0% 
"lPercentages may not add to 100.0 due to rounding. 
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more heavily. For unions representing 50 or more employees, the greater 
likelihood of negotiating collective agreements was not sufficient to 
offset the lower likelihood of winning certification. 
Unions can be encouraged that organizing in Ontario during the 1970s 
reflected the shift in economic activity away from the production of 
goods towards the provision of services. Non-union workers were most 
likely to be found in the tertiary sector and this was where organizing 
activity was concentrated. Equally encouraging was the predominance of 
smaller groups among those seeking recognition, for, to the extent that 
small bargaining units were found in small establishments, this was where 
union density was lowest. On closer inspection, however, the experience 
of the 1970s was not so reassuring. Two-thirds of the tertiary sector 
applications were concentrated in the community, business, and personal 
services industry and two-thirds of those were for workers in public 
employment, mainly health-care. Organizing success in the private, 
tertiary sector industries was much less propitious. Fewer than one in 
four applications were for workers employed in retail or wholesale trade, 
in finance, insurance, or real estate, or in private sector services--
industries where union density was especially low. Equally worrying from 
the labour movement's point of view was the small proportion of unions 
seeking certification for units of white-collar workers. Only 24.7 per 
cent of the applications filed during the 1970s were for clerical, 
technical, or professional employees and only 6.2 per cent were for sales 
personnel. Also of concern was the relatively small number of 
certification applications for part-time workers: less than 15.0 per cent 
of the total. Disturbing, as well, was the low overall rate of success. 
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For every ten unions seeking certification, only six achieved 
recognition: three were denied bargaining rights and the fourth, though 
certified, failed to negotiate a collective agreement. 
Organization of the Thesis 
The thesis is organized into four parts: Introduction (Chapters 1 
and 2), Certification and Collective Bargaining (Chapters 3 and 4), 
Bargaining Structure and Bargaining Power (Chapters 5, 6, and 7), and 
Conclusion (Chapter 8). Chapter 1 discusses the use of the law to 
encourage the growth of unions, describes the methodology and data base 
of the study, and examines the progress of organizing in Ontario during 
the 1970s. Chapter 2 examines the historical relationship between labour 
law and union growth in Canada, firstly, by describing the Labour 
Relations Act and its evolution. The second and third sections of the 
chapter attempt to analyze the effect of the law on the growth of unions 
in the private and public sectors, respectively. 
The objective of Part II is to determine whether the certification 
procedure itself affects the likelihood that a union will win bargaining 
rights and negotiate a collective agreement. The two chapters, 
'Certification' (Chapter 3) and 'Unfair Labour Practices' (Chapter 4), 
discuss, in turn, the rules and procedures regarding certification in 
Ontario and the law of unfair labour practices as interpreted and applied 
by the Ontario Labour Relations Board, including the Board's efforts to 
remedy contraventions of the Act. The data on the outcome of 
certification and collective bargaining are used to analyze the extent to 
which certain features of the process--namely, the time required to 
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process applications, anti-union petitions, and unfair labour practice 
complaints--are associated with the likelihood that certification would 
be granted and, for certified unions, the likelihood that a collective 
agreement would be negotiated. It is argued that the certification 
procedure is unnecessarily complex and offers employers too many 
opportunities, legitimate and illegitimate, to interfere with and disrupt 
organizing drives. 
Part III focuses on the bargaining process and attempts to broaden 
the analysis by examining the link between the law and bargaining power. 
Chapter 5, entitled 'Bargaining Units and Bargaining Structure', reviews 
the OLRB's notion of an appropriate bargaining unit and its relationship 
in law to bargaining structure. The conclusion argues that the small, 
fragmented units for which unions are certified are not an especially 
stable foundation for collective bargaining, particularly in the tertiary 
sector. Chapter 6, 'Bargaining Tactics', discusses how the law shapes 
the bargaining power of the parties by regulating strikes and picketing. 
The narrowly circumscribed power of workers and unions is contrasted with 
the broad resources available to employers. The last chapter in Part 
III, 'The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith', examines the OLRB's standard of 
good faith. The fact that hard bargaining is accepted as lawful is 
considered in light of the legal constraints imposed on the bargaining 
power of unions. 
Part IV concludes the thesis by discussing the extent to which 
labour law has been, and continues to be, a critical factor in 
encouraging or impeding the growth of unions, especially now that 
unorganized workers are concentrated in the trade, finance, and services 
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industries. Proposals for change are advanced based on the conclusions 
that the law affords employers too many opportunities to intervene and 
undermine employees' support for collective bargaining during the 
certification process and that there is a structural imbalance in 
bargaining power between labour and management institutionalized by the 
law. 
Conclusion 
Limits to growth in other sectors of the economy have made the 
extension of collective bargaining to the tertiary sector the most 
pressing task for Canadian unions. And while organizing during the 1970s 
was not particularly effective in the industries or occupations where 
union density was lowest, there were, nevertheless, many hopeful signs. 
The bulk of the certification applications filed with the Ontario Labour 
Relations Board were for workers in the community, business and personal 
services industry where many women, clerical, and part-time workers were 
employed. And most of the applications were for small bargaining units. 
Thus, even though unions have found these groups hard to recruit in the 
past, the experience of the 1970s suggests that they are neither innately 
anti-union nor totally willing to put up with the low wages and poor 
working conditions characteristic of jobs in the tertiary sector. 
What role the law should play in encouraging the extension of union 
representation to these groups is a matter of considerable controversy, 
however. Although Canadian employers appear willing to accept unionism 
within its current confines, they are resisting the extension of 
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collective bargaining to the tertiary sector and are adamantly opposed to 
initiatives which alter the balance of power in favour of labour. 
In the United States, the debate over the role of the law is both 
broader and more acrimonious than in Canada because labour's predicament 
is far more acute. Union membership has been falling absolutely and 
proportionately for many years, primarily as a result of the growing 
hostility of American employers to collective bargaining. And while the 
law is blamed for giving anti-union employers many opportunities to delay 
and defeat organizing drives unfairly and for failing to deter anti-union 
conduct, there are few hopes of reform. 
Hostility to collective bargaining is increasingly evident in the 
United Kingdom as well. A sharp decline in the number of industrial 
workers has cut deeply into union membership at a time when the legal 
framework that has supported union activity since the turn of the century 
is being radically altered. The erosion of the traditional structure of 
trade-union immunities underlines the importance of the law in advancing 
the cause of unions and has aroused interest in a legal regime which 
offers workers positive rights. 
In a limited way, the Canadian recognition procedure is being 
considered as a model for labour law reform in both the United States and 
the United Kingdom. From the American perspective, there is little that 
is strange about Canadian labour law. It is cut from the same fabric of 
certification, duty to bargain in good faith, and prohibition of unfair 
labour practices, yet seems to work much more effectively. The critical 
difference is thought to be the general (though not universal) reliance 
of labour boards on membership cards rather than representation votes to 
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certify unions. This procedural device is said to deflect anti-union 
conduct so explains the higher level of union membership in Canada. From 
the British perspective, the Canadian legal system is entirely foreign, 
but for those who advocate a shift away from the traditional immunities 
towards a system of statutory rights, Canada offers a comforting contrast 
to the United States. If Canadian unions can flourish within a scheme of 
positive rights then the dim prospects facing American unions cannot be 
entirely ascribed to an inevitable 'legislative snare' (Hart, 1978); 
indeed, it simply highlights the importance of choosing the right 
procedure. 
Any transferring of procedures from place to place should be done 
cautiously and with full knowledge of shortcomings as well as strengths. 
Certainly, the Canadian scheme has much to recommend it. Certification 
in Canada is vastly more effective than in the United States. Rates of 
success are much higher while the time required to process applications 
is considerably lower. The level of employer interference, though far 
from insignificant, is also substantially lower in Canada. Whether all 
of these differences are attributable to the law alone is, of course, 
highly unlikely; furthermore, the recognition procedure must be seen for 
what it is: one part of a legal regime that is highly restrictive for 
unions and workers. Canadian labour law was not inspired by 
philosophical pluralism or any desire to encourage the growth of unions 
but primarily as a measure to control industrial conflict, a purpose that 
is evident from the structure and effect of the law as a whole. 
By shaping bargaining structure and regulating bargaining tactics, 
Canadian labour law tilts the balance of power in favour of management. 
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Certification is easily circumvented because small, fragmented unions are 
commonly pitted against large, powerful corporations. On the one hand, 
the law favours single-establishment bargaining units and precludes 
virtually all forms of sympathetic activity, yet, on the other, does 
nothing to prevent employers from using their superior bargaining power 
to frustrate the bargaining process. Taken as a whole, therefore, the 
law tends to block rather than promote the growth of unions in the 
unorganized sectors of the economy, despite a relativsly efficient 
certification procedure. 
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Legal References 
1. R.S.O. 1980, c.224, as amended. 
Chapter 2 
LABOUR LAW AND UNION GROWTH 
Labour law and policy have been accorded a decisive role in the 
growth of unions in Canada. The small size of the trade union movement 
prior to the 1940s has been largely attributed to the government's 
reluctance to require employers to recognize and bargain with unions 
while the rapid growth of union membership among industrial workers 
during and immediately after World War II has been linked to the policy 
of compulsory collective bargaining adopted in 1944. In the public 
sector as well, the law has played a central role. The quick pace of 
union growth among public sector workers during the 1960s and 1970s 
coincided with a series of statutes which recognized for the first time 
the right of government employees to bargain collectively. 
But whether changes in the law caused unions to grow is a conclusion 
that demands further examination. Certainly, encouraging the growth of 
unions has not been the government's specific intention. Since the turn 
of the century, the over-riding purpose of labour relations policy has 
been the maintenance of industrial peace and any expansion of workers' 
rights has been granted with this objective in mind. Thus, the policy of 
compulsory collective bargaining introduced in 1944 was not the choice of 
a government motivated by philosophical pluralism but a concession 
wrenched from a government besieged on both the industrial and political 
fronts. Only when an increasingly restive workforce threatened to 
disrupt the production of war material did the government act, and then 
in a most begrudging manner. 
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The over-arching concern for minimizing industrial conflict has been 
evident in post-war legislation as well. Although the provinces ha\-e had 
the authority to pursue their own labour relations policies, they have 
chosen to adopt the framework of certification, duty to bargain in good 
faith, prohibition of unfair labour practices, and constraints on the 
right to strike introduced by the federal government. Public sector 
legislation has also followed this pattern, with a critical difference: 
in most jurisdictions, most public sector workers are .classified as 
essential and may not strike at any time. 
Chapter 2 describes the evolution of labour relations policy in 
Canada with particular regard to Ontario. The first section outlines the 
framework of labour law in Ontario today, focusing on the Labour 
Relations Act.! The second and third sections examine the growth of 
unions in the private and public sectors respectively with emphasis on 
the role of the law. The final section considers the econometric evidence 
which links the law to union growth in Canada and elsewhere and re-
evaluates the experience of the 1940s. 
Labour Law in Ontario 
Certification is the only certain route to union representation in 
Ontario: voluntary recognition is possible, but seldom granted outside 
of the construction industry. Thus, for the vast majority of workers in 
private-sector employment, the recognition process begins when an 
application for certification is filed on their behalf with the Ontario 
Labour Relations Board. Representation rights are granted on the basis 
of majority membership in defined bargaining units. In Ontario, the 
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Labour Relations Act provides that certification may be granted outright, 
that is, without a representation vote, if a union has, as members. more 
than 55 per cent of the employees in a unit that is appropriate for 
collective bargaining. If a union falls short of the level required for 
outright certification, the Board will order a representation vote if 
membership is 45 per cent or more, in which case certification will be 
granted if more than 50 per cent of the ballots cast favour union 
representation. If the union's membership support is less than 45 per 
cent, its application is dismissed without a vote. Alternatively, a 
union may apply for a pre-hearing vote, in which case a representation 
vote is held within ten days and certification granted if a majority of 
the ballots cast favour the union. 2 The Act also provides for the 
termination of bargaining rights8 . 3 
A certified union is the exclusive bargaining agent for all of the 
employees in the bargaining unit and its rights are protected. No rival 
application for certification, and no application for termination of 
bargaining rights, is timely for one year from the date of certification, 
and then only after the expiration of the conciliation process. In the 
event of a strike or lock-out, no application for certification or 
termination is timely until six months have elapsed or until seven months 
following the expiration of the conciliation process, whichever occurs 
first. And once an agreement is signed, a union's representation rights 
are protected until the commencement of the two-month 'open-period' prior 
to the expiration of its collective agreement. 4 
8The termination process is called decertification. 
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Certification is no more than the necessary first step, however: no 
more than a 'legal licence to bargain' (Weiler, 1980:48). A union's, 
bargaining rights are fragile until cemented in a collective agreement. 
In Canada, the agreement is both the purpose and the extent of collective 
bargaining. Typically, it is a lengthy document describing in detail the 
terms and conditions of employment to which all concerned--the union, the 
employer, and the workers--are bound by law. 5 The agreement constitutes 
the outer boundary of workers' rights. Management, by contrast, retains 
its broad, common law rights except as expressly limited by the 
collective agreement (Palmer, 1983:589-591). 
Unfair labour practices, most importantly dismissal of and 
discrimination against union members and supporters, are prohibited by 
the Labour Relations Act. Intimidation or coercion of employees seeking 
to exercise their rights under the Act and interference with the 
formation, selectiop, or administration of a union are unlawful. It is 
also an unfair labour practice for an employer to alter wages, or any 
other term or condition of employment, or any right, privilege or duty of 
employees, without the consent of the union, once the Board has notified 
the employer of an application for certification. 6 ,b,7 The Act gives the 
OLRB broad authority to inquire into and remedy unfair labour practices. 
In the event of a complaint, a labour relations officer is assigned to 
mediate and attempt to resolve the dispute by agreement of the parties. 
If the informal process fails, the matter is heard by a panel of the 
bThe Act also proscribes unfair labour practices committed by trade 
unions: intimidation or coercion of employees exercising their right not 
to join a trade union and failure to comply with the duty of fair 
representation. 7 
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Board. To remedy unfair practices, the OLRB has the power to determine 
what, if anything, an employer, union, or person(s) shall do, or refrain 
from doing, including the reinstatement, with or without compensation, of 
an employee dismissed in violation of the Act. Orders of the Board are 
enforceable as decisions of the Supreme Court of Ontario when filed with 
the court's registrar. 8 In extraordinary circumstances, the Ontario 
Board is specifically empowered to certify a union without a 
representation vote, notwithstanding the fact that membership is below 
the level required for outright certification. If the Board finds that 
an employer has violated the law and intimidated workers to the extent 
that a representation vote would not be a true expression of their 
wishes, it may certify the union provided that it has membership support 
sufficient for collective bargaining. 9 ,cl0 
By contrast with the certification process, there is a marked 
absence of procedural requirements in the Labour Relations Act respecting 
collective bargaining. Once the union has notified the employer of its 
desire to negotiate, the parties are obliged to meed within fifteen days, 
bargain in good faith, and make every reasonable effort to make a 
collective agreement. 11 What the law does regulate in considerable 
detail is the use of sanctions. Where the Act provides procedures, they 
must be followed. It is unlawful, therefore, for a union to strike for 
recognition: the certification process is provided for that purpose. 
Similarly, it is unlawful to strike during the term of a collective 
CEquivalently, if the Board finds that a union has harassed or 
intimidated workers into signing membership cards, or submitted 
fraudulent membership evidence, or discriminated against any person on 
the grounds of race, creed, colour, nationality, ancestry, age, sex, or 
place of origin, bargaining rights will be terminated or withheld. 10 
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agreement: the Act requires the parties to submit their disputes over 
the interpretation, administration, application, or alleged violation of 
an agreement to final and finding arbitration. d And, once the agreement 
has expired it is unlawful to strike before the exhaustion of the 
conciliation process, including a one or two-week 'cooling-off' period. 
And finally, it is unlawful to threaten an unlawful strike or to do 
anything, the probable and reasonable consequence of which would be to 
cause another person to engage in an unlawful strike. Excepted are acts 
done in conjunction with a lawful strike. 12 
Conciliation is a two-stage procedure in Ontario: officer and board. 
A work stoppage is unlawful until both have reported and seven days have 
elapsed from the release of the board's report or fourteen days have 
elapsed from the date on which the parties are notified that the Minister 
of Labour does not consider it advisable to appoint a board. e The Act 
also provides for a myriad of other forms of third-party intervention, 
any of which may be assigned at the discretion of the Minister, usually 
with the agreement of the parties: a mediator, a special officer, an 
industrial inquiry commission, or a disputes advisory committee. In all 
cases, the appointees are empowered to offer recommendations which the 
parties are free to accept or reject. The parties may also agree to 
refer a dispute to arbitration,f in which case the decision of the 
arbitrator is final and binding. Also final and binding are the terms 
dThe fact that the prohibition is broader than the range of 
potential disputes is a source of constant frustration (not to mention 
illegal strikes) for workers and unions. 
eThe 'no-board' option is the most common nowadays. 
fThis option is very seldom used. 
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and conditions of employment imposed to settle a first-agreement dispute. 
A recent amendment to the Ontario Act permits the OLRB to order 
arbitration if it finds that bargaining has been unsuccessful because of 
the refusal of the employer to recognize the union, either party has 
adopted an uncompromising position without reasonable cause or failed to 
make expeditious efforts to conclude an agreement, or any other reason 
the Board considers relevant.!3 
The Labour Relations Act says little about the conduct of strikes 
and nothing at all about picketing. Neither a strike vote nor a 
ratification vote is required in Ontario, but the Minister may direct, 
and an employer may request, a vote on the employer's last offer 
respecting the matters remaining in dispute. g And, whenever a vote is 
held, it must be a secret ballot; furthermore, all employees in the 
bargaining unit are eligible to participate, whether or not they are 
members of the union, and must be given ample opportunity to do SO.14 
Traditionally, the courts, not the OLRB, have regulated picketing. 
And even though peaceful picketing for the purpose of communicating 
information is permitted under the Criminal Code, judges have been quick 
to see conspiracies to injure and other tortious behaviour. More 
recently, the Ontario Board has sought to embrace picketing within its 
jurisdiction by asserting its authority to order the parties to cease and 
desist from conduct that is likely to result in an unlawful strike 
(Adams, 1985:653-4). 
When a collective agreement is made, the law requires that it 
contains certain provisions: the union must be recognized as the 
gThe employer is limited to one request per bargaining round. 
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exclusive bargaining agent of the employees in the bargaining unit; 
strikes and lock-outs during the lifetime of the agreement must be 
prohibited; there must be a procedure for the final and binding 
settlement by arbitration of disputes over the interpretation, 
application, administration, or alleged violation of the agreement; and, 
at the union's request, the agreement must provide for the deduction of 
union dues, or an amount equivalent to union dues, from the pay cheques 
of all of the employees in the bargaining unit, whether or not they are 
members of the union, and the remittance of the money to the union.h.15 
In addition, every collective agreement must be for a fixed term and at 
least one year in length. Union shop clauses are expressly permitted 
(although not when the union has been voluntarily recognized and has not 
demonstrated that its membership exceeded 55 per cent of the employees in 
the bargaining unit at the time of recognition); however, the Act 
precludes the use of compulsory membership clauses for requiring the 
dismissal of an employee who has been expelled, suspended from, or denied 
membership in a union for the reason that the person was or is a member 
of another union, has engaged in activity against the union or on behalf 
of another union, has engaged in reasonable dissent within the union, has 
been discriminated against, or has refused to pay unreasonable dues or 
assessments. 16 
The Ontario Labour Relations Board has the exclusive jurisdiction to 
exercise the powers conferred on it by the Labour Relations Act and to 
determine all questions of fact or law that arise in any matter before 
hExemption is granted to bona fide religious objectors. A person 
granted exemption by the Board is required to send an amount equivalent 
to dues to an agreed-upon charity.1 5 
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it. 17 The Board is tri-partite in composition and ordinarily sits in 
panels of three: the OLRB chairperson or a vice-chairperson with one 
representative from each of the two panels of members nominated by 
employer and union organizations. At present, there are 51 Board members 
including a chairperson, an alternate chairperson, and fourteen vice-
chairpersons, all but two of whom are legally trained (Ontario Labour 
Relations Board, Annual Report, 1985-86: 9-16). 
The Board's powers are broad. It is empowered to make its own rules 
and procedures18 and, in addition to adjudicating the 'cases which come 
before it, the OLRB is specifically empowered to attempt to settle 
disputes informally through mediation. 19 Its remedial jurisdiction is 
equally broad with a general authority to determine what, if anything, an 
employer, union or employees must do, or refrain from doing, and a 
specific power to issue cease and desist orders and directions, including 
directions to employers to reinstate employees with or without 
compensation. 20 Decisions of the Board are final and binding and 
enforceable as decisions of the Supreme Court of Ontario. 21 
Despite the OLRB's exclusive jurisdiction and a privative clause 
which purports to shield its awards from judicial reviewi , the courts 
have intervened and quashed its orders and directions. Defect of 
jurisdiction and error on the face of the record have been particularly 
fertile grounds for judicial intervention (Adams, 1985:159). Until the 
iSection 108 of the Labour Relations Act states that no decision, 
order, direction, declaration or ruling of the Board shall be questioned 
or reviewed in any court, and no order shall be made or process entered 
into, or proceedings taken in any court, whether by way of injunction, 
declaratory judgment, certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto or 
otherwise to question, review, prohibit or restrain the Board or any of 
its proceedings. 
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mid-1970s, however, the Supreme Court of Canada was far from systematic 
in its approach: if the court agreed with the Board's decision, it was 
considered not reviewable; if the court disagreed, the decision was 
reviewable and would be quashed (Weiler, 1971:33). So unencumbered by 
authoritative pronouncements were the lower courts that they intervened 
almost at will. 'The results grew to be so conflicting that 
authoritative commentators came to conclude that individual court 
decisions were of little practical importance and could be ignored' 
(Adams, 1985:157). 
Starting with CUPE, Local 963 v. New Brunswick Liquor Corp.22 in 
1973, the Supreme Court began to develop guidelines for review which took 
note of the specialized jurisdiction and accumulated experience of labour 
boards, recognizing, that is, their right to be wrong within the confines 
of their authority. Greater acceptance of the policy of compulsory 
collective bargaining by the courts and of the need for speed and 
finality in decision-making to make the policy effective have led to 
greater judicial deference. In the meantime, for its own protection, the 
Ontario Board, for one, has found it prudent to adopt elaborate rules and 
procedures, in part, to satisfy the judiciary's concept of natural 
justice (Finkelman, 1965). 
Although the overall framework of labour laws is similar throughout 
Canada the Labour Relations Act in Ontario differs somewhat from its 
counterparts in other jurisdictions. Depending on the place, a union 
needs as few as 25 or as many as 50 per cent of the employees in the 
bargaining unit as members before an application for certification will 
be entertained. Other jurisdictions also require different levels of 
membership support before certification is granted. Most of the acts 
permit a labour relations board to certify a union without a 
representation vote; however, the Nova Scotia and British Columbia 
statutes do not (Craig, 1986:129). Constraints on the right to strike 
are found in all jurisdictions. Most common is compulsory conciliation 
with a cooling-off period, but other prerequisites are the giving of 
notice or the taking of a strike vote, and all of the statutes provide a 
multiplicity of dispute-resolution techniques from conciliation to 
mediation, commissions, and arbitration (Adams, 1985:94-5). Several of 
the acts provide for first-agreement arbitration. Finally, all 
jurisdictions require every collective agreement to provide for the 
settlement of disputes over the interpretation, administration, or 
alleged violation of its terms without a work stoppage, generally by 
binding arbitration (ibid.:96). 
So many were the variations among the statutes that by the 1970s 
Woods (1973:347) thought it 'not misleading to refer to the British 
Columbia, the Ontario, or the Quebec system' of labour relations. Such 
diversity has been championed by some, abhorred by others. Although 
recognizing the complications, Weiler (1980:11) favoured the lack of 
uniformity which allowed the provinces to be 'laboratories for legal 
experimentation with our industrial relations ailments'. Woods 
(1973:362-3) and Jamieson (1973:134), contrariwise, thought that 
jurisdictional fragmentation blocked the evolution of structures that 
would lead to greater stability. Yet, viewed from a distance, the 
legislative diversity is more apparent than real. The essentials of the 
present-day system have been in place since the promulgation of PC 1003 
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in 1944. None of the jurisdictions strays far from the twin policies of 
certification and compulsory collective bargaining, on the one hand, and 
compulsory conciliation and delay of strikes, on the other. 
The Law and Union Growth: The Private Sector 
The Labour Relations Act in Ontario and its counterparts in other 
jurisdictions have as their common root Privy Council Order 1003. 
Proclaimed on 17 February, 1944, the Wartime Labour Relations 
Regulations protected the right to organizeJ by prohibiting employer 
interference with trade unions and requiring an employer to negotiate in 
good faith with a union or other bargaining representativesk acting for a 
majority of the employees. A national Wartime Labour Relations Board 
with provincial armsl,23 was created to determine questions of 
representation and other matters related to collective bargaining. The 
regulations also provided for the appointment of conciliation officers 
and boards to investigate and attempt to settle disputes. Strikes and 
lock-outs were prohibited during the lifetime of a collective agreement 
and until 14 days after a conciliation board had submitted its report to 
the Minister of Labour (Canada, Department of Labour, 1945:13). 
JpC 1003 did not affect provincial and federal government employers, 
however; only in Saskatchewan was the right to organize extended to 
employees of the Crown. Unionism among government employees was not 
possible under the law until a series of special statutes was enacted 
beginning in the mid-1960s. 
kThe war-time regulations certified individuals, not a union, as the 
workers' bargaining agent--a novelty without merit, in Laskin's 
(1948:785) opinion. 
IThe Ontario Relations Board was first established by the Labour 
Relations Board Act23 (Finkelman, 1965:3). 
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After World War II labour relations reverted to provincial 
jurisdiction where responsibility had rested since 1925. The right of 
the federal government to act on labour matters had been challenged two 
years earlier by the Toronto Electric Commission. The Commission's claim 
was initially rejected by the Canadian courts but accepted ultimately by 
the Judiciary Committee of the Privy Council in Great Britain which, 
until 1949, was Canada's highest court of appeal. In the Sniderffi· 24 
case, the British court ruled that the legislation in questionn was ultra 
vires because the federal government lacked the authority to legislate in 
matters of civil rights and private property. The British judges held 
that under the British North America Act responsibility for labour 
relations fell to the provincial governments with the exception of those 
industries operating within federal jurisdiction: railways, 
communications, shipping, defence, Crown corporations, chartered banks, 
and other industries operating in more than one province or of national 
importance. ° 
One result of the Snider decision was to create ten separate 
jurisdictions respecting labour relations: the nine provincesP plus that 
of the federal government. At first, the provinces chose to follow the 
lead of the federal government by enacting similar legislation. 'Within 
mToronto Electric Commissioners v. Snider. 24 
nThe Commission was challenging the appointment of a conciliation 
board under the Industrial Disputes Investigation Act of 1907. 
0The federal jurisdiction now encompasses a little more than 5 per 
cent of the non-agricultural labour force (Jamieson, 1973:124). 
PThe nine provinces became ten in 1949 with the induction of 
Newfoundland into Canada. 
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seven years the whole country, with the exception of Prince Edward 
Island, had made the adjustments necessary to retain a uniform policy on 
dispute settlement across the nation', Woods (1973:24) reported. By the 
mid-1930s. however, the federal government's inaction on the most 
pressing matter of the day. union recognition. had led to provincial 
experimentation. The most comprehensive of these attempts to resolve the 
stand-off over recognition was Ontario's Collective Bargaining Act25 of 
1943 which foreshadowed PC 1003 in many respects. Other provinces had 
affirmed labour's right to organize in legislation earlier but had failed 
to provide a workable method of enforcement. But with the proclamation 
of Privy Council Order 1003 the federal government reasserted its 
leadership. Most of the provinces withdrew their alternative legislation 
and after the war enacted labour codes based on the PC 1003 model. In 
1947, the Ontario Labour Relations Board became independent of its 
federal counterpartq •26 and in 1950 completely separate provincial 
legislation. the Labour Relations Act,27 was enacted. 
PC 1003 and the policy of compulsory collective bargaining emerged 
in a period of intense social unrest in Canada. In sharp contrast with 
the deprivations of the depression years. the rough equality of the war-
time austerity seemed to many 'a demonstration of the real possibility of 
social justice in the post war world' (Creighton, 1976:77). In the 
meantime. however, reality was falling short of workers' rising 
expectations. Wages were frozen at their 1929 level {MacDowell, 
qBy The Labour Relations Act26 of 1948, an interim legal regime was 
established to bridge the gap between the termination of the federal 
government's jurisdiction over labour-management relations and the 
enactment of provincial legislation. 
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1982:65)r and employers remained adamantly opposed to collective 
bargaining. In 1943, one out of three union members was involved in a 
strike, a level of discontent unsurpassed except in 1919 and then only 
marginally (MacDowell, 1978:176). Politically, the unrest was manifested 
as a dramatic rise in the popularity of the leftist Co-operative 
Commonwealth Federation (CCF). The party took 34 seats in the Ontario 
election of that year, just four fewer than the government's 38. In 
September, the Canadian Congress of Labours declared the CCF, 'the 
political arm of labour', and the Gallop Poll reported that the party had 
won the support of 29 per cent of the electorate nationally compared with 
28 per cent for each of the Liberal and Progressive Conservative parties 
(Creighton, 1976:102). 
Union membership was growing rapidly. When Canada entered the war 
in 1939, membership was below its 1919-20 level and concentrated among 
craft and skilled workers. The thousands of unskilled workers in the 
manufacturing and resource industries were 'largely untouched by any form 
of legitimate employee organization' (Laskin, 1944: 780). But after a 
year of slow growth organizing proved highly successful: membership 
increased by 100,000 between 1940 and 1941, then by 116,000, 87,000, and 
59,000 in each of the following years, so that by 1944 the number of 
rWage guidelines (established by Privy Council Order 7440) were 
replaced in 1941 by a wage stabilization order (Privy Council Order 8253) 
administered by the National War Labour Board. 
sThe CCL was the labour federation of the newly formed industrial 
unions--the United Auto Workers, the United Steel Workers, the United 
Electrical Workers, etc.--affiliated with the Congress of Industrial 
Organizations (CIa) in the United States. In 1939, they were expelled 
from the Trade and Labour Congress at the behest of the American 
Federation of Labour (AFL). 
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union members stood at 724,000 or 24.3 per cent of the paid, non-
agricultural labour force. 
Table 2:1: Union Membership and Density in Canada, 1939 to 1949#1 
Union Union membership Union membership 
membership as a % of the as a % of the 
(thousands) civilian labour force paid, non-
agricultural 
labour force 
1939 359 7.7 17.3 
1940 362 7.9 16.3 
1941 462 10.3 18.0 
1942 578 12.7 20.6 
1943 665 14.6 22.7 
1944 724 15.9 24.3 
1945 711 15.7 24.2 
1946 832 17.1 27.9 
1947 912 18.4 29.1 
1948 978 19.4 30.3 
1949 1,006 19.3 29·5 
# 1 Canada. Department of Labour. 1972. Labour Organizations in Canada. 
Ottawa: Queen's Printer. 
These gains were made within a voluntaristic legal framework: 
workers were free to organize trade unions and employers were equally 
free to discriminate against them for doing so. True. an amendment to 
the Criminal Code in 1939 made it an offence for an employer to refuse to 
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employ or to dismiss any person on the sole ground of union membership, 
or to discourage union membership through intimidation or by threatening 
or causing loss of position or employment,28 but as the offence was a 
criminal one requiring prosecution by the Crown few employers were 
brought before magistrates. And those that were, faced risible fines. 
SOCiety Brand Clothes, for example, was charged with six counts of 
unlawful dismissal in 1942 and fined of $50 on each count. 29 The 
workers, meanwhile, were left without jobs. Government policy, 
formulated in its 1940 'Declaration of Principles'3 0 was that employees 
should be free to organize independent trade unions and free to negotiate 
with management over terms and conditions of employment with a view to 
making collective agreements. But the 'prinCiples' were recommendations 
only. The federal government was prepared to encourage, but not to 
compel, employers to recognize and bargain with trade unions (Woods, 
1973:71-2). 
The only policy formulated in law at the start of the war was the 
Industrial Disputes Investigations Act. 31 Enacted in the wake of a 
potentially disastrous strike of coal miners in Alberta during the winter 
of 1906, the IDIA initially had the character of emergency legislation. 
The policy combined two principles: compulsory conciliation of disputes 
by tri-partite boards and the suspension of strikes and lock-outs until 
after the conciliation process was completed and a further waiting period 
had elapsed. Conciliation was made compulsory chiefly because experience 
with the Conciliation Act32 of 1900 had demonstrated the limitations of 
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voluntarism. The earlier legislation empowered the minister t to inquire 
into a dispute, arrange a conference between the parties, and appoint a 
conciliator or board of conciliation at the request of either labour or 
management. U In Woods' (ibid.:50-1) opinion, the Conciliation Act failed 
because it required mutuality. A conciliator might be appointed on 
labour's request but the employer was free to refuse to participate. 
From the employers' point of view, the joint machinery accorded unions 
greater recognition than most businessmen were prepared to concede. 
An element of compulsion was added to the conciliation process with 
the Railway Labour Disputes Act33 of 1903. As introduced, the bill would 
have imposed compulsory arbitration and a binding award; however, stiff 
opposition from organized labour resulted in a much reduced form of 
intervention. Babcock (1974:93-4) explained the critical role of the 
American Federation of Labour on this issue. Many Canadian unionists, 
particularly those in relatively weak unions, favoured compulsory 
arbitration along Australian lines. The AFL, however, feared that its 
adoption in Canada would lead to legislatively imposed compulsory 
arbitration in the United States so persuaded the Trades and Labour 
Congress to alter its policy of tentative support for compulsion. In any 
tOne section of the Conciliation Act created the Department of 
Labour as an appendage of the Post Office. In 1909, labour became a 
completely separate department; its first minister was William Lyon 
Mackenzie King (Craven, 1980:360). 
uOn the request of both parties, an arbitrator could also be appointed. 
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event, the scope of the statute and thus the use of compulsory 
conciliation was limited to the railways.v,3 4 
In 1907, the Industrial Disputes Investigation Act extended 
compulsory conciliation to disputes in the mining and public utilities 
industries but after the constitutionality of the Act was successfully 
challenged, it was redrafted to respect the ruling in the Snider case. 
After 1927, the scope of the IDIA35 was restricted to industries within 
federal jurisdiction, coverage that was simultaneously narrower, because 
industries such as mining were no longer covered, and broader, because 
all industries in the federal jurisdiction and not just 'essential' 
industries were embraced. In the process, the Act lost its emergency 
character and became a procedure of general application (Woods, 1973:24). 
Workers covered by the IDIA and its provincial counterpartsw ,3 6 had 
a limited right to strike. So long as their strike was timely, that is, 
after conciliation and the cooling-off period, unions were not liable for 
damages. For most workers, however, there was no such immunity. Outside 
of 'essential' industries, strikes were frequently enjoined on grounds of 
conspiracy. In Le Roi Mining Company v. Rossland Miners Union No.3837 • 
for example, the court copied the decision of English court in the Taff 
Vale38 case even though, Carrothers (1965:421) noted, the statute law on 
which the Taff Vale decision was founded did not apply in Canada. But 
Canadian judges were far from consistent in their views and no line of 
Vln 1906, the Conciliation Act and Railway Labour Disputes Act were 
joined to create the Conciliation and Labour Act3 4 . No new principles 
were introduced at this time. 
WThe lOlA principles were applied to mines, railways, and public 
utilities within Ontario'S jurisdiction in 1932 with the passage of the 
Industrial Disputes Investigation Act. 36 
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reasoning prevailed. Some regarded strikes as unlawful per se while 
other were persuaded that workers had a right to strike. Consequently, 
decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada were 'remarkably lacking in 
direction' (ibid.:423) and remained so well into the post-war years. 
Whether workers could strike without incurring liability was anybody's 
guess. 
The policy of conciliation and strike delay was the federal 
government's only labour relations policy until well into World War II. 
In 1939, the lOlA was extended to all war-related industries39 under the 
auspices of the War Measures Act. 40 But with most of mining and 
manufacturing brought under federal jurisdiction, the demand for 
conciliation quickly out-stripped its supply. The government's response 
was to introduce another intermediary body, an industrial dispute inquiry 
commission,41 the function of which was to make a preliminary 
investigation of an industrial dispute, attempt to secure a settlement, 
and report back to the Minister of Labour with a recommendation 
respecting the advisability of appointing an lOlA-board (Webber, 
1985:66). Even so, the volume of strikes continued to grow. From 120 in 
1939, the number of new strikes rose each year to 401 in 1944. The 
central issue in dispute was union recognition. 
In typically Canadian fashion, the federal government responded to 
the symptom rather than the cause of the unrest. Instead of enforcing 
its 'Declaration of Principles', or even exhorting employers to accept 
the recommendations of its inquiry commissions and conciliation boards, 
the government sought to impose labour peace by erecting further legal 
barriers in the way of strikes. Yet another obstacle was added in 1941. 
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With Privy Council Order 7307, a supervised vote became a condition 
precedent to a lawful strike. Because the Minister of Labour determined 
the voting constituency and a union was required to win the support of a 
majority 
1939 
1940 
1941 
1942 
1943 
1944 
1945 
1946 
1947 
1948 
1949 
Table 2:2: Strike Activity in Canada' 1939 to 1949'1 
Number of strikes 
beginning during 
the year 
120 
166 
229 
352 
401 
195 
196 
223 
231 
147 
130 
Workers 
involved 
41,038 
60,619 
87,091 
113,916 
218,404 
75,290 
96,068 
138,914 
103,370 
42,820 
46,867 
% of estimated 
working time 
0.04 
0.04 
0.06 
0.12 
0.06 
0.19 
0.54 
0.27 
0.10 
0.11 
'lCanada Information Canada. 1975. Strikes and Lockouts in Canada. 
Ottawa: Information Canada. 
of those entitled to vote, the measure was detested by labour. In 
Canadian Forum, PC 7307 was criticized for imposing further delays 
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'without doing anything whatsoever to deal with the causes of strikes'x. 
In its attempt to avoid industrial strife and accelerate war 
production, the government failed to provide a coherent labour relations 
policy. The Industrial Disputes Investigation Act was demonstratably 
unsuited to deal with recognition disputes, a conclusion supported by 
Selekman's (1936) knowledgeable assessment of the Act from its inception 
to the mid-1930s. The emphasis was entirely accommodative--many times 
Selekman noted that the thrust of the conciliation effort was to take the 
parties as far along the path of collective bargaining as they could be 
persuaded to go--which meant that issues of 'principle' were especially 
troublesome. The parties were best served, Selekman concluded, when the 
issue in dispute was wages or some other term or condition of employment. 
Conciliation of recognition disputes was much less effective. When an 
employer could not be persuaded to recognize the union, the conciliation 
board generally recommended a compromise more on management's terms than 
the workers', in spite of frequent affirmations of the employees' right 
to a voice in determining wages and working conditions and to be 
represented by persons of their own choosing. None the less, the IDIA 
lent a limited legislative support to weak unions and this was sufficient 
to secure labour's approval in the pre-World War II years. Conversely, 
employers tolerated government intervention precisely because it was 
limited to essential industries in which the public had a legitimate 
interest in the promotion of labour-management harmony. But any 
xQuoted by Webber (1985:68). The strike-vote requirement was 
repealed after the introduction of PC 1003. 
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extension of the lDlA principles to other industries threatened to turn 
their compliance into hostility, Selekman (ibid.:23-6, 42-3) concluded. 
Labour's war-time experiences confirmed the inadequacy of compulsory 
conciliation for resolving recognition disputes. The failure of uranium 
miners in Kirkland Lake, Ontario, to win their strike for union 
recognition in 1941-2 highlighted the inherent unfairness of the system. 
Compulsory conciliation did not make a collective agreement inevitable, 
'nor did it establish an indefinitely continuing relationship between 
union and management' (Woods, 1973:73). The saga of delay and 
frustration culminating in apathy and defeat exposed the policy's 
deficiencies. Long delays led to few concessions from management while 
damaging the union's ability to sustain a strike. The intermediaries 
further aggravated workers by repeatedly attempting to secure a 
compromise on what they regarded as a non-negotiable issue. The ultimate 
betrayal was the government's failure to back up favourable 
recommendations of the commission appointed to inquire into the cause of 
the dispute and the conciliation board (Webber, 1985:70). The effect of 
the lDlA with its strict constraints on the right to strike was to 
nullify the advantage that the acute manpower shortages have given labour 
without providing any assurance that an employer would comply with 
recommendations that proposed union recognition. 
The policy's failure at Kirkland Lake 'began the march toward PC 
1003', said Logan (1948:547). The demand for legislation modelled after 
the Wagner Act south of the border united the leaders of an otherwise 
divided union movement in a common political purpose (MacDowell, 
1978:187). The results of the 1943 election, with a particularly strong 
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showing for the CCF among industrial workers, affirmed Prime Minister 
King's worst fears: it might even be 'the beginning of the end of the 
Liberal Party federally', he confided in his diaryY. Surrounded on the 
political as well as the industrial front the government was forced to 
act. 'It is sad but true', said Pentland (1979:19), 'that Canadian 
employers as a group--and Canadian governments--have never taken a 
forward step in industrial relations by intelligent choice, but have 
always had to be battered into it'. PC 1003 was not the product of 
government or employer enlightenment but was 'forced out of a most 
unwilling government and set of employers by the terrifying rise in time 
lost by industrial disputes in 1943'. 
In fact, PC 1003 exhibited little confidence in the process of 
collective bargaining. The form of the measure, an order-in-council, 
betrayed a government little interested in remodelling labour-management 
relations and only in securing labour's co-operation for the duration of 
the war. Equally, the tight constraints on the use of economic sanctions 
demonstrated little understanding of the role of strikes (or threats of 
strike) as an inducement to settle and totally ignored the fact that such 
constraints, no matter how even-handedly applied, reinforced the status 
quo by undercutting the bargaining power of labour. Warrian's (1986) 
conclusion was that the model of labour-management relations which 
underpinned PC 1003 was unitarist, not pluralist. 
The evidence for the war years suggests that while the policy of 
compulsory conciliation coupled with severe constraints on the right to 
strike may have stifled the growth of collective bargaining, it did not 
YQuoted by MacDowell (1978:193). 
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prevent the growth of union membership. Certainly, the years prior to 
the proclamation of PC 1003 were years of remarkable increases in 
membership. The number of unionists doubled within four years and union 
density increased by almost 50 per cent. But membership actually fell, 
from 724,000 to 711,000, between 1944 and 1945, the first year of the new 
policy. During the years immediately following the war, the pace of union 
growth remained strong: new recruits numbered 80,000 in 1946-7 and 65,000 
in 1947-8. Thereafter, however, the rate of increase was much slower. As 
a proportion of the paid, non-agricultural labour force, union membership 
peaked at one-third in 1954 then tapered off, hitting its post-war low of 
19.4 per cent ten years later. Between 1954 and 1964, the number of new 
trade unionists increased by only 225,000 (17.7 per cent) while the 
labour forcez grew by 1,320,000 (35.2 per cent) persons. 
During the 1950s, unions concentrated on the development of 
collective bargaining; organizing was a secondary consideration. The 
contours of the modern collective agreement were established and, in the 
process, momentous improvements in living standards achieved. Wages were 
increased substantially and retirement pensions introduced. Vacations 
with pay and medical insurance were also made available to working people 
for the first time. Although recruiting continued, the pace of growth 
slowed considerably. Unions had reached their 'temporary limits to 
growth', Jamieson (1957:27-8) concluded: 
Virtually all the workers that are organizable, in terms of 
present union techniques, finances, ideologies, and policies, 
have been enrolled. The two-thirds of paid workers who remain 
outside of union ranks represent primarily the employees of 
small or isolated enterprises, uneconomical to organize, and, 
ZThe paid, non-agricultural labour force that is. 
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far more important in the aggregate, the large and rapidly 
growing numbers of white-collar workers. 
Jamieson's prediction proved prescient. In the private sector, 
unions made only modest gains over the next thirty years. In 
manufacturing, for example, union density stood at 37.4 per cent in 1954 
and 44.4 per cent in 1981. In construction, the proportion of workers 
organized increased from 50.5 to 54.0 per cent over the same period and 
in forestry from 43.5 to 56.2 per cent. In some industries, union 
membership fell relative to total employment. In transportation, 
communications and utilities, a large industrial grouping, the proportion 
of workers organized dropped from 65.4 to 53.2 per cent. Similarly, in 
mines, quarries and oil wells membership fell from 50.0 to 35.5 per cent. 
Overall, union density in the primary sectoraa appears to have fallen 
from 47 per cent in 1954 to 40 per cent in 1981; concomitantly, there was 
a small increase in the level of membership in the secondary sector, from 
47 to 48 per cent. 
The tertiary sector, meanwhile, remained largely unorganized. 
Despite dramatic increases in employment--the trade, finance, and service 
industries accounted for 54 per cent of paid employment by 1981--union 
membership languished outside of the public sector. In wholesale and 
retail trade, for example, union membership is lower than one in ten 
while in finance, insurance, and real estate, the proportion of workers 
enrolled in trade unions is below one in thirty. Only in the services 
industry does membership exceed one in four, and then largely because 
union membership is extensive in the public sector employments of 
88Agriculture excluded. 
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teaching and health care. Union membership in the private, tertiary 
sector industries remains very low. 
The Law and Union Growth: The Public Sector 
For government employees, Privy Council Order 1003 offered no 
opportunity to unionize. Expressly excluded were 'His Majesty and any 
person or corporation acting for or on behalf or as an agent of His 
Table 2:3: Union Density in the Primary and Secondary Sectors, 
1954 and 1981 
1954#1 1981#2 
Primary Sector 46.6% 
Forestry 
Mines, quarries and oil wells 
Fishing 
Secondary Sector 47.1% 
Manufacturing 
Transportation, communication, 
and utilities 
Construction 
43.5 
50.0 
-0-#3 
37.4 
65.4#4 
50.5 
39.7% 
48.1% 
56.2 
35·5 
37.5 
44.4 
53·2 
54.0 
#l[E J K d K A h .] 1970 Union Growth in Canada, 1921-aton, .. an . s agr1e . . 
~. Ottawa: Department of Labour. 
#2Canada .Statistics Canada. 1983. Corporations and Labour Unions 
Returns Act, Report for 1981. Ottawa: Ministry of Supply and Services. 
#3Not available 
#4Estimated from data provided. 
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Majesty', although the employees of certain Crown agencies--the Canadian 
Broadcasting Corporation, the National Harbour Board, the Bank of Canada, 
and the Canadian National Railway System, for example (Finkelman and 
Goldenberg, 1983:25)--were permitted union representation. The rights 
and protections of the new law were also withheld from provincial 
government employees with the exception of Saskatchewan where the CCF 
government extended to its employees both the right to bargain 
collectively and the right to strike in 1944 (Arthurs, 1971:45). 
After the war, civil servants continued to be excluded from the general 
labour code. The Industrial Relations and Disputes Investigation 
Actbb ,42,43, for example, governed labour-management relations in firms 
falling within federal jurisdiction, Crown corporations, and some 
government agencies,cc but not of the federal government itself. The 
post-war labour codes of the provinces, apart from Saskatchewan's, also 
excluded government employees. In Ontario, civil servants were beyond 
the scope of the Labour Relations Act as were the employees of agencies 
such as the Workers' Compensation Board, the Niagara Parks Commission, 
the Ontario Housing Corporation, and the community colleges. On the 
bbThe IRDIA was the post-war equivalent of the Labour Relations Act 
in OntariO, and the predecessor of the Canada Labour Code. 42 
CCFinkelman and Goldenberg (1983:53) provided a partial list of the 
agenCies covered by the Canada Labour Code: Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd., 
Air Canada, Bank of Canada, Canadian Arsenals Ltd., Canadian Broadcasting 
Corporation, Canadian National Railways, Canadian Overseas 
Telecommunications Corporation, Canadian Wheat Board, Canada Mortgage and 
Housing Corporation, Eldorado Nuclear Ltd., Export Development 
Corporation, Farm Credit Corporation, Harbour Commissioners, National 
Arts Centre, National Harbour Board, Northern Transportation Co. Ltd., 
Petro-Canada Pilotage Authorities, Polysar Ltd., Royal Canadian Mint, , . 
St. Lawrence Seaway Authority, and most recently Canada Post Corporat10n. 
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other hand, labour relations in proprietary industries such as Ontario 
Hydro and the Toronto Transit Commission are governed by the general 
labour code (Adams, 1985:149). 
Even so, civil servants were not entirely without representation. A 
system of joint consultation dated from 1944 in the federal civil service 
when, under the combined pressures of inflation and labour shortages. the 
federal government was forced to formalize its earlier consultative 
initiatives. Privy Council Order 3676 established the National Joint 
Council of the Public Service of Canada on the model of the Whitley 
Councils in Great Britain. The change was sought after by the staff 
associations and initially they were very positive about joint 
consultation; however, Frankel (1960:371) wondered 'whether there could 
have been any meaningful jOint deliberation after the government had 
presented its own version in detail'. In practice, the system delivered 
something less than. envisioned: 
The scope of issues which were open to consultation proved 
narrower than the Staff Side initially believed. In 
particular, wages were deemed to be outside the jurisdiction of 
the council, forcing associations to submit periodic salary 
briefs directly to the government. No mechanisms were provided 
in the event the Staff Side and the Official Side could not 
reach agreement on a particular issue. Essentially, if the 
Official Side said 'no', there the matter rested, and the 
status quo prevailed. Staff associations also complained of 
excessive secrecy surrounding the council's deliberations. In 
certain cases, the Official Side would refuse to engage in 
meaningful discussion of an issue unless Staff Side 
representatives agreed not to divulge the contents and progress 
of the discussions. Such promises prevented staff 
associations' representatives from consulting even with their 
own constituents. Further, in the absence of the principle of 
exclusive representation, more than a dozen staff associations 
were represented on the council. The many associations often 
claimed similar jurisdictions and competed with one another. 
Thus, Staff Side representatives sometimes operated at cross-
purposes, weakening their ability to achieve objectives. 
Finally, in the last analysis. council decisions were only 
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advisory. The government retained the right to reject 
recommendations if it was so inclined. While council 
recommendations were usually implemented, their implementation 
sometimes followed lengthy delays, preliminary rejections, and 
content changes in the recommendations. This absence of 
guarantees and the uncertainty it fostered added to the 
dissatisfaction of Staff Side representatives (Ponak, 
1982:348-9). 
Over and over again, the government emphasized that the role of the 
National Joint Council was advisory only. Moreover, because the council 
reported to the Treasury Board, the cabinet, and the Public Service 
Commission, delays were inevitable while these three bodies consulted 
among themselves. Over two years were required to resolve the staff 
associations' request for the automatic deduction of dues from their 
members' pay-cheques because the council's recommendation was initially 
turned down by the Treasury Board (Frankel, 1960:373). On the council 
itself there was no mechanism for resolving deadlocks. Neither side 
could out-vote the other as recommendations had to be unanimous. Nor was 
there any provision for mediation or arbitration of issues in dispute. 
From the staff associations' point of view, the greatest weakness of 
the consultative mechanism was its vagueness with respect to wages and 
salaries. The government read out of the legislation any obligation to 
consult over wages, even though the council's mandate was to make 
recommendations respecting the 'general principles governing conditions 
of employment in the public service of Canada including among other 
conditions recruitment, training, hours of work, promotion, discipline. 
tenure, regular and overtime remuneration, health, welfare and 
seniority' .dd Recommendations on salary matters were restricted to 
ddQuoted by Frankel (1960:375-6). 
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general objectives with no mention of dollars and cents. The peripheral 
role of the council was made evident in 1952 when the staff side was 
'consulted' after the government had already decided on a salary 
increase. 'It is difficult to regard this as consultation in the sense 
envisaged in the idea of a joint council', Frankel (ibid.: 377) 
concluded. A further, important shortcoming of the consultative 
mechanism was the failure to establish joint councils at the departmental 
level to deal with day-to-day problems and individual grievances. On the 
official side, management resisted any attempt to cut down its 
traditional prerogatives while the staff side was chronically weak due to 
fragmentation and competition among the various associations. It was not 
uncommon for three or four staff associations to claim the right to 
represent the employees of one department (ibid.:382-3). 
By 1960, the questioning of the joint consultation mechanism 'had 
turned into a chorus of support for abandoning the NJC scheme and 
replacing it with collective bargaining' (Ponak, 1982:348). For the 
employee organizations, the continuing flaw in consultation was that, 
consult for as long as they might, it was the government that finally set 
the rates of pay and conditions of service. Government officials were 
not enamored with the process, either. It was a situation, they said, 
where the employee organizations consulted before and complained after 
(Armstrong, 1968:488). 
The experience with joint consultation was not much happier in the 
provinces. In Ontario, joint consultation had a stronger employee base 
than federally. Even though they could not be said to have had full 
collective bargaining rights, government employees in Ontario were 
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nevertheless protected from management's unilateral decision-making after 
1962 (Goldenberg, 1973:18). The joint council mechanism was empowered to 
make recommendations respecting working conditions, remuneration, leaves 
and hours of work. More importantly, every agreement was put in writing 
and implemented. And if no agreement were reached the minister could 
appoint a mediator and/or refer the matter to the Civil Service 
Arbitration Board for final and binding settlement. All the same, the 
system chafed. The staff side wanted to be free to appoint its own 
representatives. It also felt the arbitration mechanism was less than 
impartial and that the issues subject to consultation should be 
broadened. 
It was not until the mid-1960s that the legal constraints respecting 
collective bargaining in the civil service began to be lifted. As late 
as 1964, the Premier of Quebec could forestall the demand for collective 
bargaining by provincial employees by asserting, 'The Queen does not 
negotiate' .ee The next year, however, Quebec became the first of the 
provinces (apart from Saskatchewan) to permit its employees to organize. 
The federal government followed soon after, extending the right to 
bargain to its employees in 1967 with the Public Service Staff Relations 
Act. 44 Ontario's policy was revised in 1972. Employees, other than the 
employees of the community colleges, were given the right to organize 
under the Crown Employees Collective Bargaining Act45 and the Colleges 
Collective Bargaining Act46 was enacted the same year. By 1975, the 
transformation was complete: government employees in all the provinces 
had a protected right to organize and bargain collectively. 
eeQuoted by Ponak (1982:347). 
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Once disenchantment with the consultative mechanism set in, change 
came swiftly: 
Staff associations began switching from a position of 
opposition to collective bargaining to one of advocacy. At the 
same time, they began to model themselves along traditional 
union lines, excluding management personnel from membership, 
hiring full-time staff experts, eliminating no-strike clauses 
from their constitutions, merging with competing or 
complementary organizations, and in many cases affiliating with 
the Canada Labour Congress (Ponak, 1982:349). 
Organizing was immediately successful: 'unprecedented in its brevity'. 
The first applications for certification in the federal jurisdiction were 
filed a month after the proclamation of the new law (Armstrong, 1968:492) 
and virtually all of the federal civil service was organized within three 
years (Rose, 1984:97). Union density in the federal civil service is now 
in excess of 95 per cent of those eligible for collective bargaining and 
the 'same is probably true of most of the provinces and territories' 
(Finkelman and Goldenberg, 1983:3). 
For government employees, the link between the law and union growth 
seems self-evident. According to Craig (1986:256), 'favourable 
government legislation was the major catalyst in the phenomenal growth of 
unionization in the federal and provincial public sectors'. For other 
public sector employees, however, the connection is less obvious. 
Although collective bargaining in the public sector was the exception 
prior to 1965, many groups had had the right to organize for decades. 
Collective bargaining for fire fighters,ff,4 7 for example, dates from the 
1920s in Ontario (Adams, 1981a:147). Elementary and secondary school 
ffLabour-management relations in fire departments are governed by 
the Fire Departments Act. 46 
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teachersgg · 48 had been bargaining without legislative support from the 
1920s as well. Since 1947, municipalities in Ontario have been required 
to bargain in good faith with the representatives of police officershh.49 
although, in practice, bargaining was infrequent until the mid-1960s when 
the employee associations became strong enough to demand change 
(ibid.:141-2). Likewise, the employees of social welfare agencies, 
hospitals, universities, and libraries had been entitled to organize for 
over forty years but generally chose not to until the late 1960s. And 
finally, employees of municipal governments have long been covered by the 
general labour code in most provinces, although in Ontario local 
politicians had the option of exempting their municipalities from the 
Labour Relations Act until 1966 (Sack and Mitchell, 1983:52). 
Once the exception, collective bargaining is now the rule in the 
public sector. Today, 'it is very difficult to find public employees not 
covered by a collec,tive agreement' (Ponak, 1982:345). What is more, 
their organizing successes revitalized a stagnating union movement. 
Between 1964 and 1976, union membership in Canada doubled and continued 
to grow as the appetite for collective bargaining spread among public 
employees. Of the 1.6 million new members recruited between 1964 and 
1977. over 900,000 were the result of organizing in the civil service, 
schools and universities, hospitals and nursing homes. And of the two 
million new members recruited between 1961 and 1981. half were employed 
ggSince 1973, collective bargaining in Ontario's elementary and 
secondary schools has been regulated by the School Boards and Teachers 
Collective Negotiations Act. 47 
hhTbe statutory foundation for collective bargaining between police 
officers and their employers is provided by the Police Act. 48 
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in the public sector (Kumar, 1986:114, 115). Today, the level of union 
membership in the public sector far exceeds that of the private. 
The effect on the labour movement has been dramatic. By one 
estimate, almost one-half of all members are now employed in the public 
sector (Ponak, 1982:345); by another, two out of five union members are 
public employees (Kumar, 1986:115), even though public sector employment 
accounts for less than one-quarter of total employment (Bird, 1978:25). 
The gains have been most impressive among the historically hard-to-
organize: white-collar and female employees. Of the more than one-and-a-
half million members recruited between 1965 and 1984, almost a million 
were women and most of them were employed in the tertiary sector. By 
contrast, membership in the traditional union strongholds grew by 
slightly more than 300,000, eroding the leadership of the male-dominated, 
international unions. ii In 1974. the Canadian Union of Public Employees 
surpassed the United Steel Workers of America to become the largest union 
in the country. And in 1986, CUPE's past-president was elected president 
of the Canadian Labour Congress. 
But. like PC 1003. collective bargaining legislation in the public 
sector evidences little confidence in the bargaining process. Although a 
broader range of occupations including lower-level managers are generally 
permitted union representation. in most jurisdictions public sector 
workers have fewer rights than their private sector counterparts. In 
iiCalculated from data found in the following sources: Corporations 
and Labour Unions Returns Act. Report for 1965. Ottawa: Ministry of 
Industry and Tourism. Canada, Ministry of Industry and Tourism. 1968 
Corporations and Labour Union Returns Act, Repor~ f~r 1966. Ottawa: 
Ministry of Industry and Tourism. Canada. Stat1st1cs Canada. 1987. 
Corporations and Labour Unions Returns Act. Report for 1984. Ottawa: 
Ministry of Supply and Services. 
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half, the law designates the organization that the government is prepared 
to recognize as bargaining agent (Craig, 1986:272) and everywhere the 
range of negotiable issues is severely constrained. Under the federal 
code, for example, matters of demotion, promotion, appraisal, transfer, 
and superannuation are reserved exclusively for management. Similar 
restrictions are common in the provinces as well. Strikes of government 
employees are always unlawful in six provinces and it is the rare 
jurisdiction that permits police officers or fire fighters to engage in a 
lawful work stoppage. Strikes of hospital workers are commonly 
prohibited, and of teachers occasionally. The result is a peculiar 
amalgam that simultaneously encourages workers to expect the benefits of 
collective bargaining while frustrating their attempts to achieve them. 
Econometric Studies of Union Growth 
The importance of public policy and favourable legislation as 
sources of support for the growth of unions is widely acknowledged. The 
literature on the Wagner Act in the United States is voluminous and 
virtually unanimous in concluding that the New Deal legislation was vital 
to the emergence of collective bargaining in the mass-production 
industries. JJ And despite Britain's history of voluntarism, Bain 
(1970:181) concluded that the growth of white-collar unions in private 
industry came about, 'directly or indirectly, as a result of government 
policies and the favourable climate they created for trade unionism'. 
Similarly, legislative aid for trade unionism and collective bargaining 
JJSee , for example, Bernstein (1971), Brody (1981) and Gross (1974. 
1981). 
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was provided by the legally imposed system of compulsory arbitration in 
Australia at the turn of the century and by the Rights of Association and 
Negotiation Act of 1936 in Sweden. 
Interestingly, the seeming importance of legislative support has not 
always been revealed by econometric analyses of the growth of union 
membership. To date, the most comprehensive attempt to specify a 
mathematical model has been that of Bain and Elsheikh (1976a). Their 
basic model, initially developed to account for the growth of union 
membership in the United Kingdom, was applied with varying degrees of 
success to the United States, Australia, and Sweden. The Bain-Elsheikh 
model relies on the conventional explanatory variables: rate of change of 
retail prices, rate of change of money wages, level and/or rate of change 
of unemployment, and level of union density. Using these variables, they 
reported explaining 73 per cent of the variance in the rate of growth of 
union membershipkk in the United Kingdom for the years 1893-1965, 1893-
1966, 1893-1968, and 1893-1970. In light of Bain's (1970) earlier 
research, Bain and Elsheikh (1976a:86) employed a dummy variable to 
denote either the favourable legislation or the favourable social climate 
prevalent during the years 1915-20, 1940-45, and 1952-70 in earlier 
versions. The results were unsatisfactory, however, so discarded: 'the 
estimated coefficients of all the variables either had the wrong sign, 
lacked significance, or were faulty in both respects' (ibid.:86). 
The basic Bain-Elsheikh model was also used to analyze the rate of 
growth of union membership in Sweden with considerable success. 
kkBain and Elsheikh (1976a:58) specified the dependent variable as 
the ratio of the actual number of union members to the potential number. 
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Restricting the independent variables to prices, wages, unemployment, and 
union density, they explained 86 per cent of the variance in the rate of 
union membership growth for the period 1914 through 1970. No measure of 
legislative support was included because, in their opinion, the purpose 
of the 1936 Act was mainly to stimulate the growth of unions among white-
collar workers, which it did, 'but there is no evidence from the graphs 
or from the statistical analysis that the legislation has had an 
appreciable impact upon aggregate union growth' (ibid.:100). 
The conventional variables proved unsatisfactory for the United 
States and Australia, however. In both cases, the explanatory power of 
Bain and Elsheikh's model was enhanced by the addition of a dummy 
variable for the years during which the two governments actively 
intervened to encourage the extension of collective bargaining. For the 
United States, they were able to build on the earlier work of Ashenfelter 
and Pencavel (1969). The latter pair had included, as an independent 
variable, the proportion of Democrats elected to the US Congress as a 
proxy for pro-labour sentiment which they felt would both determine the 
response to union organizing drives and indicate the extent of positive 
labour legislation. This approach was criticized by Bain and Elsheikh 
(1976a: 41-2) on a number of grounds including the accuracy of 
Ashenfelter and Pencavel's assumptions about the workings of the American 
political system; they also questioned the usefulness of a variable with 
a limited range of possible values. Bain and Elsheikh proposed, instead, 
to incorporate a dummy variable with a value of one for the years 1937-
47 and zero for all other years as a proxy for the benefits accruing from 
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the Wagner Actll before labour's rights and privileges were cut back by 
the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947. The Bain-Elsheikh, Ashenfelter-Pencavel 
hybrid model proved highly satisfactory, explaining 73 per cent of the 
variance in the rate of union growth between 1904 and 1960. The dummy 
variable distinguishing the years 1937-47 was positive and statistically 
significant. 
Bain and Elsheikh were similarly able to benefit from Sharpe's 
(1971) work on Australia. Taking his lead from Ashenfelter and Pencavel 
(1969), Sharpe initially employed, as an independent variable, the 
proportion of the electorate voting for the Australian Labour Party but 
found no significant correlation with the rate of growth of union 
membership. He then tested his model using a dummy variable to reflect 
the impact of the compulsory arbitration system on union growth and 
discovered that the most successful formulation was to assign the 
variable a value of one for the years 1907 to 1913 and zero otherwise. 
Bain and Elsheikh (1976a:95) incorporated Sharpe's discovery as a 
modification to their basic model and found the results pleasing. The 
coefficient of the dummy variable was positive and highly significant. 
And, overall, the model accounted for 74 per cent of the variance in the 
rate of union membership growth for the years 1907-1969. 
A strong statistical link between the rate of union growth and 
changes in law and policy in Canada has yet to be demonstrated despite a 
long history of government intervention and a strong presumption that the 
legal framework introduced in 1944 was critical to the emergence of a 
lIThe constitutionality of the Wagner Act was in doubt before 1937 
when the United States Supreme Court, packed with Roosevelt's appointees. 
affirmed its legality. 
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mass trade union movement. Three of the five published studies did not 
even include a variable to capture the effect of changes in the law, yet 
performed satisfactorily. The other two attempted to measure the impact 
of the law but the results proved insignificant. 
Swindinsky's (1974) model was the first attempt to analyze the rate 
of growth of union membership in Canada with statistical techniques. The 
dependent variable, the rate of change of union membership, was 
hypothesized to vary with the rate of change of employment in unionized 
industries, the rate of change in the number of strikes, the level of 
unemployment, the rate of change in prices lagged one year, and the rate 
of change of union membership in the United States. Although he reported 
explaining 72 per cent of the variance in the rate of growth of union 
membership between 1911 and 1970, his model was severely, and tellingly, 
criticized on 'theoretical, statistical, and methodological grounds' by 
Bain and Elsheikh (1976b:483). The employment variable measured three, 
not one, effect, they argued, and the volume of strikes was related to 
the growth of union membership only by way of their common cause: rising 
prices. Swindinsky's data source was also criticized as unreliable, his 
variables were thought to have been badly specified, and his model 
troubled by multi-collinearity. Correcting these problems, Bain and 
Elsheikh were able to explain 61 per cent of the variance in the rate of 
union growth using only three variables: the rate of changes of prices, 
the level of unemployment, and the rate of growth of union membership in 
the United States. Eastman (1983) was similarly able to account for 73 
per cent of the variance in the rate of union growth for the years 1947-
1970 using economic variables only. 
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Only two published studies have incorporated a dummy variable to 
mark the influence of legislative change on the rate of union growth. 
One, by Abbot (1982), was based on the Ashenfelter and Pencavel (1969) 
approach but did not seem to benefit from the critique of Bain and 
Elsheikh (1976a, 1976b), who had already rejected several of the 
variables used by Abbott as flawed. To capture the effect of Privy 
Council Order 1003, Abbott created a dummy variable set equal to one 
starting in 1944 and zero before. He also included an interactive 
variable to account for the effect of PC 1003 on union density. For the 
period 1925-1966, Abbott's model performed well, explaining 85 per cent 
of the variance in the rate of union growth. There were problems, 
however. The model did not perform satisfactorily when applied to the 
data for 1967 through 1972. Moreover, in Abbott's opinion the 
coefficient of the dummy variable for PC 1003 was improbably large. His 
conclusion was that the model provided only indirect evidence of the 
positive impact of the change in policy on the growth of union 
membership. 
The other study, by Chaison and Rose (1981), sought to account for 
the growth of national unions. mm Finding that the Bain and Elsheikh 
(1976b) model performed poorly when applied to national unions, Chaison 
and Rose attempted to construct an alternative. They were no more 
successful, however. Their model was not statistically significant, 
suffered from multi-collinearity, and explained only 20 per cent of the 
variance in the rate of the change of membership in national unions 
mmNational unions are those unions with Canadian members only, as 
opposed to international unions which, in the Canadian context, are 
American unions with branches in Canada. 
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between 1920 and 1972. Nor was the dummy variable for the effect of PC 
1003nn significant. But this was hardly surprising for, as the authors 
themselves noted, PC 1003 was not particularly relevant to the growth of 
national unions. Because their jurisdictions fall almost entirely within 
the public sector, to test for the effect of changes in the law the dummy 
variable should have been specified as one for the years after 1965 and 
zero before. 
The quantitative evidence, such as it is, does not appear to confirm 
what historians have documented, that is, that Privy Council Order 1003 
in the case of the private sector, and special collective bargaining 
legislation in the case of the public sector, have been vital to the 
growth of unions and collective bargaining in Canada. This apparent 
paradox may be addressed in two ways. First, it is possible that further 
work may lead to a more exact mathematical model of union growth. 
Experience suggests that Bain and Elsheikh's (1976a) 'basic' model is the 
place to begin, modified as it was for the United States and Australia. 
Extraneous variables, notably the rate of growth of union membership in 
the United States, should be forgotten. Despite its frequent use as an 
explanatory variable in Canada there is no convincing reason to 
anticipate a direct link; indeed, union membership in the US has 
plummeted in recent years, both absolutely and relatively, even as 
membership in Canada continued to climb. One element of a reconstructed 
model should be a dummy variable capturing, firstly, the effects of PC 
nnSet equal to one for the years 1944 and after, zero before. 
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1003 but limited to the years 194300 to 1949 and, secondly, the effects 
of the public sector legislation enacted between 1965 and 1975. 
Modifications of this sort may turn up a statistically significant 
relationship between legislative change and union growth after all, 
especially if the analysis were to incorporate data for the years after 
1970. 
Alternatively, a more sophisticated model may be necessary. If, as 
the historical record indicates, the rapid growth in union membership 
between 1940 and 1944 coupled with the terrifying rise (to use Pentland's 
description) in strike activity forced the federal government to 
introduce PC 1003 which then supported further union growth, the 
interaction of the law with other factors cannot be captured by a simple 
dummy variable; in fact, the bluntness of econometric models is a 
shortcoming of statistical analysis noted by many others. pp Moreover, a 
statistically significant relationship, if found, does not demonstrate 
causation. The simple conclusion, that liberalized labour laws caused 
unions to grow would be unwarranted. A more accurate assessment would be 
that liberalized labour laws did not so much cause union growth as permit 
it. 
There is no doubt that industrial workers exhibited a strong 
propensity to organize during the early years of the war. Nor is there 
any doubt that compulsory conciliation coupled with constraints on the 
right to strike was an inadequate policy. 'Positive' labour law 
OOThe year 1943 should be included to account for the effects of 
Ontario's Collective Bargaining Act. 
PPSee, for example, Galenson and Smith (1978:33). 
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affirming a right to associate and a right to strike were likely 
essential. But even though PC 1003 may have been a necessary condition 
for the emergence of a mass trade union movement, it was not a sufficient 
condition. Brody (1981:107) might well have been describing Canada when 
he concluded that the Wagner Act in the United States was 'indecisive for 
one whole stage of unionization': 
More than the enrollment of workers and the attainment of 
certification as bargaining agent was needed in unionization. 
The process was completed only when employers and unions 
entered bona fide collective bargaining. But this could not be 
enforced by law. Meaningful collective bargaining was 
achievable ultimately only through the interplay of 
nonlegislative forces. 
PC 1003 did not force employers to recognize unions, nor did it make 
collective bargaining inevitable. In many firms, unions were recognized 
only after collective bargaining had been won on the picket line. At 
Ford, for example, the United Auto Workers was established with stewards 
and committee men--there was even a collective agreement 'but the company 
continued to make decisions as it had in the past, without regard to the 
men or the union' (Moulton, 1975:132). There were few constraints on 
management's right to make decisions unilaterally and Ford did not 
hesitate to abrogate even this weak agreement in 1944 (Millar, 1980:249). 
During the fateful 1945 negotiations, the company laid off 13 per cent of 
its workforce just as the report of the conciliation board was issued, 
then questioned whether the union still retained its majority. Ford then 
refused to bargain with 'outside' UAW officers and rejected further 
third-party intervention. The stewards were publicly denigrated as a 
bunch of Communists. 
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It took a three-month strike to convince Ford that it must accept 
joint decision-making; a five-and-a-half month strike was necessary at 
Stelco. And this was typical. Time lost due to strikes in 1946 was 
higher than in any previous year, with the exception of 1919. qq 
The fall of 1945 marking the return of peace was hailed by both 
parties--not altogether secretly--as a testing time: was 
collective bargaining to dominate the field of labour relations 
or was it not? The showdown at Ford in Windsor in November-
December and that at Stelco some months later were crucial 
(Logan, 1956:75). 
The role of the law in this process should not be over-rated. Union 
recognition, then as now, was not something labour boards could grant. 
The law could do nothing more than sanction workers' efforts to bargain 
collectively. Legal recognition meant little unless employers were 
prepared to relinquish their prerogative to determine terms and 
conditions of employment unilaterally. The new legal framework was 
undoubtedly of secondary importance. Of much greater moment was the 
steady rise in the bargaining power of labour. By 1941, the rapid 
expansion of the war industries created a seller's market for labour that 
was to give workers their opportunity. As the war wound down, labour's 
bargaining power was sapped by the transition to peacetime industries but 
this hiatus was quickly followed by the 'great post-war expansion with 
increasing prices, increasing work population, and rising business 
confidence deriving from continuing prosperity' (ibid.:77). In these 
Circumstances, the demand for collective bargaining could not be refused. 
qqWhile time lost due to strikes as a percentage of total working 
time was higher in 1946 than in 1943, a smaller proportion of union 
members--one in six--was involved in strike activity. 
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Liberalized labour laws played a similar role in the growth of 
unions in the public sector. Government employees demonstrated their 
propensity for collective action during the years of joint consultation. 
For whatever reasons--rising prices, bureaucratic management, unfair 
treatment, and so on--civil servants at all levels felt the need to act 
collectively respecting their terms and conditions of employment. And 
when the joint consultation process failed to meet their expectations, 
they turned to collective bargaining. The law was an important, though 
secondary, consideration: when it chafed, it was changed. The change was 
critical, however, more so than in the private sector. In the private 
sector, the pre-1944 legal framework permitted, but did not support, 
collective bargaining. In the public sector, the pre-1965 legal 
framework made collective bargaining impossible. Governments would not 
and, they claimed, could not recognize unions demanding full 
representation rights. By liberalizing the law, unionism was almost 
assured. Civil servants quickly transformed their associations into 
unions and applied for certification. And, unlike some private sector 
employers, governments could be relied upon to bargain in good faith. 
Having agreed to change the law, they were unlikely to resist collective 
bargaining. 
The growth of unions among public sector employees, other than 
government employees, has been less directly affected by the law. In 
many jurisdictions, elementary and secondary school teachers have had 
well entrenched, though not legally recognized, bargaining rights for 
half a century. Some groups, hospital workers most importantly, have had 
the right to organize and bargain under the PC 1003 framework since the 
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1940s while others, notably police officers and fire fighters, have been 
covered by legislation peculiar to their occupations for several decades. 
The upsurge in union membership in the late 1960s and 1970s had little to 
do with the law, consequently. Factors such as inflation, budgetary 
constraints, and the like provide a more convincing explanation for the 
recent growth of unions among these public sector groups. The one 
possible exception might be hospital workers. For them, the law may have 
played an important part in the decision to unionize. To the extent that 
strikes conflict with a commitment to their patients, hospital workers, 
and nurses in particular, have been relieved of the potential dilemma by 
the widespread practice of outlawing work stoppages in hospitals and 
nursing homes. Moreover, because the law prescribes final and binding 
arbitration of all disputes, hospital workers are assured that if their 
unions are certified, collective agreements will result. The guarantee 
has carried its price, however, for as Deverell (1982:124) astutely 
observed, hospital workers may be unionized but they are in large measure 
unorganized. Hospital bargaining is less and less a voluntary process; 
more and more, terms and conditions of employment are dictated by the 
process of interest arbitration. 
The link between the law and union growth in Canada sits comfortably 
within Bain's (1970) model of union growth among white-collar workers in 
the United Kingdom. Bain's investigations led him to conclude that the 
density of white-collar unionism depended upon the extent to which 
employees were concentrated in large numbers and the extent to which 
employers were prepared to recognize trade unions. An employer's 
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willingness to recognize unions was, in turn, a function of the level of 
union membership and the extent to which government action promoted the 
recognition of unions. His model was presented as follows: 
D = f(C,R) 
R = g(D,G) 
Where D = the density of white-collar unionism; 
C = the degree of employment concentration; 
R = the degree to which employers are prepared to recognize unions 
representing white-collar employees; and 
G = the extent of government action which promotes union 
recognition. 
Bain's basic insight, that union growth depends on the recognition 
of unions and that the recognition of unions depends on their relative 
size, helps put the contribution of the law into perspective. In Canada, 
it seems quite likely that neither PC 1003 nor the Public Service Staff 
Relations Act and its provincial counterparts would have been enacted had 
workers not already organized on a large scale. The most rapid growth in 
union membership during the 1940s occurred before collective bargaining 
was made compulsory. But once the law was changed, that is, once the 
legitimacy of trade unions was, in a sense, recognized by the government, 
growth continued apace. Similarly, civil servants were already well 
organized in employee associations and demanding collective bargaining 
before the laws respecting collective bargaining in government employment 
were liberalized. In either case, governments had no real choice: either 
the law would be changed to reflect social reality or they would face the 
consequences. In the 1940s, the prospect was civil disobedience and 
widespread disruption of war production; in the 1960s, the consequences 
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were hardly so dire although the postal strike in 1965 in defiance of the 
law may have been seen as a portent of things to come. 
Conclusion 
Taken at face value the econometric studies suggest that the law has 
been an incidental influence on the growth of union membership in Canada. 
Despite a strong presumption that PC 1003 was central to the extension of 
collective bargaining to manual workers in the mass-pDOduction 
industries, only two studies investigated the relationship between the 
change in policy and the rate of growth of union membership, and the 
results of neither provided convincing evidence of causation. Yet, to 
dismiss the influence of the law on the growth and development of the 
labour movement would certainly be rash in the face of historical 
evidence linking changes in public policy in a significant way to union 
growth, first in t~e private sector and some time later, in the public 
sector. It is much more likely that the econometric models employed have 
been flawed or that the seminal role of public policy has been masked by 
problems of multi-collinearity. 
The link between the law and union growth in Canada, as elsewhere, 
is not a straightforward one of more favourable laws therefore more union 
members. The record suggests that in both the private and public 
sectors, workers were already widely organized before the law was 
changed. The new policies, moreover, were more directly related to the 
growth of collective bargaining than union membership. By encouraging 
the practice of collective bargaining, both PC 1003 and its public sector 
equivalents created a climate favourable to further membership growth. 
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In the public sector, collective bargaining was a certainty once the 
law was changed. There was no question that governments in their 
capacity as employers would flout their duty to bargain in good faith. 
Once civil servants were organized into trade unions, collective 
bargaining quickly became the established method of determining terms and 
conditions of employment. In the private, by contrast, the outcome was 
not so predictable. Although PC 1003 made collective bargaining legally 
compulsory most employers were no more prepared to bargain with unions 
after the law was changed than they had been before. Their objections to 
unions and collective bargaining were not automatically resolved by the 
simple expedient of certifying unions. It was only through strikes that 
workers firmly established their right to union representation. A few 
key confrontations in the 1940s convinced employers that for industry to 
function, labour-management co-operation was necessary and the price of 
that co-operation was recognition of unions and bona fide collective 
bargaining. 
The law's seminal contribution was its role in shaping the 
bargaining power of the parties. Prior to 1939, most workers had neither 
immunity from tort liability nor a statutory right to strike. With the 
extension of the Industrial Disputes Investigation Act to most resource 
and manufacturing firms at the beginning of the war, industrial workers 
were given a limited right to strike. Under the lOlA, strikes were 
lawful and unions indemnified so long as the dispute had been referred to 
conCiliation, the report of the board had been issued, and the subsequent 
cooling-off period had expired. But the process was time-consuming. 
Conciliation had never been expeditious and during the war the delays 
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grew longer and longer. And since the government's primary concern was 
the preservation of industrial peace, it heaped more obstacles in the way 
of lawful strikes: first another commission of inquiry and then 
compulsory strike votes. By the time the strike arrived, workers were 
frequently disillusioned and demoralized. PC 1003 did not remove all of 
these obstacles but it did give the outcome greater certainty. 
Certification enhanced the legitimacy and stability of trade unions and 
while there was no over-riding right to strike, timely strikes were made 
lawful. And even though the new policy was not a particularly liberal 
package of rights for workers, it proved to be workable framework for the 
extension of collective bargaining. 
Conceivably, the rights themselves were less important than the 
setting in which they were won. The critical labour shortage of the 
early 1940s gave industrial workers new power; power to demand better 
terms and conditions of employment and power to demand union 
representation without fear of reprisal. It was their insistence in the 
face of employer resistance that finally forced the government to 
introduce the policy of compulsory collective bargaining, a right which 
workers were on the verge of winning for themselves. The post-war 
confrontation had been in the making for a decade and a half. With or 
without PC 1003, it was bound to happen. 
In 1944, Laskin (1944:783) predicted that 'the battle for collective 
bargaining, for the opportunity of employees to share in the 
determination of the conditions under which they will work, is on the way 
to being won in Ontario'. And while PC 1003 did, indeed, prove to be a 
workable framework for the extension of collective bargaining to manual 
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employees in large, primary and secondary sector firms, for workers 
employed in smaller firms or in the tertiary sector, the PC 1003 
framework has not been adequate. The laws that permitted the growth of 
unions in the private sector forty years ago do not appear to meet the 
needs of unorganized workers today. To overcome the opposition of 
employers, government action in support of collective bargaining must 
take other forms. 
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In Chapters 3 and 4, the recognition process is analyzed to 
determine whether the certification procedure affects the likelihood that 
bargaining rights are granted. Two aspects of the process are under 
study. One is the procedure itself, that is, the extent to which the 
rules and regulations prescribed by the Labour Relations Act and the 
Labour Relations Board facilitate or obstruct organizing campaigns. If 
certification is a complex process or open to abuse, and this is 
reflected in the outcome, the procedure is less effective than it might 
be and falls short of the statutory objective of encouraging the practice 
and procedure of collective bargaining. A related consideration is the 
conduct of employers as captured and formalized by the certification 
process. If some employers oppose collective bargaining and their 
opposition takes the form of procedural delays, support for anti-union 
petitions, or the commission of unfair labour practices, the impact of 
their behaviour on the outcome of certification can be measured 
statistically. 
Studies of certification in the United States have revealed, among 
other things, a strong negative relationship between the likelihood of 
winning bargaining rights and both the time required to process 
applications and the use of unfair labour practices. Whether a similar 
relationship would hold in Ontario is a matter of conjecture. Despite 
many outward similarities with the American system, the certification 
procedure in Ontario is substantially different. For a variety of 
reasons, employers are afforded fewer opportunities to delay proceedings 
and interfere with the outcome. The result is that proportionately more 
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unions are certified in Ontario. in a shorter time, and with fewer unfair 
labour practice complaints. 
A second objective is to examine the relationship between the 
certification process and the outcome of bargaining. In law, the outcome 
of certification is unproblematical: once certified, a union is 
recognized. But the reality of labour-management relations is more 
complex. While certification adds to the legitimacy of a union's claim 
to represent a group of employees. it is the employer'~ acceptance of the 
union that is decisive. 
To date, only one American study has considered the possibility that 
the nature of the certification process might affect the likelihood of 
negotiating a collective agreement. There are, in addition. two small 
Canadian studies--one in Ontario and one in the federal jurisdiction--
which analyze the relationship between certification and first 
agreements. And while a first agreement, admittedly. is no guarantee 
that a bargaining relationship has been firmly established it is, 
nevertheless, a critical benchmark and one that many newly certified 
unions in Ontario fail to achieve. 
Whether the law works to encourage collective bargaining depends, in 
large measure, upon the willingness of employers to accept the legitimacy 
of unions. To the extent that employers are prepared to recognize the 
legitimacy of certified unions and refrain from obstructive practices, 
the law is grounded in a realistic premise. However, if employers are 
not willing to abide by the law and actively resist collective 
bargaining, the certification process is far from a dispassionate 
exercise. Though banished from the scene, bargaining power plays a major 
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role. By dismissing union supporters, circulating anti-union petitions, 
or obstructing the proceedings, anti-union employers inform workers that 
they choose union representation at their economic peril. It is in this 
sense that the certification process is linked to bargaining success. 
Delays, anti-union petitions, and unfair labour practices, to a greater 
or lesser extent. are indicative of employer opposition. And employer 
opposition is a primary determinant of the success of collective 
bargaining. 
Chapter 3 
Certification 
Certification is tantamount to union recognition in Canada's system 
of compulsory collective bargaining. Whereas, in the past, workers were 
commonly forced to win recognition on the picket line, under the PC 1003 
framework a labour relations board is empowered to determine whether a 
group of workers, by majority decision, wishes to be represented by a 
trade union. And their decision is conclusive. Once a union is 
certified it is the workers' exclusive bargaining agent in law, so 
entitled to compel an employer to enter negotiations. An employer, in 
turn, is legally obliged to recognize the union, bargain in good faith, 
and make every reasonable effort to make a collective agreement. 
What was once a simple and informal procedure is now a complicated 
morass of deadlines and details. The multiplication of forms and rules, 
the increasing formality of the proceedings, and the striving for legal 
precision are distorting the purpose of the certification process. 
Unions are required to adhere to a complex set of rules about when and 
how members can be recruited. Every step of the process is scrutinized 
by the OLRB and any irregularities that come to light are investigated 
further. Full-scale hearings are frequent, evidence is presented, 
witnesses are examined, then cross-examined. Any weakness in a union's 
case is probed by the employer's lawyer. As a result, the procedure is 
hedged about with a myriad of extraneous details, driving the cost of 
organizing and risk of failure relentlessly upwards. 
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The complexity of the process invites employers to interfere where 
they do not belong. Whether workers want union representation is surely 
a matter for them alone to decide, yet employers are entitled to 
intervene at every step of the way. They are asked to express their 
opinion on the appropriateness of the bargaining unit proposed by the 
union, may question the eligibility of certain employees for membership 
in the union, and may draw the Board's attention to any procedural lapses 
it may have overlooked. Some employers go further and, contrary to the 
law, sponsor or tacitly support anti-union petitions. The result of 
these interventions is, of course, further delay in the processing of a 
union's application for certification while the Board investigates the 
employer's allegations of wrong-doing or, in the case of a petition, the 
union's allegations that the document has been vetted by management. 
Delays are an integral feature of the certification process in 
Ontario. Not only are they a frequent source of frustration for workers 
hoping to get on with the business of bargaining, delays directly affect 
the outcome of certification and collective bargaining: the longer the 
process, the lower the likelihood that certification will be granted and, 
if granted, the lower the likelihood that a collective agreement will be 
negotiated. Anti-union petitions have a similar, deleterious effect. 
Even if a petition is free of managerial influence unions are much less 
likely to win bargaining rights. And when employers are involved in 
sponsoring or supporting a petition, unions are much less likely to 
negotiate collective agreements. 
Chapter 3 analyzes the relationship between delays and anti-union 
petitions, on the one hand, and the outcome of certification and 
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collective bargaining on the other, firstly, by describing the procedure 
developed by the OLRB and, secondly, by discussing its potential for 
abuse. The petition procedure is then described and discussed in light 
of the Board's jurisprudence. Finally, the effect of delays and 
petitions on the granting of certification and the negotiation of first 
agreements is analyzed statistically using data collected from the OLRB 
and the Ministry of Labour for the years 1970-1981. 
The Procedure 
For most unorganized workers,a1234the collective bargaining process 
begins with an application for certification filed on their behalf with 
the Ontario Labour Relations Board. To be granted bargaining rights, a 
union must demonstrate that it enjoys the support of a majority of the 
employees in a unit appropriate for collective bargaining. The critical 
numbers are 55 and 45 per cent. b When a union can demonstrate that it 
has, as members, more than 55 percent of the employees in a bargaining 
unit, certification is commonly granted outright, that is, without a 
aThe following categories of persons falling within provincial 
jurisdiction are excluded from the coverage of the Labour Relations Act: 
professionals (architects, dentists, land surveyors, lawyers, and 
doctors)1; managerial employees and persons employed in a confidential 
capacity in matters relating to labour relations2 ; domestics employed in 
a private home; persons employed in agriculture, hunting or trapping; and 
persons, other than employees of municipalities or persons employed in 
silvaculture, employed in horticulture by employers whose primary 
business is agriculture or horticulture3 . Also excluded from the scope 
of the Act, but entitled to bargain collectively under other statutes are 
police officers, fire fighters, teachers and employees of the provincial 
government4 . 
bFor the period, 1 September, 1971 to 1 January, 1976, the 
percentages were 65 and 35, respectively, as recommended by the Task 
Force on Labour Relations (Woods, 1968:143). 
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representation vote. Alternatively, if membership falls short of this 
mark but is 45 percent or more, a vote is ordered, in which case a 
majority of the ballots cast must favour the union for certification to 
be granted. c Finally, if membership in the union is below 45 percent, 
the application is dismissed without a vote. 5 
Accompanying the Act are the OLRB's rules of procedure. The Board 
is 'master of its own house' (MacDowell, 1977:266), empowered to make 
whatever regulations seem necessary or advisable to carry out the purpose 
of the legislation. 6 Included in the regulations are fifteen pages of 
rules, thirty-six forms, and sixteen practice notes pertaining to 
certification in general industry. A complementary set of rules and 
forms has been devised for the construction industry. 
On receipt of a union's application for certification (form 1), the 
OLRB establishes a terminal date {form 2)--typically, eight to ten days 
hence--for acceptance of evidence of membership in, or objection to, the 
union. A hearing date {form 2)--generally within three weeks--is also 
determined at this time. The employer is then notified of the 
application (form 4) and instructed to post the official 'Notice to 
Employees of Application for Certification and Hearing before the Ontario 
Labour Relations Board' (form 6) conspicuously around the workplace and 
to confirm the posting by return mail (form 74). The employer is also 
required to file its reply (form 10) in quadruplicate on or before the 
terminal date. 
cPrior to 1 September, 1971, a union was required to secure the 
votes of a majority of the employees in the bargaining unit, not just the 
majority of those casting ballots. 
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In addition to reporting the firm's name, address, and the nature of 
the business, an employer is directed to provide information respecting 
the total number of employees in the establishment(s) concerned, and the 
number of employees in the bargaining unit(s) described by the union. If 
an employer wishes to contest the appropriateness of the unit the union 
seeks to represent, the number of employees in the alternate unit must 
also be reported. Finally, form 10 asks for the name and address of any 
union that might be affected by the certification application. 
With its reply, an employer is required to file a list, in 
alphabetical order, of the employees in the bargaining unit described in 
the union's application. On schedule A are all employees in the unit 
proposed by the union as of the date of application. Listed on schedules 
B,C, and D are all employees regularly employed for not more than twenty-
four hours per week (or, if the application is for part-time employees, 
all employees employed for more than twenty-four hours per week), all 
employees in the bargaining unit not at work on the date of application 
by reason of lay-off, and all other employees in the bargaining unit not 
at work on the date of application, respectively. The names of those the 
employer intends to challenge as ineligible for membership in the union 
or not in the bargaining unit are indicated by an asterisk or listed at 
the bottom of the page. Specimen signatures (not in the form of 
cancelled cheques), against which the union's membership evidence can be 
verified, must be provided. 
The Board then notifies any union (other than the applicant) that 
might be affected by the certification proceedings (form 11) and directs 
the organization to state the nature of its interest if it wishes to 
98 
intervene (form 12). Alternatively, an interested union may apply for 
certification on its own behalf (form 13). 
Hearings are held in all cases. The right to be heard is integral 
to the OLRB's conception of natural justice: 
At the very outset of the Board's history in 1944, the Board members 
determined that every employer, every trade union, every employee 
and, for that matter, every other person who had an interest in a 
proceeding before the Board should be entitled as of right to 
present his case orally to the members of the Board at a formal 
hearing ... Every application, no matter whether it was contested or 
uncontested, was not only listed for hearing, but an oral hearing on 
every aspect of the case was held before the Board itself before any 
decision was reached (Finkelman, 1965:3-4). 
In uncontroversial cases, such as the legal status of unions created by 
merger, hearings are no longer held but when bargaining rights are at 
issue hearings are routinely scheduled. d 
The parties are required to be fully prepared on their scheduled 
hearing day. Proceedings will not be adjourned to allow either the 
company or the union to assemble evidence or call witnesses not in 
attendance (Cornish and Ritchie, 1980:99). Nor are adjournments granted 
dAn important exception is the construction industry. The 
transitory nature of employer-employee relations in construction caused 
the Goldberg Commission (1962) to recommend the streamlining of the 
certification procedure. Hearings are no longer scheduled automatically 
in certification cases; instead, the party requesting a hearing is 
required to explain why it is necessary. The result was an immediate, 
drastic reduction in the time required to process applications. Within a 
year of implementation one-quarter of all cases involving construction 
units were disposed of within eight days, one-half within twelve days, 
and three-quarters within nineteen days (Finkelman, 1965:19). The most 
recent data are not so encouraging, however. While 3.0 per cent of the 
certificates granted in the construction industry in fiscal year 1985-86 
were finalized within 14 days and 51.5 per cent within 21 days, compared 
with 2.4 and 37.6 per cent respectively for non-construction, 
applications, the remainder of the cases took somewhat longer to dispose 
of. Seventy days elapsed before three-quarters of the applications in 
construction were settled compared with fewer than 56 days for non-
construction (Ontario Labour Relations Board, Annual Report, 1985-86:77). 
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for the convenience of counsel (MacDowell, 1977:231); indeed, one 
employer's complaint that a refusal to grant an adjournment amounted to a 
denial of natural justice was lost on appeal. 7 When delay is 
unavoidable, additional days will be set aside by the registrar of the 
Board if the parties cannot agree to further dates within a reasonable 
period of time, usually six weeks (Wakely, Wahl, and Freeman, undated: 
AIX-3). 
Compared with its counterparts in other jurisdictions, the Ontario 
Board is far more legalistic. Its first rules and procedures were 
modelled from those of the Ontario Labour Courte (Bromke, 1961:74) and 
remain court-like, despite the power of the Board to devise its own rules 
and procedures. 8 Hearings are formal: witnesses may be subpoenaed, 
excluded from the proceedings, and sworn in to testify; they are subject 
to examination-in-chief, cross-examination, and re-examination; and, for 
the most part, the rules of evidence are followed. Technical questions 
constantly arise. Arguments about the burden of proof, the weight of 
precedent, proper identification of documents, estoppel, and so on are 
common (Cornish and Ritchie, 1980:101; MacDowell, 1977:230-1). And 
although lay-persons can, and do, appear before the OLRB, for anything 
other than straightforward cases legal counsel is essential. 
Objections and Disputes 
Between application and disposition lie a host of potential 
disputes. The Board's initial task is to determine the scope of the 
eThe Labour Court was established as a division of the Supreme Court 
of Ontario in 1943 to administer the Collective Bargaining Act. The Act 
was repeated and the court dissolved after PC 1003 was proclaimed. 
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bargaining unit. What constitutes an appropriate bargaining unit is now 
well established for most occupations in most industries. The Act does 
not, however, entitle union officials to the names and addresses of 
potential members; nor are they entitled to copies of the schedules filed 
by the employer in its reply. Accordingly, although organizers know 
generally the size of the group they are seeking to recruit, they may 
discover the unit is larger or composed differently than they supposed. 
After the terminal date (that is, after the date by which the union must 
have filed its membership evidence) and in the presence of an officer of 
the OLRB, an official of the union may check his or her membership lists 
against those of the employer, but may not record the names (Cornish and 
Ritchie, 1980:98). However, the inquiry must be bona fide. Union 
officials have been reprimanded by the Board when it believed that an 
application for certification was not genuine, only filed to gain 
information for a future organizing drive. 9 
But even when the parties can agree on the description of the unit, 
challenges to the lists (that is, schedules A-D of the employer's reply) 
are potentially numerous. Either the union or the employer may be 
uncertain about the legal status of some employees or attempt to 
gerrymander the size of the bargaining unit by inflating it with persons 
not covered by the Act (e.g., independent contractorsf )10 0r deemed by the 
Act not to be employees (e.g., managerial and confidential employees), 
employees not in the unit applied for (e.g., part-time employees or 
flndependent contractors are excluded from the scope of the Act by 
virtue of the definition of a trade union as an organization of 
employees. Since 1975, however, workers classed as 'dependent 
contractors' have been defined as employees and so permitted to bargain 
collectively. 10 
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students), or employees not at work on the date of application and 
therefore not eligible for inclusion in the 'count'. Equally, either 
party may seek to restrict the scope of the unit by claiming certain 
persons are not employees under the Labour Relations Act or are otherwise 
ineligible for inclusion in the bargaining unit. 
A check of an employer's records can resolve the status of some of 
the contested persons. Employees at work on the date of application are 
included for the 'count', that is, for determining the level of the 
union's membership support in the bargaining unit, unless they quit or 
were dismissed before the terminal date and were not reinstated by the 
OLRB. Workers absent on the date of the application are counted in the 
unit if they satisfy the Board's '30/30 rule': if they worked at jobs 
included in the bargaining unit during the thirty-day period prior to, 
and returned to work or were expected to return to work within thirty 
days of, the date of application (Sack and Mitchell, 1985:122). 
Similarly, to distinguish between full- and part-time workers the Board 
applies its 'seven-week rule'. If, over a representative period, 
normally four or more of the seven weeks preceding the date of 
application, the employees worked twenty-four or more hours per week they 
are considered full-time (ibid.:158). 
More difficult to resolve are allegations that certain employees 
should be excluded from the bargaining unit because they are independent 
contractors, perform managerial functions, or are employed in a 
confidential capacity in matters related to labour relations. Even 
though 'every person is free to join a trade union of his own choice and 
to participate in its lawful activities' ,11 roughly thirty per cent of 
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the labour force falls outside the protection afforded by collective 
bargaining legislation. Since the 1960s, the Board has routinely 
assignedg a labour relations officer to inquire into a dispute over the 
eligibility of any person for inclusion in the bargaining unit. An 
officer has no adjudicative power, however, so seeks to resolve the 
matter by informal agreement of the parties. If settlement is not 
possible, a formal examination into the nature of the employment 
relationship, the duties and responsibilities of the person(s) in 
dispute, and other relevant matters is conducted. 
Examinations are held at the employer's place of business during 
working hours. Documentary evidence is filed with the labour relations 
officer and the persons in dispute are questioned about their duties and 
responsibilities. Once the witnesses have been examined by the Board's 
representative, counsel for the union and the company are afforded an 
opportunity to ask further questions and present additional evidence. 
The discussion, generally recorded verbatim on tape, forms the basis of 
the officer's report to the OLRB. The parties are also served with 
copies of the report and notified that any comments they wish to make 
must be submitted within six days. If a party wishes to make further 
representations, not with respect to the accuracy of the report but 
concerning the conclusions to be drawn from it, a hearing will be 
scheduled. 12 
An examination may resolve a dispute relatively quickly or it may 
take weeks, even months. The first date is fixed by the Board, generally 
gIn the past, at a hearing but now as soon as the dispute becomes 
apparent. 
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within three weeks of the date of application, but additional dates are 
set by agreement of the parties as needed, within four weeks of each 
other if possible. In the past, when the status of an entire 
classification of employees was challenged, a labour relations officer 
was required to interview all of those in dispute unless the parties 
agreed that the functions of one person were representative of the duties 
and responsibilities of the employees in the classification as a whole. 
For those wishing to proceed expeditiously, there was an incentive to 
reach agreement but there was also an invitation to delay. The revised 
policy now provides that one or more representative persons may be 
interviewed; however, neither party is required to accept a grouping of 
employees merely because an examination would otherwise be lengthy 
(Cornish and Ritchie, 1980:123). 
Once the composition of the bargaining unit has been settled, the 
Board ascertains the level of membership in the union as of the terminal 
date, that is, the 'count'. Although a union with more than 55 per cent 
of the employees in the bargaining unit as members is normally certified 
without a representation vote, the OLRB has the discretion to order a 
vote13 and will do so to resolve any doubts about the validity of a 
union's claim to represent the requisite majority. 
To be granted certification, a union must present evidence of 
membership in, not just support for, the union. Since 1950, the Act has 
defined a member as a person who has applied for membership and paid at 
least one dollar on his or her own behalf. 14 The OLRB prescribes the 
form in which, and the time as of which, membership evidence is 
acceptable. Evidence must be in writing and submitted by the terminal 
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date. The Board is empowered to determine what form the membership 
evidence should take15 and does not accept oral evidence. Its 
preferences are well established: 
Each document submitted as evidence that a person is a member 
of the applicant union must bear the signature of the employee. 
In addition, the application for membership must be supported 
by evidence of the payment by the employee of the requisite 
dues or fees, and this evidence is usually submitted in the 
form of individual receipts for the payments made. The Board 
has encouraged unions to have the receipts countersigned by the 
employee who paid the dues or fees so as to confirm the fact of 
payment (Finkelman, 1965:33). 
At the end of each membership drive, the supervising organizer is 
required to submit a 'Declaration Concerning Membership Documents' (form 
9) substantiating the authenticity of the evidence filed. The Ontario 
Board is extremely strict about the veracity of these claims. Because it 
cannot interview each new member it insists 'on the highest standards of 
integrity on the part of those who submit such evidence' .16 When a 
declarant has no personal knowledge of the circumstances in which cards 
were signed, he or she must inquire through a direct and complete chain 
of persons from himself through to those subscribing as collectors on the 
receipt portion of the membership cards and confirm with all that they 
have themselves collected at least one dollar from the employees who 
joined the union and that those employees paid the dollar personally on 
their own behalf (Sack and Mitchell, 1980:181). If the chain is 
incomplete, the evidence is defeated. Although errors may be declared on 
form 9. it is preferable to avoid listing mistakes which may be fatal to 
the application or result in delays and the questioning of employees. 
Organizers are advised instead to re-sign the member properly. 
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remembering to collect a second dollar payment (Cornish and Ritchie. 
1980:43). 
Even one defective card, if submitted knowingly by a responsible 
union official, may cause the Board to conclude that it cannot rely on 
any of the membership evidence submitted by the union. 17 An official's 
failure to report that a worker was loaned the necessary dollar has 
caused the OLRB to dismiss more than one application. 18 On the other 
hand, when proper inquiries were made but a rank-and-file collector 
deceived the principal organizer, only the evidence submitted by the 
former has been disregarded. 19 
Over time, a body of 'strict but hard-to-evaluate rules' has evolved 
(ibid.:44). A seemingly endless stream of cases attest to the Board's 
chariness. The OLRB will investigate to determine whether a worker who 
was loaned a dollar paid it on his own behalf,20 whether it was proper 
for an organizer to tell workers that membership would cost five dollars 
now but fifty later,21 or whether goods given as payment-in-kind were the 
equivalent of the required dollar. 22 Any hint that workers might have 
been confused or deceived can be equally troublesome. If, for example. 
the application is in the name of the international union while the 
worker appeared to have jOined a branch, the evidence is generally 
acceptable; however, if membership is in the international, the 
application of a local union is ordinarily dismissed. 23 If the local 
union number was mistakenly omitted from the membership card24 or the 
local merged with another branch of the same union during the organizing 
drive25 the evidence has been judged equivocal. Even the validity of 
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membership cards signed on a Sunday has been litigated before the Ontario 
Board. 26 
Doubts about the value of the union's membership evidence may cause 
the Board to exercise its discretion to order a vote, notwithstanding the 
union's claim to represent more than 55 per cent of the employees in the 
bargaining unit. In one instance, a vote was ordered when a collector 
failed to report that he had received one membership card and the 
accompanying payment indirectly. When this was revealed, all fourteen of 
the cards counter-signed by this collector were disregarded. 27 A vote 
was also ordered in Primo Importing and Distributing28 because the union 
failed to collect a second dollar when members reaffirmed their support 
for the union on cards signed over a year earlier. In the absence of the 
reaffirmation, the cards would have been considered 'stale' and of no 
value (ibid.:52). In another case, the entire organizing drive was 
aborted because the sign-up campaign had been led in large part by an 
employee who was, in the union's opinion, a group leader, but whom the 
Board later found to be a managerial employee. 29 And evidence proffered 
by the union was rejected in Intermodal Marine30 when it was learned that 
an organizer suggested that non-members would not be allowed to work at 
unionized jobs. 
Anti-Union Petitions 
The validity of a union's claim to membership in excess of 55 per 
cent may also be undermined by a petition or statement of desire opposing 
certification. If a sufficient number of union members subsequently sign 
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a document repudiating their membership in the union, the OLRB may 
exercise its discretion to order a representation vote. 
Such petitions are a regular feature of the certification process 
Objections were filed in 19.5 per cent of the applications dealt with by 
the OLRB between fiscal years 1970-71 and 1981-82; yet, they are nowhere 
mentioned in the Act. At first, the Board's practice was to determine 
the level of membership support as of the date of application and no 
weight was accorded to subsequent repudiations. But this practice was 
struck down by the Supreme Court of Canada in 1953. Holding that the 
Labour Relations Board was obliged to hear all relevant evidence and that 
evidence of withdrawal from membership was relevant to the issue of 
certification, the Board's award was quashed.)l To cure the defect 
identified by the courts, the OLRB chose to fix a terminal date for each 
case. Now, the size of a bargaining unit is determined as of the date of 
application, while the union's membership support is ascertained as of 
the terminal date, 'that is, eight to ten days later. The result is a 
formalized procedure for repudiating membership in a union. 
Only a petition which satisfies the Board's criteria is considered 
well-grounded. To be valid, a petition must be in writing, filed by the 
terminal date, include the name of the employer, and the address of the 
petition's sponsor. These requirements are communicated to employees by 
the 'Notice to Employees of Application for Certification and of Hearing 
before the Ontario Labour Relations Board' (form 6) posted by the 
employer in the workplace. Objectors are warned that statements of 
desire not conforming to these requirements will not be accepted. 
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Other defects in form may also result in rejection. The document 
must, for example, state clearly on its face that the employees oppose 
the union. Statements which do not cast doubt on the employees' desire 
to be represented by a union will be disregarded. Thus, when workers 
petitioned the Board for the sole purpose of obtaining a representation 
vote their request was denied. 32 Similarly, a petition headed by the 
equivocal statement, 'The undersigned people are petitioning the Hotels, 
Clubs, Restaurant, Taverns Employees Union Local 261', was rejected. 33 
But even a petition which is timely and proper in form may not be germane 
to the disposition of an application. To be relevant, a petition must 
cast doubt on a union's claim to certification without a vote, that is, 
the number of union members signing a petition must be sufficient to 
reduce a union's unqualified membership support to 55 per cent or less. 
Consequently, if no union members endorse the statement of desire or if 
the number of member signatories (called 'overlaps') is too few to reduce 
a union's uncontested support below that required for outright 
certification, a petition will not affect the disposition of the 
application. 
To complicate matters further, a union may file a counter-petition 
which, on its face, nullifies the intent of the statement of desire. By 
signing the counter-petition, those who repudiated their membership in a 
union reaffirm their support. If a sufficient number of 'overlaps' 
subsequently sign the counter-petition, the Board may decide to grant 
certification without a representation vote notwithstanding an anti-
union petition, so long as the signatures were obtained without threats, 
intimidation, undue influence, or misrepresentation. Once a counter-
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petition is accepted, an anti-union petition becomes irrelevant, whether 
or not it was signed voluntarily (Sack and Mitchell, 1985:199-200). 
While revocations of membership raised doubts about the employees' 
true wishes, they are not considered decisive. In the face of a 
petition, the import of a union's membership evidence is equivocal but 
not void: 
It would be somewhat anomalous if evidence of membership, which must 
withstand the requirements laid down in the Act together with its 
related rules and forms, could be 'revoked' by a much less formal 
and essentially unregulated course of conduct which usually follows 
on the heels of an employee having joined a trade union ... lf this 
was not the approach taken, a trade union would never know when to 
cease organizing 34 . 
Thus, by itself, a petition is not grounds for dismissing an application; 
at most, it will cause the Board to exercise its discretion to order a 
representation vote. First, however, the Board must be satisfied that 
the signatures were obtained voluntarily. When a petition is timely, 
proper, and potentially relevant, the OLRB investigates the circumstances 
surrounding the origination, preparation, and circulation of the document 
to ensure that it truly reflects the wishes of the employees involved. 
The onus is on the objectors. They must dissipate the 'aura of 
suspicion' which attaches to the members' 'sudden change of heart' .35 It 
is not enough for the origin of a petition to be left uncertain, the 
petitioners must show that 'they got the idea, drew up the petition 
without company help, and obtained all signatures themselves in a fair 
way, without intimidation or misrepresentation' (Cornish and Ritchie, 
1980:88-9). Objectors are forewarned that witnesses must be available to 
attest to the origination of a petition and how and under what 
circumstances each signature was obtained: form 6. Failure to testify 
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or gaps in the evidence will cause the OLRB to disregard the statement. 
Each signature on the petition (referred to by number to prevent 
disclosure of a person's name) must be identified by someone who saw or 
was present when the petition was signed. Signatures not so identified 
will be discounted and, if only a small proportion is identified, the 
weight attached to a petition as a whole will be reduced (Sack and 
Mitchell, 1985: 206-7). 
Having regard for an employee's 'natural desire to want to appear to 
identify himself with the interests and wishes of his employer', a 
petition is inherently suspicious if it has been abetted by management. 36 
Any involvement by an employer, for example, referring the objectors to a 
lawyer, paying their legal fees, or allowing a petition to be typed or 
copied in the office, invalidates the document (Cornish and Ritchie, 
1980:90-1). A petition will be rejected if it is circulated by persons 
exercising even limited managerial authority.37 If a document is signed 
by a foreman or other person in authority, the signatures which follow 
will be discounted (Sack and Mitchell, 1985:211-2).38 In one case, a 
petition was rejected because the objectors were escorted to the home of 
the petition's originator by a foremen. His presence in the house, 
though not in the room, where the document was discussed and signed 
caused the Board to conclude that the employees had been unintentionally 
influenced. 39 
Any intimidating statement or action may cause the Board to regard a 
petition as involuntary. A petition drive organized in the wake of a 
'captive audience' speech held during working hours and on time paid for 
by the company has traditionally been viewed with suspicion. In the case 
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of New Ontario Dynamics,40 the decision to unionize was linked with the 
possibility of bankruptcy and the inevitability of strikes in a speech by 
a member of the company's board of directors. But no matter what is 
said, these meetings by themselves may 'convey the anti-union sentiments 
of the management regardless of their content' and thus 'tend to taint 
the following efforts of employees who decide to oppose the application'. 
Voluntariness is the sole issue. The test applied does not depend 
on an employer's anti-union intent. Thus, a petition may be set aside 
even if management's influence has been unintentional and quite by 
accident: it is not the actions of an employer but 'the reasonable 
perception of the employees that the Board must assess' .41 Because 
workers may logically fear that a refusal to sign might become known to 
management, circulating a document in the workplace during working hours, 
though not fatal in itself, is suggestive of the employer's support. 
Accordingly, management's failure to discipline the promoter of a 
petition when he was absent from his work-station was decisive in one 
instance. Its failure to respond could not have gone unnoticed, the 
Board reasoned. Other workers might logically have assumed that 
management supported the petition and that the names of those refusing to 
sign would become known. Thus, despite the absence of 'collusion or 
other conscious or deliberate improprieties on the part of either the 
objectors and/or the respondent company', the petition was rejected. 42 
Similarly, in Valley Bottling,4 3 the petition was rejected because the 
employer's conduct was judged capable of unduly influencing employees 
even though its written statements were factual and devoid of comment, 
there were no threats, promises or references to the union during 
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interviews with the employees, and meetings were not unusual at that time 
of year. 
The Effect on Certification and Collective Bargaining 
Certification is a complex and time-consuming process in Ontario: a 
'legal nightmare', unions complain. h Though designed to be informal and 
speedy, 'we find ourselves today with a bureaucratic, court-like tribunal 
that seems far removed from ordinary people wishing to have their unions 
certified' (Cornish and Ritchie, 1980:15). Unnecessary delays and undue 
attention to legal technicalities are the perennial complaints of 
labour's representatives. Unions are 'bogged down in a mass of detail, 
technical difficulties and legal quibbling', (Ontario Federation of 
Labour, 1962:2). The law obstructs unions and allows anti-union 
employers who 'know where to find counsel who will exploit every 
provision and procedure available to delay and defeat certification' 
(Ontario Federation of Labour, 1978:20). Unionists have been 
particularly outspoken in their opposition to anti-union petitions. 
Their frequent abuse by employers has caused unions to assume that all 
petitions are management-inspired. 'If any aspect of the administration 
of the Act impedes unionization, it is this one', the Ontario Federation 
of Labour (1980a:3) complained. 'The record of abuse, irregularities and 
management inspiration of petitions is so clear that these statements 
opposing certification should be dropped' (Ontario Federation of Labour, 
1980b:1). 
hCited by Cornish and Ritchie (1980:16). 
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Employers, by contrast, insist the process is not thorough enough. 
Addressing the Woods Task Force on Industrial Relations, the Canadian 
Chamber of Commerce (1967:3) argued that workers 'often "join the union" 
(i.e. sign the membership card and pay a nominal sum) not so much from a 
desire to join the union, but rather to avoid controversy and dispute in 
the work place'. Not infrequently, the employer is aware, 'or believes he 
is aware, of employee opposition to the union which, because of the 
certification procedures, did not have an opportunity to express itself. 
As a result, many unions are certified without the true wishes of the 
employees being determined a secret ballot'. From the employers' 
perspective, petitions are an essential component of the process, an 
opportunity for sober second thought, and should be made easier to 
organize. 
The belief that workers might be pressured rather than persuaded to 
join a union is shared, to some extent, by the Ontario Labour Relations 
Board. Absent the check of a representation vote, the Board defends its 
many procedural precautions as necessary to protect the integrity of the 
procedure. But too much complexity--too many checks and balances--
afford employers many opportunities to intervene. The result is that 
certification is made harder to get. Three out of ten applications for 
certification were unsuccessful during the 1970s, and not always because 
of inadequate membership support. Of the 2,656 applications dismissed or 
withdrawn, at least 31.3 per cent l were applications in which the union 
lIn fact, the proportion may have been higher because data on 
membership were available for 832 applications and missing for the 970 
applications that were dismissed or withdrawn before the bargaining unit 
was determined. 
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had enrolled more than 50 per cent of the employees in the bargaining 
unit as of the terminal date. 
A minimum of two to three weeks was required to dispose of 
uncomplicated applications, and generally the process took much longer: 
an average of 58 calendar days over the course of the study; 72 days when 
a petition was involved. More than four weeks elapsed before a majority 
and more than eight weeks elapsed before three-quarters of all 
applications were settled. After fourteen weeks, one out of eight 
applications remained unresolved. And the longer the process, the lower 
the likelihood of certification. Applications disposed of within five 
weeks were significantly more likely to result in certification than 
those finalized thereafter: 75.4 per cent of unions were granted 
bargaining rights when their applications were processed within 35 days 
compared to 61.2 per cent when their applications took longer. 
Table 3.1: Average Time Elapsed in Certification 
Fiscal Years 1970-71 to 1981-82 
Applications with petitions 
Applications granted certification 
All applications 
72 days 
52 days 
58 days 
Applications involving petitions were also significantly less likely 
to result in certification although the difference was relatively small. 
Bargaining rights were granted to 69.9 per cent of unions whose 
applications for certification were unopposed whereas unions were 
successful in securing certification 66.5 per cent of the time when anti-
115 
union petitions were filed. And even this difference disappeared when 
those petitions which the Board found to have been voluntary were 
substracted. Of this group, fewer than one in five (18.3 per cent) were 
granted certification following a representation vote whereas the rate of 
success in all other petition cases was slightly higher than average at 
71.9 per cent. 
Table 3.2: Time Elapsed in Certification by Outcome of Certification 
Fiscal years 1970-71 to 1981-82 
1-35 days 36 or more days Total 
Union certified 3,700 2,281 5,981 
Union not certified 1,207 1,449 2,656 
Total 4,907 3,730 8,637 
Proportion certified 75.4% 61.2% 69.3% 
X2 = 202.1·· 
(1 degree of freedom) 
··Significant at the .01 level 
The impact of delays was evident in the outcome of bargaining as 
well. Delays not only reduced the likelihood that certification would be 
granted but also the likelihood that collective agreements would be 
negotiated. Unions certified within five weeks of application were 
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significantly more likely to negotiate collective agreements than were 
those certified later. The effect was comparatively small, however: of 
the former group. 85.3 per cent concluded first agreements compared to 
83.5 per cent of the latter. j 
Table 3.3: Incidence of Petitions by Outcome of Certification 
Fiscal years 1970-71 to 1981-82 
Petition No Petition Total 
Union Certified 1.119 4,862 5,981 
Union not Certified 564 2,092 2,656 
Total 1,683 6,954 8,637 
Proportion Certified 66.5% 69.9% 69.3% 
X2 = 7.5** 
(1 degree of freedom) 
··Significant at the .01 level 
Bargaining success was more obviously affected by anti-union 
petitions. When statements of desire were filed, unions were found to 
JSolomon (1984), using a sample of 150 certification applications 
disposed of by the OLRB during fiscal year 1980-81, found the length of 
the certification process was a significant factor in predicting the 
outcome of bargaining. Span (total time elapsed between the opening of 
the hearing and the disposition of application) was significantly and 
negatively related to the likelihood of a first agreement. Similarly, 
the number of days of hearing was an impediment to the negotiation of an 
agreement although the number of hours of hearings appeared to increase 
the likelihood of concluding a first agreement. 
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have concluded agreements for only 79.1 per cent of their bargaining 
units, a rate of bargaining success almost seven percentage points lower 
than for unions whose applications for certification were unopposed. But 
the effect was not evenly distributed. The likelihood of bargaining 
failure was highly concentrated among those unions against which 
petitions were filed and dismissed by the OLRB as tainted. When 
statements of desire were found to have been involuntary (and the unions 
were certified without a representation vote), the likelihood of 
Table 3.4: Time Elapsed In Certification 
by Bargaining Outcome 
Fiscal years 1970-71 to 1981-82 
Collective agreement 
negotiated 
No collective 
agreement negotiated 
Total 
Proportion with 
collective agreements 
X2 = 3.7-
(1 degree of freedom) 
-Significant at the .1 level 
1 - 35 36 or more 
days days 
3,138 1,895 
539 375 
3,677 2,270 
85.3% 83.5% 
Total 
5,033 
914 
5,947#1 
84.6% 
I1The total in this table differs from the total number of unions 
certified by the number of cases in which the outcome of bargaining could 
not be determined. 
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negotiating collective agreements was only 66.6 per cent, that is, 
sharply lower than the 85.2 per cent of unions negotiating agreements 
when petitions were either untimely, irrelevant, or accepted as genuine 
by the Board. For the latter group. the rate of bargaining success was 
not significantly different than for unions whose applications for 
certification were unopposed. k 
Table 3.5: Incidence of Petitions by Bargaining Outcome 
Fiscal years 1970-71 to 1981-82 
Collective agreement 
negotiated 
No collective 
agreement negotiated 
Total 
Proportion with 
collective agreements 
X2 = 32.6--
(1 degree of freedom) 
··Significant at the .01 level 
Petition No Petition 
880 4.153 
233 681 
1.113 4.834 
79.1% 85.9% 
Total 
5.033 
914 
5.947 
84.6% 
kSolomon (1984) using a sample of 150 certified unions in Ontario. 
reported no correlation between anti-union petitions and the incidence of 
first agreements which, he said, defied expectation. But as the total 
number of applications with petitions analyzed was small (fewer than 50) 
and because information about the number of union signatories and the 
relevance of the petition were not collected. the importance of this 
finding is questionable. 
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These findings echo the experiences of American unions with respect 
to delays. A number of studies have demonstrated a significant, negative 
correlation between the length of the certification process and the 
likelihood of winning bargaining rights (Drotning, 1967; Miller and 
Leaming, 1962; Prosten, 1978; Roomkin and Juris, 1979; Roomkin and Block, 
1981; and Cooke, 1983). And Cooke (1985a, 1985c) found that delays 
during certification were also strongly associated with the failure to 
negotiate collective agreements although contrary evidence was reported 
by Solomon (1985) for a sample of 195 cases granted certification by the 
Canada Labour Relations Board in 1979-1980. In this sample, the 
likelihood that collective agreements would be negotiated was 
significantly higher for unions whose applications for certification took 
longer to process. l 
Policy-makers are not unaware of the prejudice caused by procedural 
delays. Both the pre-hearing vote procedure, introduced in 1960, and 
interim certification, introduced in 1975, were intended, in part, to 
shorten the time required to process applications. The advantage of the 
former is that representation votes are conducted relatively quickly, 
usually within ten days of application, and the ballot box sealed (with 
elaborate provision for identifying the ballots of those whose 
eligibility to vote is being challenged). Only after all the disputes 
over the composition of the bargaining unit, the admissibility of the 
union's membership evidence, and so on are resolved, and only if the 
IThere is nothing comparable to Ontario's petition procedure in the 
United States or under the Canada Labour Code. 
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Board is satisfied that a union had, as members, not less than 35 per 
cent of the employees in the voting constituency as of the date of 
application, are the ballots counted. 44 On average, however, pre-hearing 
vote applications took longer to resolve than so-called regular 
applications. Six weeks elapsed before a majority of the pre-hearing 
vote applications was disposed of compared to four weeks for regular 
applications. 
Table 3.6: Type of Petition by Bargaining Outcome 
Collective Agreement 
negotiated 
No collective 
Agreement negotiated 
Total 
Proportion with 
collective agreements 
X2 = 51.2** 
(1 degree of freedom) 
Fiscal Years 1970-71 to 1981-82 
Petition relevant All other petitions 
but not accepted #1 
243 637 
122 111 
365 748 
66.6% 85.2% 
**Significant at the .01 level. 
#lTbese unions were certified without a representation vote. 
Interim certification has been a more successful innovation. 
Observing that collective bargaining was frequently delayed because 
unions with an indisputable right to be certified were caught up in 
Total 
880 
233 
1,113 
79.1% 
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disputes over the legal status of a relatively small number of persons. 
the Act was amended to permit the OLRB to grant certification on an 
interim basis when the outcome of a dispute would not affect a union's 
claim to represent more than 55 per cent of the employees in a bargaining 
unit.45 But even though the volume of cases has been sizeable--404 over 
six years--the impact of the change has been marginal as bargaining 
rarely began in earnest until the case was finally closed. 
The Labour Relations Board has also sought to expedite the 
processing of certification applications by organizational changes. To 
improve efficiency, a manager has been appointed to co-ordinate the 
Board's case-load, the progress of applications though the system is now 
monitored, and the Board's method of scheduling continuation hearings has 
been revised (Adams, 1980a:4). Most innovative of the internal changes 
is the waiver of hearing programme encouraging the parties to dispense 
with a full-scale hearing. But as this is possible only when there are 
no impediments to outright certification, the parties must agree on the 
description of the bargaining unit and the union's claim to represent 
more than 55 per cent of the employees in the unit: there can be no 
anti-union petition on file and no outstanding unfair labour practice 
allegations (Wakely, Wahl, and Freeman, undated:AVIII-14). 
The cumulative effect of these changes is not evident from the 
OLRB's statistics. The proportion of applications disposed of within 14 
days remains small: 8.9 per cent in fiscal year 1985-86. By the end of 
the fourth week, a majority (49.5 per cent) of the applications had been 
settled; however, ten weeks elapsed before three-quarters (75.1 per cent) 
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of the cases were closed (Ontario Labour Relations Board, Annual Report 
1985-86:72) . 
Shortening the certification process is impossible without altering 
it fundamentally. So long as employers have full standing before the 
Board, it is easy for them to buy time: 
It is always possible to manufacture some kind of contest about 
legal certification: about whether the office staff should be 
included in a plant unit, or about the status of certain 
foremen and leadhands. Counsel for the employer demands a 
hearing, which will have to be scheduled weeks later, and which 
may be able to be adjourned or continued for months (Weiler, 
1980:39) . 
In Ontario, 'most challenges are raised by employers who have the 
resources and incentive' to pursue such matters (Adams, 1985:360). 
Disputes are easily exaggerated. Questions about the legal status of 
employees, the size and composition of bargaining units, and the weight 
to be accorded membership evidence offer employers many legitimate 
opportunities to intervene and delay the disposition of applications. 
Considerable time and effort are spent in ferreting out technical 
lapses. A single breach of its complex rules, a single indiscretion by a 
lay organizer, will cause the OLRB to investigate. And if it is the 
least bit uncertain, a representation vote is ordered. But does it 
really matter whether a member gave the dollar to the organizer directly 
or by way of another worker? Why is it so important that the money be 
collected when the card is signed rather than later? Is the worker any 
less committed to collective bargaining because she borrowed the dollar 
or gave the organizer his lunch instead of cash? The important issue, 
Bain (1978:36) emphasized is 'not whether a majority of the employees in 
a bargaining unit are "legally" members of the union but whether they 
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wish the union to represent them'. In the meantime, employees become 
impatient, wonder why the union has done nothing to improve their working 
conditions, leave their jobs, or lose interest. Delays also allow anti-
union employers time to take counter-measures designed to undermine the 
employees' support for collective bargaining. 
Equally troublesome for unions is the petition procedure. Anti-
union petitions serve no useful purpose. For employees who oppose 
certification, the procedure offers nothing at all. Signing a petition 
is no more weighty a statement than refusing to sign a union's membership 
card. At the same time, the procedure entices employers to intervene 
where they do not belong. Sponsoring and defending a petition may also 
turn a group of disaffected individuals into an organized and vocal, 
anti-union minority: a division only hardened by the Board's 
investigations. Hearings may be spread over weeks or months; tension at 
work remains high; many bitter things are said. To discredit the 
petitioners, a union's lawyer must cross-examine aggressively and feels 
compelled to deride their independence and motivation leaving them 
hostile and resentful. Certification cannot heal the rift; indeed, in 
these circumstances, certification is 'probably still the most deeply 
resented decision that a Board makes. Where the union loses it will 
blame the Board for failing to take account of employer anti-unionism. 
Where it wins the employer will assume that the true wishes of a majority 
of the employees have not been properly ascertained' (Christie, 1977:47). 
Whether so detailed an examination of a union's application is 
necessary is questionable. Arguably, the Ontario Board makes too much of 
certification. It is nothing more than a necessary prerequisite for 
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bargaining: in Weiler's (1980:48-9) words, a 'legal licence to bargain'. 
The real test of the employee's wishes comes 'when the trade union looks 
for a mandate to support its efforts at the bargaining table'. 
Conclusion 
To facilitate the growth of unions, the certification procedure 
should be simple and straightforward; instead, it is long and involved, 
and less effective than it might be. Delays in the pr.ocessing of 
applications were not only frequent during the 1970s, they were 
associated with lower rates of success in certification. Unions whose 
applications took longer than five weeks to process were less likely to 
be granted bargaining rights and, if certified, much less likely to 
negotiate collective agreements. 
Far from reinforcing the right to associate, the OLRB's complex 
rules and exacting standard of conduct impede the organizing of unions. 
Procedural niceties have been the downfall of many organizing campaigns. 
The OLRB is excessively careful, checking and cross-checking the details 
to insure that its many rules have been followed. Any question about the 
validity of a union's membership evidence -- any uncertainty about the 
manner in which the membership cards were signed, any hint that the 
workers might have been confused about the organization they were 
joining, or any doubt that each new member paid a dollar directly to an 
organizer -- will cause the Board to investigate. And if the Board 
remains uncertain, it will order a representation vote. 
Equally frustrating for unions are the objections raised by 
employers. Because they are a party to every application, employers are 
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entitled to raise points of law and procedure, challenge the scope and 
composition of a bargaining unit proposed by a union, question the 
eligibility of supervisory or other employees for union membership, or 
alert the Board to irregularities in the conduct of organizing drives. 
Each of these allegations will cause the OLRB to investigate and if the 
matter cannot be resolved informally either party is entitled to a full-
scale hearing. So willing is the Board to entertain these objections, 
anti-union employers can delay the outcome of certification proceedings 
almost at will. 
A second obstacle to the growth of unions in Ontario is the 
ubiquitous anti-union petition. Associated with petitions are time-
consuming inquiries into the organization, preparation, and circulation 
of the documents with the result that unscrupulous employers may encourage 
their use, even in the knowledge that those tainted by managerial 
involvement will result in rejection by the Board. In fact, most of the 
petitions filed with the OLRB during the 1970s were either not relevant 
to the outcome of the applications concerned or were tainted by management's 
sponsorship or tacit approval. In only a small number of cases was a petition 
both signed by enough union members to cast doubt on a union's claim to 
outright certification and found to be a voluntary statement of the employees' 
true wishes. But of this group, fewer than one in five unions was 
granted bargaining rights following a Board-ordered representation vote. 
More troubling was the strong correlation between anti-union 
petitions and bargaining failure. Unions were generally less likely to 
negotiate collective agreements when their applications for certification 
were opposed by petitions; however, a closer look revealed that the 
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problem was confined to unions opposed by petitions rejected as 
involuntary by the OLRB. For the sizeable group of unions faced with 
petitions that were relevant (that is, signed by enough union members to 
reduce a union's uncontested membership support to below the level 
required for outright certification) but were found to be unreliable 
because of managerial involvement, the likelihood of negotiating 
collective agreements was dramatically lower. 
Petitions are clearly troublesome for unions. Even though the OLRB 
seeks to impose a high standard of conduct on employers by rejecting not 
only petitions directly sponsored by management but also petitions which 
appear to be tacitly supported, it can do little more than set the 
document aside and certify the union. If, in the process, workers have 
come to believe that management is strongly opposed to collective 
bargaining and knows who supports the union, the process of investigating 
a petition and questioning its promoters may split the workforce into 
pro- and anti-union factions. Such division saps a union's bargaining 
power and reduces its chances of negotiating a collective agreement 
significantly. Given the potential for abuse, therefore, the anti-union 
petition should be eliminated: it does little to protect the rights of 
those who oppose collective bargaining while undermining the rights of 
workers who prefer union representation. 
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Chapter 4 
UNFAIR LABOUR PRACTICES 
The right to associate enshrined in the Labour Relations Act is made 
effective by the prohibition against aggressive, anti-union conduct. 
Interference with the formation, selection, or administration of a trade 
union, intimidation or coercion to discourage workers from exercising 
their statutory rights, discrimination against or dismissal of workers 
for union activity, and the unilateral alteration of wages or working 
conditions during organizing and bargaining are unlawful. Though wide-
ranging in scope, the protection afforded by the prohibition against 
unfair practices is undercut by the Board's view that anti-union animus 
is a necessary ingredient of unlawful conduct. Unless the OLRB is 
persuaded that an employer is motivated by unlawful intent, management 
retains the right to run the firm as it sees fit. Thus, a dismissal 
during an organizing campaign is not unlawful per se or even if it is 
unjust, but only if the Board can detect an anti-union purpose. Other 
sorts of employer conduct are similarly protected so long as the 
initiatives are undertaken for reasons of efficiency or profitability. 
An employer may, for example, sub-contract work, lay workers off, 
reorganize the work process, or introduce new technology despite the 
adverse effects that such conduct may have on an organizing drive, 
provided of course that the motivation for such changes is the pursuit 
legitimate self-interest. 
The right to associate is undercut as well by the nature of the 
Board's remedies. Orders to reinstate and compensate workers dismissed 
in violation of the Act may right the wrong suffered by an individual but 
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do little to assert the rights of the collective. Such orders, moreover, 
fail to deprive an unfair employer of the benefits of its unlawful 
conduct so have little deterrent value. This being the case, outright 
certification may be the most effective means of protecting workers' 
rights. By certifying unions on the basis of membership cards rather 
than representation votes, the law prevents an unscrupulous employer from 
undermining a union's application for certification. No amount of 
unlawful conduct can take away membership cards already signed. 
This chapter examines the effect of unfair labour practices on 
certification and collective bargaining by looking first at the Board's 
jurisprudence. How the Board interprets the statutory prohibition 
against unilateral changes in terms and conditions of employment is 
followed by a discussion of the scope of the protection against 
intimidation and dismissal for union activity and then by a review of the 
cases dealing with unlawful interference. The next section describes the 
Board's remedial authority and how it exercises its power to remedy 
violations of the Act. Finally, the effects of unfair labour practice 
complaints on the outcome of certification and the likelihood of 
negotiating a collective agreement are analyzed statistically using data 
gathered from the OLRB and the Ministry of Labour. 
Statutory Freeze 
The most straightforward of the unfair labour practice protections 
is the so-called statutory freeze. Since 1970 it has been unlawful for 
an employer to alter wages, or any other term or condition of employment, 
or any right, privilege or duty of employees without the consent of their 
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union once it has filed an application for certification with the Labour 
Relations Board and the employer has been notified of the application. 
The freeze lasts until certification has been granted and bargaining has 
been initiated or until the certification application has been dismissed 
or withdrawn. Also caught by the freeze are changes decided upon but not 
communicated to employees before the employer learned officially of the 
certification drive.! Terms and conditions of employment are again 
frozen once a union has served an employer with notice of its desire to 
negotiate and the freeze lasts until the conciliation process has been 
exhausted and the right to strike accrues or the union's representation 
rights have been terminated, whichever occurs first. 2 
The purpose of the freeze is to establish 'a period of stability, 
prohibiting unilateral change during the sensitive periods when the union 
is seeking certification or while the parties are negotiating a 
collective agreement' {Adams, 1985:551}. And although changes are 
permitted with the consent of a union, employers apparently feel that by 
seeking agreement they would be drawn into bargaining (Christie and 
Gorsky, 1968:49). In fact, unions are advised to greet an attempt to 
blame a wage freeze on an organizing drive with a well publicized 
invitation to management to implement the increase (Cornish and Ritchie, 
1980:108-110). 
Unlike other categories of unfair practices, anti-union animus is 
not a necessary ingredient for violations of the freeze. There is strict 
liability regardless of motive. To be above the law an employer must, 
not, for example, reduce wages3 or alter benefits, introduce a fee for 
parking,4 or revoke the privilege of permitting employees to refuse 
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Saturday work.5 In one case. an employer was found to have breached the 
freeze when it reduced the hours of work after consulting with, but 
without the consent of. the union. 6 Nor is it necessary to rely on a 
contractual right. a formal written policy. or even an express promise: 
The term 'privilege' is extremely broad and extends to all of 
those benefits which an employee is accustomed to receiving but 
to which he is not legally entitled. and which cannot. 
therefore. be considered a 'right' ... It is sufficient if 
there is an established. and well entrenched. course of conduct 
which gives rise to the reasonable expectation that a benefit, 
previously given. will be continued. 7 
Elsewhere, the Board explained that 'some promises do give rise to 
expectations that harden into privileges, and such privileges are not 
beyond the reach of the statutory freeze,.8 In the Canron9 case, 
management was found to have committed an unfair labour practice when it 
unilaterally ceased paying workers in cash. The company's defence, that 
the change was merely procedural, was rejected. And in Etobicoke General 
Hospital,10 the employer was required to continue its historical error in 
the calculation of 'payments for statutory holidays: the established 
method of payment constituted a privilege frozen by the Act. 
Not only are the existing terms and conditions frozen but the prior 
pattern of the employment relationship in its entirety. The 'business as 
before' approach requires an employer to continue managing the operation 
as it has in the past, that is, in accordance with the patten established 
prior to the onset of the freeze including any firmly established 
promises to improve wages or conditions. Thus, an employer has been 
required to implement the customary wage11 and merit12 increases during 
the freeze period, maintain the long-standing parity between the wages of 
full- and part-time employees. 13 and continue to adjust working 
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conditions in concert with the established reference group.14 By the 
same reasoning, it was not a breach of the Act for an employer to grant a 
retroactive wage increase just before a representation vote because the 
adjustment had been promised to employees prior to the onset of the 
freeze. 1S 
Management is not in a complete legal straitjacket, however. The 
'business as before' approach does not imply an absolute freeze because 
'such an interpretation would effectively paralyze an employer's 
operations for the duration of the statutory freeze, a period which could 
be quite lengthy' .16 In AES Data,1 7 therefore, the Board affirmed the 
employer's right to make ordinary business and production decisions in 
the interest of efficiency even though the effect was to modify an 
employee's job functions. So long as an employer does not depart from 
the previous pattern of conduct, it is free to exercise its traditional 
prerogatives and may, for example, transfer employees from one shift to 
another to meet staffing requirements18 or dismiss an employee during the 
freeze period, provided that the discharge is implemented in a manner 
consistent with the prior operation of the business (Adams, 1985:557). 
Even large-scale changes can be justified if an employer is motivated by 
economics and not anti-union animus. Thus, there was no breach of the 
statute in Superior Glove Works 19 when one production line was closed 
down and workers were laid off in the face of an organizing drive, in 
spite of the owner's open hostility to unionism. Because the cut-back 
was for business reasons and the lay-offs were based on seniority, no 
anti-union intent was evident. 
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Changes of this sort are justified, the OLRB believes, because 
lay-offs for business reasons are part of workers' 'reasonable 
expectations'. Employees should anticipate that employers will respond 
to changing economic conditions through hiring, firing, and attrition: 
'It is in this sense that it is "reasonable" for employees to expect an 
employer to respond to a significant downturn in business with layoffs 
(or terminations) even where such layoffs are resorted to for the first 
time during the freeze' .20 The magnitude of the cut-backs must be 
proportionate to the severity of the loss of business, but otherwise a 
firm is free to adjust the size of its workforce as it considers 
advisable. In another case, the 'business as before' rule was 
interpreted to permit the introduction of new technology during the 
period of the statutory freeze with no obligation on the employer to 
discuss the consequences with the union. 21 
On occasion, the Board has distinguished lay-offs resulting from a 
downturn in business from lay-offs resulting from contracting out: the 
former were said to form part of employees' reasonable expectations while 
the latter did not. None the less, in Town of Petrolia,22 management's 
right to sub-contract its garbage collection and landfill operations was 
affirmed even though the parties were in the midst of negotiations for a 
first agreement and the union was seeking to protect workers from 
lay-offs. In this particular case, the cost-cutting programme had been 
initiated well in advance of the onset of the freeze and the lay-offs 
should have been anticipated by the employees, the Board decided; 
moreover, the possibility of intermittent lay-offs was clearly stated in 
the employees' handbook. In any event, the right of an employer to sub-
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contract work for bona fide business reasons was considered to be a 
traditional prerogative of management which remains intact and which 
cannot be modified by an employment manual or by past practice. 
Clearly, an application for certification does not herald the start 
of a collective bargaining regime in Ontario. Although the freeze is 
said to provide a fixed point of departure for bargaining, it does 
nothing of the sort. As interpreted by the OLRB, the law affords 
employers one last opportunity to rid themselves of unwanted employees, 
introduce new technology, contract work out, or make any other changes 
they choose without bargaining, or even consulting, with the union. The 
legitimacy of such decisions is grounded in the legitimacy of the pursuit 
of economic self-interest: so long as there is no anti-union motive, an 
employer remains free to continue making decisions which affect terms and 
conditions of employment. Nor is the constraint of past practice a 
pressing one. As interpreted by the Board, the Labour Relations Act 
allows an arbitrary employer to continue to act arbitrarily. 
While the statutory freeze has been characterized as an interim 
legal regime during which neither the law of master and servant nor the 
law of collective bargaining applies, the freeze is not regarded as the 
prelude to collective bargaining. By adopting the 'business as before' 
approach, the Board has chosen the individual contract of employment as 
its point of reference. The workers are not treated as equal partners in 
the decision-making process; indeed, the notion of joint decision-making 
has been almost forgotten. Neither the fact that workers have formed a 
union nor the fact that the parties may be about to negotiate a 
collective agreement appears to entitle them to be consulted. 
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Full acceptance of collective bargaining, by contrast, would imply 
that the freeze should be absolute. Important changes should be held in 
abeyance during the certification process. Once workers have organized, 
an employer has lost the right to act unilaterally; moreover, the terms 
and conditions of employment established under individual bargaining are 
no longer the appropriate reference point. In a collective bargaining 
regime there are no rules governing the employment relationship until the 
parties have negotiated them. There should be no right to discipline or 
dismiss in accordance with past practice, no right to introduce new 
technology or sub-contract work, no right to make any changes at all 
without consulting with the union, at least not until those rights have 
been agreed to by both parties. But so total a freeze is not acceptable 
to the OLRB. An absolute freeze would not give management the 
flexibility it desires: so total a freeze would fail 'to accommodate 
necessary and inevitable changes' and would allow a union to extract an 
'artificially high price for change' (ibid.:559). Instead, employers are 
accorded is traditional prerogatives even though the effect may be to 
undermine the right to associate. 
Intimidation, Coercion, and Dismissal for Union Activity 
It is also an unfair labour practice for an employer, at any time, to 
seek by intimidation or coercion to compel any person to become or to 
refrain from becoming, or to continue to be or to cease to be a member of 
a trade union, or to refrain from exercising any other right conferred by 
the Labour Relations Act.23 The protection afforded is quite specific: 
only a person (and not a trade union) is a potential victim and it is 
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necessary to establish that there was a threat, or intimidating or 
coercive action coincident with an express or implied demand to join, or 
to refrain from joining, a union or to forgo exercising a right. But 
there is no need to establish that the person was, in fact, intimidated 
or coerced (Sack and Mitchell, 1985:440). The converse also holds: it is 
not sufficient to demonstrate that the complainant might reasonably have 
been intimidated or coerced, or even that he or she was. 
For the conduct to be unlawful, an illegal motive is necessary.24 
Accordingly, the Board has found unlawful the sudden and strict 
enforcement of plant rules or safety procedures, transfers of employees 
which were in effect demotions, hypercritical supervision and the 
harassment of union activists, and overburdening an employee with work 
while withholding the necessary assistance because the employer's 
underlying purpose was unlawful (Adams, 1985:496-7). In some instances, 
the injurious results of the employer's conduct have been so predictable 
that the Board was willing to assume that management intended the 
consequences of its actions. Most serious were threats of personal 
injury. In Norsemen Plastics Ltd., 25 the necessary unlawful motive was 
found in the company's campaign of anonymous telephone calls threatening 
physical harm against those who refused to sign an anti-union petition. 
Management also counselled workers to vote against the union and 
distributed company and T-shirts on the date of the representation vote. 
Similarly unlawful was the surveillance of those involved in union 
activities by spies or agents provocateurs hired by a company to 
infiltrate a union. 26 And by dramatically increasing security in 
138 
conjunction with an organizing campaign, Skyline Hotels27 was also found 
to have intended to intimidate its employees, though it claimed to be 
protecting them from harassment by union organizers. 
Almost as telling have been threats which undermined workers' job 
security. Trulite Industries28 was found to have committed a serious 
breach of the Act when it told employees in a 'captive audience' speech 
that a union would 'kill the company'. In another case, the employer's 
'request' to attend a meeting during working hours amounted to an order. 
Coupled with a reference to the survival and profitability of the firm 
the employer's conduct was no less than 'a veiled threat to the job 
security of the employees'2 9 • Finally, Food City3 0 was found to have 
violated the Act when management questioned workers about their union 
membership and imposed a punitive change in work schedules. 
For the same reasons, lay-offs and cut-backs to avoid collective 
bargaining have been regarded as breaches of the law. Decisions to 
shut-down or cut-back were tainted if motivated, even in part, by 
anti-union animus. In one case, employees were reinstated despite the 
fact that the decision to sub-contract their work had been made weeks 
before the complainants applied for certification. In the Board's 
assessment, management's decision had been 'crystallized' by the 
organizing drive and so was unlawful. 31 It was similarly unacceptable 
for Culverhouse Foods32 to contract work out to a less than arm's length 
sub-contractor that subsequently refused to employ workers who had 
challenged their terminations by lodging grievances. And when the 
Academy of Medicine33 closed down its telephone answering service rather 
than bargain with its newly certified union, the OLRB found it 'difficult 
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to conceive of conduct more destructive of rights than a permanent 
closure of a business, based not upon legitimate business considerations 
but upon an employer's simple refusal to operate with a trade union'. 
At the same time, however, a shut-down or cut-back resulting from 
bona fide business considerations does not violate the law. Specifically 
protected by the Labour Relations Act is an employer's right to suspend 
or discontinue all or part of its operations for cause. 34 Consequently. 
a lay-off is not unlawful simply because it coincides with an organizing 
drive or otherwise interferes with the right to associate. In 
Accutext,35 for example, the union's complaint was dismissed because the 
Board accepted that a downturn in business was the real reason why two 
employees had been terminated shortly after two others had been dismissed 
from a six-person bargaining unit, all within three months of 
certification. Nor was an unlawful purpose discerned when a nursing home 
contracted out its housekeeping and janitorial work, laying off all 
sixteen of the workers employed in this capacity. The employer's 
motivation was purely economic, the Board concluded: 'the fact that the 
union and the employees were adversely affected does not itself taint the 
legitimacy of that decision'. At no point did the employer consider the 
advantages of non-union over union labour: 'It was not until a 
substantial saving was offered that the respondent took the idea of 
contracting out seriously' .3 6 . 8 ,37 But economic necessity cannot make 
legitimate, conduct motivated by anti-union animus. Even though lay-offs 
8 However, a later decision by the nursing home--to sub-contract its 
nursing functions while retaining control over the work -- was not 
legitimate. In the Board's opinion, the imperfect contracting out of a 
'core function' of a business raised the presumption of an unlawful objective." 
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at Tillotson-Sekisui Plastics38 were justified by the company's financial 
predicament, the OLRB ruled that management had violated the Act because 
it had manipulated the timing of the cut-back in order to undercut the 
union's application for certification. 
In addition to the general prohibition against intimidation and 
coercion, the Act specifically forbids an employer to refuse or threaten 
to refuse to employ or to continue to employ, or to discriminate against 
a person in employment because the person is a member of a trade union or 
is exercising any other right under the Act. 39 Dismissal or discipline 
is unlawful if an employer is motivated, in part or in whole, by 
anti-union sentiment. An employer runs afoul of the law, consequently, 
unless the dismissal is 'for some reason totally unrelated to the 
presence of union activity at or around the time of discharge' .40 
Affirming this approach, the Ontario High Court ruled that a comparable 
provision in the Canada Labour Code had been breached when membership in 
the union was merely 'present in the mind of the employer' when the 
decision to dismiss was made. 41 Whether union activity was the main or 
merely an incidental consideration was unimportant: an improper motive 
need be only one, not the sole, or even the principal reason. 
Questions of fairness, reasonableness, or 'just cause' do not arise, 
however. Where no anti-union motive is established, a dismissal is not 
unlawful simply because it is unjust. The Labour Relations Act does not 
protect employees 'from the unfair or unreasonable actions of their 
employers if those actions are not tainted by anti-union motive,42; the 
Board 'determines the quite different issue of whether a cause of the 
discharge was the employees's union activity' .43 Thus, the dismissal of 
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an employee on the grounds that she was not perfect was upheld once the 
OLRB was satisfied that the employer genuinely expected near 
perfection. 44 Nor was the dismissal of an employee for eating peanuts on 
the job interfered with once this infraction was accepted as the real 
reason for his discharge. 45 Similarly, when a union's chief organizer 
was fired for making caustic remarks and behaving in a threatening way, 
the worker was not reinstated even though he was dismissed on the day of 
the certification hearing. 46 On the other hand, the Board found the 
dismissal of an employee who was incompetent and, in another case, an 
alcoholic, unlawful because both employers had been motivated, in part, 
by anti-union animus (Sack and Mitchell, 1985:411). 
Before a complaint is upheld, the Labour Relations Board requires 
evidence of the employer's anti-union motivation. But proving intent can 
be difficult: 
Typically, an employee will assert that there has been an 
anti-union motive for his termination, while the employer will 
deny that the termination has in any way been connected with 
the employee's union activity. It has been the Board's 
experience that self-serving assertions of this sort have 
little probative value and that the true reasons for the 
discharge can best be gleaned from objective circumstances. 47 
Accordingly, the OLRB inquires into the events surrounding a dismissal 
including the existence of a pattern of anti-union conduct, the 
employer's knowledge of the organizing drive and the complainant's 
involvement in the campaign, the manner in which the employee was 
dismissed, and the credibility of the witnesses. 48 Suspicious are the 
sudden dismissal of a long-service worker or the discharge of an employee 
without a legitimate reason. 
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Other anti-union conduct around the time of a dismissal is 
circumstantial evidence that supports the inference that the discharge 
was part of a pattern. In Comstock Funeral Home49 , the Board relied on 
two unlawful dismissals during the organizing drive to conclude that the 
lay-off of a third, four months later, was a breach of the Act. None the 
less, the decision to layoff a fourth employee was found to have been 
rooted in legitimate self-interest so not disturbed. Conversely, if the 
dismissal was an isolated event or separated in time from other anti-
union conduct the Board has been unlikely to find an employer's conduct 
suspicious. Thus, when one of the leaders of an organizing drive at 
DeVilbiss50 was dismissed for producing too much scrap, low productivity. 
and absenteeism, the OLRB could find no evidence of management's 
anti-union animus. Although the complainant felt he had been observed 
signing up members in the company's parking lot, his concerns were 
dismissed as exaggerated. And although a second union supporter was 
reprimanded for absenteeism and warned after he was observed distributing 
leaflets some time later, the Board could detect no pattern of anti-union 
conduct. In O. Tamblyn Limited,5 1 on the other hand, the Board was not 
deterred by the fact that ten weeks had elapsed between the time when the 
employer became aware of the complainant's union activity and his 
dismissal because his services had been required to cover for others away 
on vacation in the interim. 
Nor has evidence of an employer's anti-union animus always been 
conclusive. The managers of Makita Power Tools5 2 were anti-union without 
a doubt: they organized a petition opposing certification, predicted the 
distributorship would be closed if the union were granted bargaining 
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rights, and questioned workers about their membership in the union. Even 
so, the Board accepted that the complainant had been dismissed as a 
result of his poor performance. While he was one of three union members 
in a bargaining unit of only five persons, the OLRB concluded that the 
dismissal was not for union activity because the complainant had had no 
particular involvement with the organizing drive. 
Ordinarily, the employer's knowledge of a worker's involvement in the 
union has been strongly suggestive of an underlying, improper motive. In 
Delhi Metal Products,53 for example, a worker was allegedly dismissed for 
having alcohol on his breath and he had, in fact, drunk two bottles of 
beer at a lunch-time organizing meeting before returning to work. 
However, the union was able to show that management was well aware of the 
worker's union activities; indeed, moments before his dismissal he had 
torn up an anti-union petition presented to him to sign by another 
employee, the son of a foreman. As a result, the OLRB rejected the 
employer's claim that it was unaware of the worker's role in the 
organizing drive and found the dismissal to have been motivated by 
anti-union animus. 
Lack of knowledge of a worker's union activity has been a 
correspondingly strong defence. The Ontario Board has been unlikely to 
find anti-union animus when a union has been unable to demonstrate that 
the employer knew of the complainant's involvement. Accordingly, the 
dismissal of a worker for inventory shortages was upheld in Becker Milk5 4 
for, although he had written to co-workers urging them to unionize, he 
was not publicly linked to the letter. The Board also doubted that the 
complainant's activity was union-related as he could produce no 
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witnesses, bank books, membership cards, or minutes of meetings to prove 
the organization existed. In Imperial Flavours Inc.,55 likewise, it was 
alleged that five employees had been terminated in contravention of the 
Act although the company disavowed all knowledge of the union's presence, 
a defence the Board accepted despite the fact that management had posted 
a news article describing an organizing drive at Eaton's. Management's 
legitimate concern over extended work-breaks was determined to be the 
real reason for the dismissals. And no unfair labour practice was found 
in another case in which the employer denied knowledge of a worker's 
union activity, even though the dismissal had been precipitous and 'on 
the face of it, appear[ed] less than fair' .5 6 
The reasons for, and the manner of, a dismissal may also indicate 
unlawful intent. An employee laid off for no apparent reason after eight 
months of satisfactory work shortly after she had been observed talking 
to a union organizer was reinstated. 57 In another case, in which an 
employee was dismissed for violating minor company rules, the Board found 
the necessary unlawful intent in the unusual severity of the 
punishment58 . In cases of this sort, it has been the employer's past 
practice that has been the Board's touchstone. When, for example, the 
employment of a nurse's aid was terminated, ostensibly for rough 
treatment of patients, it was established that the incident would 
normally have warranted no more than a verbal warning. Because the 
complainant had four years of service, was a good employee, had no 
disciplinary record and was well known as the initiator of the organizing 
drive, the Board was convinced that the true reason for her discharge was 
her determination to unionize the nursing home. 59 Similar was the case 
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of a worker who admitted the profanity for which he was allegedly 
dismissed. But since he had over three years of service, a good work 
record, and had never been insubordinate before, it was concluded that 
his conduct would normally have warranted only a suspension: the real 
cause of his dismissal was his activities as president of the works 
committee and proponent of unionization. 6o 
Finally, the Board considers the credibility of witnesses. Unions 
are warned that their witnesses should impress the OLRB with their 
frankness and sincerity: 'many discharges have been lost because 
witnesses exaggerated something and were caught by the company lawyers'. 
Cornish and Ritchie (1980:193) cautioned. The union lost the DeVilbiss 
case,61 in part, because the complainant was not forthright about his 
rather poor work performance. And the employer in Barrie Examiner62 
lost, in part, because a supervisor was less than frank about how 
vigorously he had opposed the union. 
Traditionally, the complainant was required to establish the validity 
of the allegation; but, in 1975, the Labour Relations Act was amended and 
the burden of proof shifted to the employer in cases of unlawful 
dismissal, discrimination, intimidation, and coercion. 63 Prior to 1975. 
a worker had to show that he or she had engaged in union activity and 
that his or her employer knew, or believed, the complainant was involved 
in such activity (Sack and Levinson, 1973:217). In reply, an employer 
was required to give a credible explanation for its conduct. Now, 
however, an employer must show that it did not act unlawfully. The onus 
is on it to satisfy the OLRB that the reasons given for the discharge 
were the only reasons and that those reasons were not tainted by an 
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anti-union purpose. 64 Though criticized as an unjust assumption of an 
employer's guilt, the reversal of the burden of proof has been defended 
as consonant with the common law and not inconsistent with the 
presumption of innocence enshrined in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
(Adams, 1985:489). As a practical matter, the 1975 amendment did little 
more than codify the Board's existing practice (England, 1976b:601). In 
Belisle Automobiles Limited65 decided in 1970, for instance, the employer 
was required to justify the sudden dismissal without explanation of seven 
employees whose service ranged from eight weeks to ten years. 
Although it recognizes that a dismissal for any reason during an 
organizing drive is potentially damaging to a union, the Ontario Labour 
Relations Board will leave unremedied conduct which undermines the right 
to associate when it cannot detect an underlying anti-union purpose. 
When urged to recognize the chilling effect that dismissal for any reason 
can have on an organizing campaign, the Board replied: 
That is no doubt true. Other innocent factors, such as layoffs 
for good business reasons or a financial downturn might also 
have a negative impact on the fortunes of a union. As real as 
those concerns may be to a union, they are not matters which 
the provisions of the Act are designed to protect unions or 
employees against. They should, therefore, not be the basis of 
a complaint to this Board. 66 
The issue of motive is paramount. In principle, the Board adheres 
to an objective standard and so quoted with approval the United States 
Supreme Court's view that an improper motive is revealed by conduct that 
is inherently discriminatory or destructive of the right to associate: 
The employer in such cases must be held to intend the very 
consequences which foreseeably and inescapably flow from his 
actions and if he fails to explain away, to justify or to 
characterize his actions as something different than they 
appear on their face, the unfair labor practice charge is made 
out ... His conduct does speak for itself -- it is 
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discriminatory and it does discourage union membership and 
whatever the claimed overriding justification may be, it 
carries with it unavoidable consequences which the employer not 
only foresaw but which he must have intended. (Adams, 
1985:492). 
In practice, however, the Ontario Board is reluctant to infer an unlawful 
motive from an employer's conduct particularly when there is some 
evidence of an acceptable business justification. Efficiency and 
productivity are over-riding considerations: 'every employee remains 
subject to the legitimate actions of his employer in adjusting his work 
force to meet the genuine needs of his enterprise' .67 A good deal of 
damaging conduct goes unremedied as a result. Lay-offs and terminations 
are acceptable so long as an employer is pursuing a legitimate business 
objective. Although a former chairperson of the Ontario Labour Relations 
Board has argued that Canadian collective bargaining legislation 
prohibits 'employer conduct that interferes with the organization of 
employees' (Carter, 1982:1), this is not, in fact, how the law has been 
interpreted and applied. 
Unlawful Interference 
The least tractable of the statutory protections of the right to 
associate is the prohibition against an employer participating in or 
interfering with, the formation, selection or administration of a trade 
union or the representation of employees by a trade union. 68 Despite 
efforts to restrict its meaning, unlawful interference remains a broad 
category of offences including closing or threatening to close an 
establishment to avoid collective bargaining, dismissing an employee for 
union activity, sponsoring an anti-union petition, conferring benefits 
148 
and soliciting grievances to undermine support for the union, 
disciplining employees to prevent them from discussing union business on 
their coffee breaks, or spreading rumors that management knows the names 
of those who joined the union (Sack and Mitchell, 1985:433-4). Employers 
have been warned against assisting workers in the formation of an 
employees' committee to rival a union seeking certification69 or helping 
to establish such a committee and discussing terms and conditions of 
employment with it. 70 An employer may also be in violation of the Act if 
its foremen or supervisors assist in sponsoring or circulating 
anti-union petitions; even if upper management is unaware of their 
activities. 71 And because a union is the aggrieved party under this 
section of the Act, complaints of unfair practices directed at 
individuals are commonly coupled with a general complaint alleging 
unlawful interference with the union. 
The Board's rule is simple: do not interfere. 
An employer can align himself neither with the employees who 
favour a union nor with those who are opposed. Doing so 
distorts the balance of choice and frustrates the free exercise 
of employees' rights under the Act. Support to either camp, 
whether open or covert, amounts to interference contrary to the 
Act ... Apart from the right to express his views, a right whose 
exercise requires some care, the Act imposes a simple rule for 
the employer: Do not interfere. 72 
But even though the wording of the Act suggests a total ban on 'any 
employer action which has the effect of interfering with the 
representation of employees by a trade union regardless of whether or not 
an anti-union motive exists' ,73 this is not how the Act has been applied. 
So broad an interpretation would render other sections meaningless, the 
Board believes. If an employer's motive were not considered, any 
dismissal of an organizer, or possibly of any employee, during an 
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organizing campaign might lead to a finding of unlawful interference. 
Similarly, any other conduct that has the effect of undermining the right 
to associate could lead to a finding of unlawful interference. Such an 
interpretation implies that any violation of section 66, 70, or 79b would 
necessarily be a violation of section 64, although the reverse would not 
necessarily hold. This far the Ontario Board is not prepared to go. 
Contradictions abound, however. In some cases, the employer's 
motivation has been a pivotal issue while in others the Board has 
fastened on the effect, rather than the intent, of the conduct. In the 
'no-solicitation' cases, for example, the Board has attempted to balance 
the workers' right to organize against the employer's right to have work 
continue uninterrupted. Although the Act specifically warns employees 
that they have no right to engage in union activity during working 
hours,7 4 an employer is not permitted to rely on its property rights to 
ban organizing altogether. A blanket no-solicitation rule is not 
acceptable unless an employer can show that it has a legitimate business 
reason for prohibiting solicitation at all times. Otherwise, the OLRB 
distinguishes between working and non-working time and employees are free 
to engage in organizing activities while not on the job, for example, on 
their lunch and coffee breaks, even if paid for by the company. Other 
forms of campaigning, such as wearing buttons, are also permitted (Adams, 
1985:521-2). 
bSections 66, 70, and 79 prohibit dismissal and discrimination for 
union activity, intimidation and coercion of union supporters, and 
unilateral changes in terms and conditions of employment during 
organizing and bargaining, respectively. 
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In the no-solicitation cases, the employer's motivation has 
generally not been evaluated or, if it has, the Board has often been 
willing to assume that the purpose of the rule was a legitimate interest 
in maintaining order and efficiency (ibid.:523). In Consolidated 
Fastfrate Ltd.,75 for example, the Board said that the Act does not 
preclude the introduction of rules designed to enhance efficiency or 
prevent the interruption of work and in this instance it could discern no 
other, unlawful, purpose behind the company's policy against unauthorized 
posting or circulating of literature or stickers on its property even 
though 'its rule was rather broadly drafted and, ex facie could apply to 
non-working areas'. Canadian boards also give to management the right to 
prohibit solicitation by non-employees on company property: an employer 
'may raise its property rights against strangers to the employment 
relationship even though access could not interfere with any bona fide 
management interest' (ibid.:523)c.7 6 and to prohibit solicitation, such 
as political campaigning and canvassing, not directly related to 
collective bargaining. 77 
The full adoption of an objective standard, one that puts the 
results of the employer's conduct ahead of its purpose, is stymied by the 
Board's condonation of conduct that has at least a partial business or 
collective bargaining purpose. In A.A.S. Telecommunications,7 8 conduct 
that interferes with a trade union was distinguished from conduct that 
merely affects a union incidentally. Only the former is unlawful: the 
'normal wear and tear of collective bargaining' should not be 
CThe exception to this rule occurs when employees reside on property 
owned or controlled by the employer in which case union organizers must 
be allowed access pursuant to a direction of the Board. 76 
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characterized as illegal interference, the OLRB concluded. And although 
it will occasionally infer motivation from an employer's conduct, when 
there is some evidence of a business purpose the Board is unlikely to do 
so. Thus, the OLRB accepted as totally genuine one hospital's 
explanation for laying a complaint of profeSSional misconduct against a 
union activist who had publicly linked the death of a patient to under-
staffing, an issue then in dispute between management and the nurses' 
union. Whether there might have been an unlawful, ancillary motive the 
Board failed to consider. 79 Other times, a more objective test has been 
applied when the Board concluded that its inaction would have left 
unremedied, conduct motivated by good faith but which interfered with the 
right to associate and had no persuasive or worthy business purpose. A 
case in point was the dismissal of workers whom the employer mistakenly 
believed were involved in an assault on two strike-breakers. In this 
instance, the Board decided that it must intervene otherwise its lack of 
action would have given the impression that peacefully picketing the 
place where strike-breakers convened before attending the plant was not a 
protected activity. To give effect to this right, the complainants were 
reinstated with back pay.so 
What constitutes unlawful interference is greatly complicated by the 
right of free speech. The Ontario Board has never required employers to 
remain neutral in organizing campaigns, a view endorsed by the Task Force 
on Industrial Relations (Woods, 1968:159). Apart from making threats or 
promises, the Task Force thought employers should be entitled to defend 
their records through statements of fact or by rebutting a union's 
allegations or promises. 
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Though it recognizes the sensitive nature of the employer-employee 
relationship, the OLRB does not accept the proposition that employers' 
statements, by definition, exert an undue influence on workers. Even 
before 1960 when the qualification, 'nothing in this section shall be 
deemed to deprive an employer of his freedom to express his views so long 
as he does not use coercion, intimidation, threats, promises or undue 
influence', was added to what is now section 64 -- the OLRB distinguished 
between statements designed to compel and those designed to persuade, and 
only the former were unlawful (Laskin, 1961:118-9). In fact, the so-
called free speech protection does not seem to have influenced where the 
OLRB drew the line. Then, as now, workers were presumed to 'recognize 
that employers generally are not in favour of having to deal with 
employees through a trade union, and that therefore it ought not to 
surprise them when their employer indicates that he would prefer it if 
they voted against a trade union' .81 Employers have always had the right 
to review their past accomplishments, draw attention to current wages and 
working conditions, advise employees of their freedom of choice, and even 
express their opposition to collective bargaining {Sack and Mitchell, 
Statements about the company's profitability and competitive 
position, for example, were not considered to be threats but legitimate 
expressions of the employer's concerns in Greb Industries. 82 And in 
d McPhillips (1982:148) argued that 1975, not 1960, evidenced a 
change of emphasis in interpretation. In the earlier cases, employers 
were permitted greater latitude in their dealings with employees, he 
thought. More recently, the Board has sometimes been willing to ban 
propaganda 'although an employer is still entitled to express his views 
and is not confined to mere platitudes'. The differences he noted are 
difficult to find, however. 
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another case, an employer's encouragement to vote against the union in a 
representation election 'delivered in writing in the absence of any 
surrounding facts or circumstances which would cause employees to place 
undue emphasis on such statement' was not characterized as undue 
influence. 83 Likewise, an address by a plant manager urging employees to 
give careful consideration to the certification proceedings and 
indicating his disappointment with their decision to unionize was found 
to be neither intimidating nor coercive, or sufficient to taint the anti-
union petition circulated in the wake of the speech. 84- Nor will the 
Board censor communications in the absence of threats or other elements 
of intimidation. Employees must be credited with common sense: 
exaggeration, inaccuracies, partial truths, name-calling and falsehoods, 
while not condoned, are excused as legitimate propaganda so long as they 
are not so misleading as to prevent the exercise of free choice. 85 Thus, 
it was not interference for an employer to allege that a union was 
interested only in the workers' dues and its own advantage when the 
employer did not suggest that jobs or wages were in jeopardy.86 However, 
another employer was found to have exercised undue influence when its 
message was clearly discernible: 'the employees were invited to reject 
the union and thusly obtain an immediate salary increase or otherwise 
they must be prepared to assume the risks inherent in the arduous 
negotiations which would subsequent (sic) ensue' .87 
The scope of the protection against interference afforded by the Act 
is sharply narrowed once workers are organized. The high standard of 
behaviour required of employers during the representation process is 
considered unnecessary and too intrusive once a union is certified. So 
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long as an employer respects a union's status as the exclusive bargaining 
agent, management is generally free to communicate with workers during 
negotiations. Accordingly, statements that would be construed as 
intimidating during an organizing drive are acceptable as part of a 
party's negotiating strategy. While it was improper for G.T. Couriers88 
to tell workers that its operations in Hamilton might be closed because 
the firm's most important customer would not do business with an 
organized company, the same prediction made in the context of bargaining 
would not be unlawful. Similarly, the statement that the plant might be 
closed if the employees failed to accept the employer's offer did not 
constitute an unlawful threat or undermine the reliability of the 
ratification vote in another case. 89 And in A.N. Shaw Restorations90 it 
was not the threatening content of the employer's messages to its workers 
but management's attempt to by-pass the union as bargaining agent that 
the Board found unlawful. Nor did management's insistence on a 
no-reprisals clause in the collective agreement amount to unlawful 
interference. The company's objective, to protect strike-breakers from 
union discipline, had a legitimate collective bargaining purpose in 
encouraging the parties to put the dispute behind them. 91 
The purpose of the free speech protection, the Board says, is to 
'enable others to make an informed judgment as to what concerns them'9 2 • 
But such statements often have a 'sinister significance' (Arthurs, 
Carter, and Glasbeek, 1980:151). In law, the decision to bargain 
collectively is the employees' alone. An employer has no legitimate part 
to play: 'the employer's concern is not that the employees make a free 
and informed choice in their interest[.] rather the employer wants to 
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influence the employees to make a choice in his interest' (Weiler, 
1980:47). Indeed, what the Ontario Board permits under the free speech 
protection is called interference by others. In Weiler's (1975:3) 
opinion, the law tells an employer to adopt a totally neutral stance: 
The audience of employees is a captive one and particularly 
vulnerable to the overtones underlying such comments. Reasoned 
debate is precluded by an appreciation of the employer's wishes 
and anticipation of the consequences that may follow from 
exposing a viewpoint at odds with that position. That is not 
free speech nor any form of debate which can assist an employee 
in making an informed decision. 93 
There is a definite conundrum in the Ontario Board's permissive 
construction of the free speech protection. Its interpretation of this 
section of the Act is at odds with its view that mild and unthreatening 
statements made during an organizing drive may be improperly suasive and 
so render involuntary the repudiations of union membership which 
sometimes follow. Anti-union petitions which emanate from captive 
audience speeches, for example, are frequently rejected as tainted; yet, 
the statements themselves appear to be protected by the free speech 
guarantee. The OLRB cannot have it both ways: either the workers were 
influenced or they were not. 
Remedies for Unfair Labour Practices 
Over the years, the power of the OLRB to investigate and remedy 
breaches of the Act has been greatly expanded. The statutes of the 1940s 
and 1950s were rudimentary: 'certification of a trade union -- that was 
it' (Adams, 1981b:44). Authority over complaints was vested in the 
Minister of Labour; the Board lacked even the power to enforce its own 
awards. In 1960, on the recommendation of the Select Committee on Labour 
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Relations, the OLRB's jurisdiction was expanded to include investigating 
and remedying complaints that a person had been dealt with unfairly. At 
the same time, its awards were made enforceable as decisions of the 
Supreme Court of Ontario (Bromke, 1961). In 1975, the Board's 
jurisdiction was again expanded, and now encompasses all allegations that 
the Act has been violated. Previously, unions were not entitled to file 
unfair labour practice complaints because they were not legally 
'persons'. Although they were lumbered with most of the disadvantages of 
legal personality--unions were bound by their 'contracts' and liable for 
breaches and while they could not be sued in tort they could be 
prosecuted, fined and ordered to pay damages for violations of the Labour 
Relations Act--unions had few of the advantages, an imbalance partially 
redressed when the Board was given the authority to investigate and 
remedy all complaints arising under the Act. 94 
When a complaint is filed, a labour relations officer is routinely 
assigned to inquire into and attempt to settle the dispute by agreement 
of the parties. 95 If it cannot be settled informally, the parties are 
entitled to a formal hearing. e On finding a breach of the Act, the OLRB 
has a broad authority to remedy the wrong and determine what, if 
anything, the employer, trade union, or person(s) shall do, or refrain 
from doing. Remedies are pronounced by way of declarations and 
directions: the former are simply statements of facts and findings, the 
latter are injunction-like orders to rectify the conduct complained of. 
Declarations are routinely issued in unfair labour practice cases but if 
eIn fiscal year 1958-86, fewer than one in five complaints were 
ultimately referred to the OLRB (Ontario Labour Relations Board. Annual 
Report 1985-86:69). 
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a stronger measure is warranted, the Board will issue a direction, most 
commonly an order to cease and desist augmented where appropriate by an 
order to reinstate in employment, pay compensation, and so on. 96 Orders 
are effective when issued and not delayed if challenged in court.97 
The Board's mandate is remedial, not punitive: its awards must not 
have punishment, harassment, or public embarrassment as their primary 
purpose. As a practical matter, therefore, a breach of the statutory 
freeze is the unfair labour practice most amenable to remedy. Normally, 
a complaint of deteriorating terms or conditions, or a refusal to adjust 
terms or conditions in accordance with past practice, can be rectified by 
a direction to compensate workers for their losses. The Board has, 
according to circumstances, awarded a retroactive wage increase, 98 
directed an employer to reinstate the old work schedule,99 and 
compensated employees for wages lost due to an unlawful reduction in the 
hours of work. 1oo In another case, to avoid depriving employees of the 
improved working conditions unlawfully conferred (and to minimize 
interference with the operation of the business), the Board did not 
require the employer to revert to the status quo ante but ordered instead 
that a notice informing the employees of the violation be posted in the 
workplace and permitted the union to address the assembled workforce. 101 
Unlawful dismissal is a far more difficult wrong to right. Unique 
to labour boards is the power to order reinstatement! and this is the 
OLRB's standard remedy. An employer may also be required to compensate a 
worker for lost income, ordinarily, an amount equal to wages lost 
'The Board's power does not include the substitution of a lesser 
penalty, however (Adams, 1985:492). 
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adjusted for interim changes and the amount of overtime the employee 
might have worked, vacation pay he or she would have been entitled to, 
and any special bonuses or supplementary payments. Prior to 1980, 
interest was not required and, as yet, there is no 'pain and suffering' 
component, although in one extraordinary case K-Mart was ordered to pay 
two workers $500 each to compensate for the mental distress caused by 
their employer's unusually aggressive harassment and surveillance. 102 
An employee collects only the equivalent of his or her net pay, that 
is, total wages minus stoppages for income taxes, Canada Pension Plan 
contributions, and unemployment insurance premiums. Compensation is also 
reduced by the amount earned from alternate employment. Accordingly. an 
employer pays only the difference between what the employee received 
while out of work and what is owing. If the new job pays more. an 
employer is only required to compensate a worker for the time between 
jobs (Cornish and Ritchie, 1980:113-4). To qualify for compensation a 
worker must attempt to mitigate his or her losses or suffer a reduction 
in compensation commensurate with the failure to do so. The duty to 
mitigate also requires a complainant to accept an offer of reinstatement 
if the terms are generally similar to those prevailing before the 
discharge, but not if the job offered is substantially inferior to the 
one the employee is entitled to or if there are other extenuating 
circumstances. 103 An employee is expected to apply for unemployment 
insurance benefits, register with Canada Manpower, and be willing to 
accept any work in the field, whether full- or part-time. The 
complainant must also make reasonable efforts to secure a job on his or 
her own (ibid.:114). 
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Failure to follow its rules has caused the Board to reduce or deny 
compensation in unlawful dismissal cases. The amount paid to one worker 
was cut by a third when he unreasonably delayed filing his complaint with 
the OLRB and later quit another job. 104 And if the OLRB believes a 
worker's behaviour contributed to the dismissal, he or she may be 
reinstated without compensation or with the amount of compensation 
considerably reduced. In one case, compensation in full was denied 
because the complainant had a record of absenteeism. 105 And in another, 
full compensation was withheld when the Board decided that anti-union 
animus had caused an employer to dismiss an employee for conduct which 
would have normally warranted a suspension. The worker was reinstated 
but compensation was reduced by the amount that would have been earned 
during the suspension. 106 Normally, the Board does not calculate the 
amount owing but leaves it for the parties to determine. If they cannot 
agree, the OLRB will resolve the dispute, but only if it was specifically 
asked to retain jurisdiction; otherwise, the case is closed (ibid.:114). 
While reinstatement with compensation is an appropriate, albeit far 
from generous, remedy for the wrong suffered by an individual, it is at 
best a weak palliative for the employer's interference with what is an 
inherently collective right. The impact of a dismissal during an 
organizing campaign extends far beyond the consequences for the dismissed 
worker. With this act, the employer deliberately, and often 
successfully, sets out to intimidate the entire work force. Dismissal is 
a warning to all and cheap at the price. 
It was this deficiency the Board sought to correct with its 'make 
whole' order, first issued in Academy of Medicine. 107 The Academy was a 
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determinedly anti-union employer: the union's organizing drive was 
punctuated with threats of job losses and dismissals and it was clear 
from the outset that bargaining would be fruitless. Not long after the 
start of a strike, the business was shut down. The Board found the 
employer to have been egregious in its disregard for its employees' 
rights but because it was impractical to order the business to be 
re-opened, the OLRB granted a 'make whole' order. The employees and the 
union were awarded compensatory damages amounting to the equivalent of 
three months of wages for the workers and, for the union, its organizing, 
bargaining, and other expenses. 
The 'make whole' order remains an extraordinary measure. More 
commonly, the Board augments its standard remedy -- reinstatement with or 
without compensation -- with a posting and/or access order. An unfair 
employer may be required to post a notice informing workers that it has 
been found guilty of violating the Labour Relations Act accompanied by a 
commitment to comply with the law in future. The notice is directed at 
the collective: it is specifically 'designed to have restorative impact 
on the employees and the union as a whole' ,108 to ameliorate 'the 
lingering psychic effects of unfair labour practices and the consequent 
injury to a union's organizational or bargaining strength' . 10 9 Normally, 
the notice must be posted for sixty days in one or more conspicuous 
locations in the workplace. And when flagrant violations have been 
committed, an employer may also be directed to mail, publish, or read the 
notice to the assembled workforce. In 1980, it was decided that posting 
orders ought not to be restricted to exceptional breaches of the Act 
because even isolated violations have 'an undoubted and significant 
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psychological impact on labour relations and the attainment of the 
statute's objectives' .110 Accordingly, a posting order is now routinely 
incorporated into the Board's directions. 
An access order is another recent innovation intended to help a 
union re-establish communication with its members. Unfair labour 
practices may leave the union in disarray. Long lapses of time and 
employee turn-over make it difficult for a union to keep in touch with 
its members. The employer, by contrast, has day-to-day contact with its 
workers. Thus, to redress the one-sidedness of the information received 
by workers, the Board may direct an employer to permit union officials to 
address employees during working time, to post union notices on bulletin 
boards, and give a union access to the names and addresses of employees. 
Finally, when an employer has contravened the Act so extensively 
that the true wishes of the employees are not likely to be ascertained, 
the Labour Relations Board may certify a union without a representation 
vote, even when membership in the bargaining unit falls short of the 
requisite majority.111 By imposing certification, the Board seeks 'to 
visit the employer who has breached the law with the very outcome he 
sought to avoid' (Adams, 1981a:155) and to ensure that an employer does 
not profit from its own wrong-doing. 112 . Three conditions must be 
satisfied: the employer must have contravened the Labour Relations Act, 
the contravention must be of a nature that the true wishes of the 
employees are not likely to be ascertained in a representation vote, and 
the union must have membership support adequate for the purpose of 
collective bargaining. Prior to 1975, the Act was somewhat less 
restrictive in that it allowed the Board to impose certification when a 
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representation vote would not be expressive of the employees' wishes, 
even in the absence of a technical violation (Adell, 1966:29); on the 
other hand, prior to 1975, the union could not be certified unless it 
could demonstrate that a majority of the employees in the bargaining unit 
were members. Presently, remedial certification is restricted to 
situations where the breach is serious and where the Board's prognosis as 
to the viability of collective bargaining is favourable--in practice, to 
those situations in which the union has signed up more than 40 per cent 
of the employees. g ,11 3 
Outright certification remains an extraordinary remedy, reserved for 
those instances in which the employer's unlawful conduct has caused 
workers 'to equate their decision to unionize with a threat to their 
economic security' .114 The Board did not agree, for example, that 
sponsoring an anti-union petition was sufficient to trigger the 
remedy.11 5 And a representation vote was ordered in Robin Hood 
Multifoodsl16 even· though it was clear to the OLRB that the captive 
audience speech was intended 'to frustrate the applicant's campaign and 
that conclusion would not easily evade the most naive of employees'. 
Similarly, an employer's suggestion that workers form an 'in-house' union 
was not grounds for outright certification although it was coupled with a 
foreman's comment that a sister plant had been closed down, in part, as 
gIn Manor Cleaners,113 the Board spelled out the factors it 
considers in determining the adequacy of a union's membership support: 
the stage of the organizing campaign at which the unlawful conduct 
occurred, the circumstances surrounding the signing of membership cards 
prior to the employer's interference, the existence of a full-time group 
to support the bargaining objectives of a part-time group seeking 
certification, the severity of the employer's misconduct, and the level 
of the union's membership support in the bargaining unit. 
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the result of unionization. Because the statement was ultimately denied 
by upper management, the Board believed a representation vote would allo~ 
the workers to express their true wishes. 117 And despite finding 
numerous breaches of the Labour Relations Act and agreeing that many 
union supporters were 'fearful that the company would close or they would 
be blacklisted if they continued to support the union', the Board did not 
consider remedial certification appropriate in Primo Exporting and 
Distributing: 118 there were no discharges, demotions, transfers or 
layoffs; there were no 'captive audience' or small group meetings; there 
were no speeches or anti-union leaflets; there was no surveillance or any 
systematic attempt to identify, isolate or discriminate against union 
supporters; there was no evidence of widespread threats or other coercive 
activity; in short, there was no co-ordinated or concerted campaign of 
illegal conduct. 
Where outright certification has been awarded, the employer must 
have exhibited a wilful and flagrant disregard for workers' rights. In 
one case, management told the assembled employees that unionization would 
cause the company to close the site down. 119 In another, the employer 
referred frequently to job security in its communications with employees 
and linked the closure of another plant with its unionization. 12o 
Certification was also ordered when management 'skillfully juxtaposed' 
comments about 'strikes, wages and benefits, customers, and job security' 
and in spite of some employees' denials of undue influence;121 inquired 
about union membership, offered workers a wage increase if they would 
quit the union and abandon its certification, and fired union 
activists;122 and bombarded workers with letters 'calculated to play upon 
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employee fears for their job security', displayed posters urging workers 
to keep the union out, and instructed them how to 'Vote No' in the 
representation election. 123 
The Labour Relations Act also provides for the prosecution of 
offendersh ,124 , but only with the consent of the Board; 12 5 however. 
permission is seldom sought and even more seldom given. Over the last 
five years, the Board has received only 72 applications. And of the ten 
disposed of in fiscal year 1985-86, 7 were withdrawn, 1 was settled. and 
2 were indefinitely postponed (Ontario Labour Relations Board, Annual 
Report, 1985-86:68, 66). 
Neither the Board nor the parties put their faith in criminal 
penalties: 'Since the 1930's it has been recognized that a criminal 
"penalty" is not an effective "remedy" in labour relations' (MacDowell. 
1977:216). Both labour and management prefer the Board to the courts. In 
addition to the accommodative component of the Board's mandate, 
proceedings before the OLRB are expedited, less costly, and more likely 
to take industrial relations considerations into account. And over the 
years, judges have come to appreciate the validity of the Labour Board's 
remedies. Though interventionist in the past, the courts are now less 
likely to set aside the Board's rulings on appeal and more likely to 
accept its remedies (Carter, 1976). 
Prosecution is permitted only if it is consistent with good 
industrial relations; certainly not if the matter is trivial or 
hThough a union is not a legal person, the Act specifically permits 
a union to institute a prosecution or to be prosecuted in its own name. 
165 
vexatious, or the offending party is in substantial compliance with the 
Act: 
It is clear to us that, given the expanded remedial power of 
the Board, applicants seeking consent to prosecute must bear a 
heavy onus to establish that a criminal prosecution is 
consistent with the promotion of good industrial relations in 
the Province .... Since full remedial relief from the Board is 
now available to unions and employers, as well as individual 
employees, an applicant seeking consent to prosecute should 
establish why the matter cannot be dealt with effectively by 
recourse to the Board's remedies alone. 126 
Consent has been granted when an employer threatened and intimidated 
employees in an effort to destroy their union, threatened to dismiss 
workers who went on strike, or threatened not to employ them if they 
joined the union. Prosecution was also allowed when an employer 
unilaterally increased wages, cancelled a cost of living bonus, and 
withdrew pension plan coverage after the union had given notice to 
bargain and no collective agreement was in effect (Sack and Mitchell, 
1985:525,528). 
Enforcement of its orders has rarely been a problem for the Ontario 
Board: 'even the most obstreperous party' is unlikely to disobey when it 
will be appearing before the Board again (MacDowell, 1977:221). But if 
its orders are not complied with, a party may seek the Board's help after 
fourteen days. Finding non-compliance, a copy of the award will be filed 
with the Supreme Court of Ontario whereupon it is enforceable as an order 
of that court. 127 
Because its enforcement problems are few, the Board believes its 
remedies are effective. In reality, it is difficult to conceive of 
remedies that would be truly effective: remedies that would compensate 
the injured, deprive the offending party of the benefits of its unlawful 
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conduct, and prevent further breaches of the law (Backhouse, 1980:501). 
None of these goals has been fully accomplished by labour boards in 
Canada. Fear of over-compensation has caused the Ontario Board to reject 
anything more generous than a strict accounting of the money actually 
lost which, oddly enough, leaves the Board lagging behind the courts on 
this issue. Damages as high as $25,000 have been awarded in common law 
actions for wrongful dismissal as compensation for mental distress 
resulting from firing in a callous and humiliating manner, unfounded 
accusations of incompetence, and failing to give an employee the 
opportunity to tell his or her side of the story (The Globe and Mail, 6 
October, 1986). By artificially limiting its awards, the Board fails to 
force an employer to compensate workers fully. As a result, the Board's 
awards have little deterrence value. From an employer's point of view, 
the value of unfair practices is in the doing. Firing union activists, 
threatening to run-down the plant or 'move out west' instill fear which 
cannot be erased. The resulting loss of confidence in the union and the 
law are not easily rectified while the benefits for employers are 
potentially large. Unions increase wages an average of 10-15 per cent 
and the impact on the cost of fringe benefits is generally greater 
(Gunderson, 1982). 
Compensation, reinstatement, posting and access orders, even 
certifying the union without a representation vote, are valuable 
instruments but cannot repair the damage already done as is often 
claimed. McPhillips (1982:153) thought remedial certification was 'one 
of the most severe and effective disincentives to the commission of 
unfair labour practices'. By imposing certification the Board creates a 
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disincentive to the use of anti-union tactics because it deprives the 
employer of the benefits of its unlawful conduct. But remedial 
certification is only imposed when support for the union has already been 
crushed. In K-Mart (Peterborough),128 for example, the OLRB confidently 
predicted that certification would restore 'the legitimacy of the trade 
union in the eyes of the employees' even though the company was found to 
have harassed two union supporters with 'a ruthless campaign of 
surveillance that endured for some three weeks' and subjected one woman 
to 'the most humiliating treatment of an employee that this Board has yet 
encountered'. Even so, the Board thought certification augmented by 
posting and access orders and $1,000 in compensation would 'establish the 
conditions for collective bargaining in an atmosphere devoid of fear and 
suspicion'. 'Assuming that all unfair labour practices will end', there 
was 'little reason to doubt that the union's base of support will grow 
and that more and more employees will come forward to participate in the 
endeavours of their bargaining agents'. Under the circumstances, this 
conclusion was unduly optimistic, to say the least. 
The Effect on Certification and Collective Bargaining 
Though much has been made of the Board's innovative remedies and 
determination to show employers that 'brazen violations of the statute 
will meet a Labour Board that means business' (Adams, 1980a:5), a 
significant minority of employers continue to practice union-avoidance 
tactics. During the 1970s, unfair labour practices complaints were laid 
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by 11.6 per cent of the unions seeking certification. i But although 
unfair practice complaints lengthened the process substantially,J they 
appeared to have no significant affect on the outcome. Of those unions 
filing complaints, 66.S per cent were granted bargaining rights compared 
with 68.7 per cent in cases in which no unfair labour practice was 
alleged, a difference that is not statistically significant. 
Experience in the United States has been quite different: not only 
is the incidence of unfair practices startlingly high by comparison with 
Ontario, the likelihood of winning certification is markedly lower when 
unfair practices have been employed. Between 1960 and 1980, the number 
of unfair labour practice complaints rose four-fold in the United States, 
the number of charges involving dismissal for union activity rose 
three-fold, and the number of workers awarded back payor ordered 
reinstated rose five-fold, even though the number of representation 
elections barely changed. The ratio of workers fired to workers voting 
in favour of union representation is now 1:20. More important was 
Freeman's (198S) conclusion that one-quarter to one-half of the decline 
in union success in representation elections was due to the growing tide 
of unfair labour practices. And Cooke (198Sb, 1985c) estimated that the 
iThis proportion was calculated from the sub-sample data. Due to 
the mediating process it is impossible to determine how many complaints 
would have been confirmed, in whole or in part, had they been heard by 
the Board. 
JThe time required to process applications was at least twice as 
long when unfair labour practice complaints were laid against employers. 
Whereas four weeks were required to dispose of SO.l per cent of the 
applications uncomplicated by complaints, eight weeks were required to 
dispose of a comparable proportion (SO.6 per cent) of applications with 
complaints. Similarly, 76.3 per cent of applications without complaints 
were resolved within 8 weeks while 18 weeks were required to resolve 78.5 
per cent of applications with complaints. 
Table 4.1: Incidence of Unfair Labour Practice Complaints by Outcome of 
Certification 
Fiscal Years 1970-71 to 1981-81 
Complaint No complaint Total 
Union Certified 141 1,106 1,247 
Union not certified 71 502 573 
Total 212 1,608 1,820 
-- -- - - --- --
Proportion certified 66.5% 68.8% 68.5% 
x2 = 0.5 
(1 degree of freedom) 
I 
I--' 
"'" \.0 
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use of unfair labour practices reduced the likelihood of a union victory 
by 17 percentage points. Procedural delays, the use of management 
consultants, and active programmes of communication with employees during 
organizing campaigns have similarly undercut unions' prospects of 
securing bargaining rights (ibid.; Roomkin and Block, 1981; Roomkin and 
Juris, 1978; Lawler, 1981; Murrman and Porter, 1981, Prosten, 1978; 
Seeber and Cooke, 1983; Lawler and West, 1985). 
A critical difference between Canada and the United States is the 
possibility of outright certification. In Ontario, 85.8 per cent of the 
unions certified were granted bargaining rights without a representation 
vote during the 1970s. The popularity of the procedure derives from the 
Board's reliance on membership cards signed near the start of an 
organizing campaign. Ordinarily, an organizing drive is all but over 
before a union files its application with the Labour Relations Board so 
that 'by the time the union surfaces with its majority, the die is cast: 
the statutory condition is satisfied and the union is legally entitled to 
certification irrespective of what the employer may be tempted to do' 
(Weiler, 1980:41-2). Unfair labour practices committed subsequently can 
delay the proceedings but cannot reverse a union's majority or undermine 
its claim to certification without a vote. 
It is this feature which makes the outright certification so 
controversial. Employers in Canada are quite candid about their 
preference for representation votes as a check on unions' organizing 
tactics. Weiler, too, was attracted by the democratic aura of votes. In 
the abstract, he thought the case very compelling. 'The literature is 
replete with references to the flaws to which union membership cards are 
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prone', he argued, yet cautioned that there is no easy equation between 
representation votes and the employees' true wishes. In his experience 
as the chairperson of the Labour Relations Board in British Columbia, 
'the employer normally found it impossible to resist the temptation to 
engage in improper tactics to turn his employees against the union' 
during a hotly contested organizing campaign. Moreover, any attempts to 
'sanitize' the process, to provide the 'ideal laboratory conditions' in 
which employees could freely express their wishes, were futile. 
Subsequent interventions, ordering new votes and so on, did little more 
than increase business for labour lawyers (ibid.: 30-41). 
It is certainly true that unions in Ontario fare poorly when 
representation votes are ordered. Unions won only 50.0 per cent of the 
votes directed by the Board during the twelve years under study. It must 
be remembered, however, that it was mainly those unions whose membership 
support was too low to qualify for outright certification that were put 
to the test. But even well-supported certification applications may be 
jeopardized by representation votes. Piliotis (1975:14-7) reported that 
over a three-year period during the early 1970s only two-thirds of the 
unions with majority membership support as of the date of application 
were granted bargaining rights following a representation vote. When the 
initial level of membership in the union was compared with the results of 
the representation vote, the number of applications in which support for 
the union had decreased was double that where support had increased and 
the overall decrease outweighed the increase. Accordingly, when the Act 
Table 4.2: Method of Disposition of Certification Applications by Outcome of Certification 
Fiscal years 1970-71 to 1981-82 
Granted Granted Dismissed Dismissed Withdrawn Other Total 
without vote after vote after vote without vote 
Union 
certified 5,175#1 806 5,981 
Unions not 
certified 805 943 853 55 2,656 1 
Total 5.975 806 805 943 853 55 8,637 
#1Includes remedial certification. 
t-' 
'-...l 
N 
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was amended in 1970 and level of support for outright certification was 
raised from more than 55 to more than 65 per cent {and the percentage 
required to obtain a vote was lowered from 45 to 35 per cent)k as 
recommended by the Task Force on Labour Relations, the results were 
disastrous for unions. Not only did the anticipated growth in the volume 
of applications not materialize, the percentage of applications decided 
by votes increased and the overall likelihood of certification fell. For 
all of the years but one, the rate of success in certification was lower 
than the average for the 1970s as a whole. l 
It is not representation votes per se that frighten union organizers 
but the opportunity afforded employers to intervene in the campaign. 
Thus, Weiler (1980:48) was intrigued by the possibility of 'instant 
votes'.m Implemented in Nova Scotia (where the volume of applications 
was small but because the Board sat part-time, three-month delays were 
common), votes were conducted within a week of application and the ballot 
box sealed until after the hearing. Only if the union did not have the 
required membership support for outright certification were the ballots 
kThe 65/35 levels were in force from 1 September, 1971 to I 
January, 1976 at which time the 55/45 formula was restored. 
lThe concomitant relaxation of the requirement that unions win the 
votes of a majority of the employees in the bargaining unit to a majority 
of the ballots cast as the law presently stands had little apparent 
effect on the proportion of votes won by unions (Piliotis, 1975). Many 
years earlier, the chairperson of the OLRB told the Select Committee on 
Labour Relations of the Ontario Legislature that 'in 272 votes taken over 
a period of some two years ... the number of cases in which the result 
would have been different if [the Board] had taken the majority of votes 
cast rather than the majority of eligibles was 3.' Quoted in Bromke (1961:85). 
mWeiler (1983) now advocates this alternative in the United States 
where outright certification is politically unacceptable. 
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counted. A union that could not win certification in these circumstances 
did not represent the workers, the chairperson of the Nova Scotia Board 
argued (Christie, 1977). But while the 'instant vote' procedure 
drastically reduced the time in which Nova Scotian employers could 
campaign against union representation it was not eliminated. In Ontario, 
where anti-union petitions filed with the Board commonly bear the name of 
one or more union members, the period during which the signatures are 
obtained is the short, eight- to ten-day hiatus between the application 
and terminal dates. Nor do 'instant votes' shorten the certification 
process as a whole: post-vote delays are simply substituted for the more 
common pre-hearing delays while membership cards are checked and hearings 
held. 
To many, outright certification is the most effective mechanism for 
discouraging unfair labour practices. So glossy is this solution to the 
problem of employer interference that certification without a vote is 
said to be a seminal difference between the Canadian and American systems 
of granting bargaining rights. In Canada, the proportion of successful 
applications ranged between two-thirds and three-quarters during the 
1970s whereas American unions were winning fewer then half of their 
petitions for certification (Kochan, 1980). Explaining the difference, 
Meltz (1985:324) thought outright certification 'the single most 
important factor'. Others agreed. Freeman (1985:61) called outright 
certification the 'principal difference' between the Canadian and 
American systems: 
U.S. laws allow management to conduct lengthy well-funded 
election campaigns against unions. Canadian labor law does 
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not permit such activity ... Result: growing unionization in 
Canada. 
Outright certification is particularly important in Canada where 
legal recognition is a necessary pre-condition for collective bargaining. 
If representation votes were compulsory, anti-union employers could 
shield themselves from the intent of the law. Still, it is easy to 
exaggerate the importance of a procedure. Weiler (1983) was careful to 
explain that it is not the law (which has changed very little in 
twenty-five years) but the mounting hostility of American employers that 
is the primary obstacle to the growth of unions in the United States. 
None the less, he advocated outright certification as a means of 
'finessing' the anti-union employer, a method of deflecting anti-union 
tactics rather than trying to stop them head-on. By substituting 
membership cards for representation votes labour-management conflict and 
the damage that results from the improper exercise of power during 
representation campaigns can be minimized. By eliminating the invitation 
to interfere, the law would prevent the future bargaining relationship 
from 'being poisoned with charges and counter charges made during the 
heat of any such campaign' (Weiler, 1980:42). 
The lower incidence of unfair labour practices in Canada is 
undoubtedly linked to their apparent futility. Because unions are 
frequently certified without a representation vote, the effect of anti-
union tactics is not immediately evident; indeed, applications involving 
unfair labour practice complaints were almost as likely to result in 
certification as applications without during the 1970s, and the 
difference was not statistically significant. But the damage was real, 
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none the less. Although camouflaged at the certification stage, the 
effectiveness of unfair labour practices was evident once unions tried to 
negotiate collective agreements. Unfair labour practice complaints were 
strongly and negatively associated with bargaining success. Only 67.6 
per cent of the certified unions which filed unfair labour practice 
complaints with the OLRB were able to negotiate first agreements, almost 
20 percentage points lower than the 86.8 per cent of unions with 
collective agreements which filed no complaints. n Even the Board's most 
powerful remedy, outright certification, has been far from effective. 
Very few bargaining relationships have followed remedial certification in 
Ontario; in fact, the rate of bargaining failure has been astonishingly 
high. Of the 44 unions granted certification in this manner, only 26 
(59.1 per cent) negotiated first agreements. 
Conclusion 
The right to associate is far from absolute in Ontario. The 
standard of conduct demanded by the OLRB leaves employers considerable 
room to manoeuvre. In general, an employer is permitted to run its firms 
as it see fit so long as it does not act out of anti-union animus. But 
anti-union animus can be difficult to prove, particularly 
nSolomon (1985) reported a similar, strong correlation between 
unfair labour practice complaints and the likelihood of negotiating 
collective agreements from his study of the federal jurisdiction. Unfair 
labour practices have also been correlated with bargaining failure in the 
United States. Cooke (1985a,c) estimated that the likelihood of 
negotiating a collective agreement was one-third lower when management's 
hostility to collective bargaining took the form of verifiable unfair 
labour practices. 
Table 4.3: Incidence of Unfair Labour Practice Complaints by Outcome of Bargaining 
Fiscal years 1970-71 to 1981-82 
Complaint No complaint 
Collective agreement 
negotiated 
No collective 
agreement negotiated 
Total 
Proportion with 
collective agreements 
x2 = 35.3** 
(1 degree of freedom) 
** Significant at the .01 level. 
96 956 
46 146 
142 1,102 
---
67.6% 86.8% 
Total 
1,052 
I 
192 
1,244 
- -
84.6% 
I--' 
....,J 
....,J 
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when there is an over-riding business justification. Thus, lay-offs and 
cut-backs are usually permitted during an organizing drive despite the 
statutory freeze, if the changes can be linked to efficiency. Even 
dismissals may be sanctioned by the Board if an employer is able to 
establish that it was motivated by its legitimate business interests and 
not anti-union animus. Nor is an employer required to remain neutral in 
the face of an organizing drive. An employer is permitted to state its 
desire to remain non-union so long as the statement is not coupled with 
threats or promises. 
In the circumstances, the workers' most effective defence is 
undoubtedly outright certification. Because unions are commonly granted 
certification on the basis of membership cards signed near the start of 
an organizing campaign, subsequent attempts by an employer to interfere 
with an organizing drive cannot subvert a union's representation claim. 
Once the cards are filed, a union is entitled to certification if it has 
more than 55 per cent of the employees in the bargaining unit as members. 
For this reason, there was no significant correlation between the 
incidence of unfair labour practice complaints and the outcome of 
certification. By granting bargaining rights on the basis of cards 
rather than votes the law ensures that the representation process is well 
insulated from the deleterious effects of anti-union conduct. 
The effect of anti-union conduct on bargaining, by contrast, was 
dramatically evident. Unions which complained of unfair practices were 
significantly and substantially less likely to negotiate first agreements 
during the years under study. Despite the Board's efforts to mediate 
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these disputes and resolve them by encouraging an employer to voluntarily 
reinstate and/or compensate employees whose right had been violated or, 
failing informal settlement, by ordering an employer to remedy any breach 
of Labour Relations Act, anti-union tactics had a lingering effect on 
labour-management relations. By adopting aggressive tactics, an employer 
makes it known that workers choose union representation at their economic 
peril. And no amount of reassurance from the OLRB can obscure that fact. 
Remedies such as reinstatement, compensation, the pos~ing of notices, 
even outright certification and 'make whole' orders, can do little to 
affirm the right to associate in the face of an employer's determined 
hostility to collective bargaining. Put bluntly, unfair labour practices 
pay large dividends; the cost of being caught is far out-weighed by the 
potential savings derived from avoiding unionization. 
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The evidence presented in Part II suggests that the certification 
procedure is longer and more complex than necessary and provides anti-
union employers with many opportunities, both legitimate and 
illegitimate, to delay and subvert the recognition process. Disputes 
over the composition of bargaining units or the eligibility of employees 
for membership in a union are readily manufactured by employers hoping to 
forestall an organizing drive. And some employers go much further, 
sponsoring or tacitly promoting anti-union petitions or employing unfair 
labour practices to undermine their workers' enthusiasm for collective 
bargaining. 
Such interventions were highly effective in warding off unionization 
during the 1970s. Unions whose applications for certification took 
longer than five weeks to process were significantly less likely to win 
bargaining rights as were unions whose applications were opposed by anti-
union petitions an4 although the more aggressive forms of anti-union 
conduct were less likely to affect the outcome of certification they were 
particularly effective in disrupting collective bargaining. The 
likelihood of negotiating collective agreements was substantially lower 
in cases in which employers were found to have sponsored or supported 
petitions opposing the applications for certification or in which unions 
lodged unfair labour practice complaints. 
Overtly anti-union behaviour does not, however, explain the full 
extent of bargaining failure in Ontario. Fewer than one in eight 
certified unions filed an unfair labour practice complaint with the OLRB 
during the 1970s, only one in sixteen encountered a petition that was 
rejected by the Board as employer-sponsored, and the applications of 
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fewer than 40 per cent took longer than five weeks to process. Bargaining 
failure was, in fact, concentrated among unions which could not be said 
to be victims of aggressive, anti-union tactics: in 76.0 per cent of the 
cases there was no unfair labour practice complaint, in 74.5 per cent 
there was no anti-union petition of any sort, and in 59.0 per cent the 
union's application for certification was disposed of in fewer than five 
weeks. 
With these data in mind, Part III pursues a different sort of 
explanation for the failure of many unions to cement their bargaining 
rights in collective agreements. Believing that the outcome of 
bargaining is primarily determined by the relative power of the parties, 
the remainder of the thesis describes how the law institutionalizes an 
imbalance of bargaining power. Accordingly, Chapter 5 argues that there 
is a structural imbalance between organized workers and employers rooted 
in the practice of certifying unions on a single-establishment basis and, 
within establishments, of dividing workers into even smaller groups of 
office, manual, full- and part-time employees. Nor are workers entitled 
to structure themselves into broader-based negotiating units. Such a 
demand is unlawful if pursued to impasse. 
So fragmented a bargaining structure leaves unions weak and 
vulnerable because the law constrains the time and manner in which 
workers may exercise their economic power. These constraints are 
discussed in Chapter 6, first, under the heading of strikes. Workers 
have a right to strike only after the expiration of their collective 
agreements or if there is no agreement in force only after conciliation. 
Strikes at other times leave workers open to discipline, including 
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dismissal, and their unions liable for damages. In fact, the jobs of 
strikers may be in jeopardy even if the stoppage is lawful. As the 
second section explains, strikers retain their status as employees yet, 
perversely, may be permanently replaced. There is but a narrow right of 
reinstatement in Ontario, and only on terms dictated by employers. 
Finally, the legal constraints on picketing are such that effective 
picketing is unlawful, that is, picketing which trespasses on private 
property, interferes with the movement of goods or people, or attempts to 
widen the ambit of a dispute is almost always a breach of the law and 
likely to be enjoined. As a result, workers are legally isolated in the 
small bargaining units created by the OLRB and within the confines of 
these units are unable to exert their bargaining power to its fullest 
extent even though there are few legal constraints on the conduct of 
employers. 
Having institutionalized an imbalance in the bargaining power of 
labour and management, the law does nothing to ameliorate the adverse 
effects. Chapter 7 describes how the duty to bargain in good faith is 
interpreted and draws particular attention to the fact that the labour 
boards find hard bargaining lawful, even when the result is no 
bargaining. Thus, in the Eaton's case, the company was found to have met 
the good faith test simply because it was willing to sign a collective 
agreement. That the agreement was on terms dictated by the employer, 
terms so onerous that there was no role for the union, did not alter the 
OLRB's conclusion. 
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Chapter 5 
BARGAINING STRUCTURE 
Bargaining units are 'obviously of immense practical importance. not 
only for the immediate parties, but for the structure and performance of 
the collective bargaining system as a whole'!. The size and composition 
of the units described by the OLRB may dictate success in certification 
and are critically important in determining the outcome of collective 
bargaining. While small units are generally easier to organize, quite 
the reverse is true in bargaining where large groups of workers are more 
likely to negotiate collective agreements. This conundrum has presented 
labour boards with a seemingly irresolvable problem: the broad-based 
bargaining units that would provide the most stable basis for collective 
bargaining are often too large to permit unions to win certification. 
This dilemma is exacerbated by the Ontario Board's interpretation of 
the Labour Relations Act and in particular its unwillingness to recognize 
the link between bargaining structure and bargaining power. The OLRB 
sticks religiously to its conception of an appropriate bargaining unit as 
a work group with day-to-day interests in common despite the highly 
fragmented structure which results. At the same time, the Board refuses 
to permit workers to form broader-based negotiating units even within the 
same firm. The result, therefore, is a structural weakness rooted in the 
law. 
Central to the argument is the Board's definition of an appropriate 
bargaining unit, and this is the first issue examined. Equally 
important. however, is the relationship between the bargaining unit for 
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which a union is the certified bargaining agent and the bargaining unit 
as negotiating unit. In the Board's opinion, the bargaining unit it 
describes is also the negotiating unit. Whether or not these units 
provide a firm basis for collective bargaining is examined in the third 
section. 
Appropriate Bargaining Units 
Newly certified bargaining units are small in Ontario, averaging 35 
employees during the 1970s. Only one in fourteen was larger than 100; 
one in three was smaller than 10. Units of this size are the product of 
the Labour Board's preference for establishment-by-establishment 
certification: the 'single-employer, single-location, single-plant unit' 
is the cornerstone of OLRB policy (Bromke, 1961:80). Within an 
establishment, office workers are separated from production and part-time 
workers from full-time. 
Legally, a bargaining unit is simply a unit of employees appropriate 
for collective bargaining: an employer unit, a plant unit, or a 
subdivision of either.2 And apart from certain groupings deemed to be 
appropriate--security guards, dependent contractors, professional 
engineers, and craft workers in certain circumstances3--the authority to 
determine the scope of the bargaining unit is vested in the Labour 
Relations Board: 
The only fetters on the Board's discretion to make a 
determination are the requirements contained in section 6(1) 
that the 'unit shall consist of more than one employee' ... and 
that the unit of employees is appropriate for collective 
bargaining--there are no other requirements. 4 
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None the less, the Ontario Board has 'standard units' which it typically 
determines. Most common is the blue-collar/production unit described as 
all employees, save and except foremen, persons above the rank of 
foremen, office and sales staff. The corresponding white-collar unit 
encompasses all office employees, all office and clerical employees, or 
all office, clerical and technical employees depending on the work 
setting. With the qualification, employed for not more than twenty-four 
hours per week, part-time units generally mirror the composition of the 
full-time units they complement. 5 Occupations not caught by the Board's 
standard descriptions are recognized as 'tag-end' units (Sack and 
Mitchell, 1985:149-153). 
Although the bargaining unit need only be appropriate, not 'more' or 
'most' appropriate,6 the OLRB feels bound by its past practice. Its 
standard units have become 'a kind of norm', ensuring 'some uniformity in 
collective bargaining'.7 And the onus of proof is borne by the party 
seeking to depart from the established pattern. 8 Unless the Board's 
earlier decisions are shown to be 'manifestly in error, or that the facts 
are sufficiently dissimilar to those earlier decisions' the Ontario Board 
is loathe to depart from its previous rulings. 9 Even modifications are 
unusual: disputes over the inclusion of particular persons or job 
classifications are generally resolved by appending a 'clarity note' to 
the standard description in the certification order (Labour Law Case Book 
Group, 1974:140). 
Each establishment is considered a natural bargaining constituency. 
Multi-employer certification, possible under the 1948 Act, has been 
precluded since 1950 (Sack and Levinson, 1973:60). And single-employer, 
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multi-establishment units, though legally possible, are rare. Single-
establishment certificates have been the rule from the Board's inception 
Initially, it may have simply followed the progress of 
organizing prevalent among industrial workers, but what was then no more 
than a common practice has become a hard and fast rule. 
Multi-establishment units are created only when the Board is 
convinced that the workers at the two (or more) locations have a day-to-
day working relationship. Accordingly, the union's request for a multi-
plant unit at Magna International was rejected even though the workers at 
all three (close) establishments had similar skills, performed similar 
work, were paid similar rates, and laboured under similar conditions. 
The workers' community of interest was held to be 'more local'; the 
absence of transfers between sites meant that employees would 'not see 
work at the other plants as part of any promotional opportunity and may 
feel threatened by anything more than plant-wide collective agreement 
administration' .10 Similarly, the employees of Adams Furniture Stores, 
were also separated into three bargaining units when one had been 
requested: there was 'simply no evidence to establish a community of 
interest among the employees in a regional bargaining unit of the size 
proposed by the applicant' .11 
Retailing was the one notable exception to the single-establishment 
rule. Because terms and conditions of employment were often standardized 
across a chain of stores, the Board felt that the interests of employees 
at all locations were essentially the same; hence, it would not be 
aFor the practice of the Ontario Labour Court and the Wartime Labour 
Relations Board see the awards cited by Willes (1979) and Chrysler 
(1949), respectively. 
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'conducive to sound collective bargaining for a series of bargaining 
units to be established in respect of groups of employees performing 
similar tasks and having similar interests' .12 Until the mid-1970s, the 
standard unit in the retail and personal service industries was all 
locations within a municipality (Sack and Mitchell, 1985:144-5). More 
recently, however, the realities of organizing in the tertiary sector 
have shaken the Board's confidence in this approach. The multi-
establishment unit was itself an obstacle to organizing, so abandoned. 
Recognizing the 'right to self-organization' as a primary theme of the 
Act,13 the Labour Relations Board now says it will 'lean towards the 
bargaining structure which best facilitates organization' in industries 
where collective bargaining has not gained a foothold. 14 Over the 
objec~ions of employers, single-establishment certificates are now 
common. 
The separation of office and production workers is an equally well 
entrenched practice: the Board has 'always recognized the divergent 
interests of plant and other employees' (Reed, 1969:3). To the Ontario 
Board, 'it is readily apparent why plant units, or office and sales units 
are appropriate as a subdivision of any employee unit' .15 Combined units 
are not always precluded, however. Initially, office and production 
workers were permitted to join forces if they expressed a preference for 
an organization structured along those lines. 16 But rigidity soon 
followed. Indeed, separate bargaining units were not sufficient for some 
Board members: 'there should be a different union or at least a separate 
local' for office employees, one panel declared. 17 So restrictive a 
policy could not be justified, however, and the Board soon reverted to 
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its previous practice. Office workers were once again placed in separate 
units (but not separate unions), save in the most exceptional 
circumstances. 18 . b And this remains the firm policy, although clerical 
and sales staff are sometimes combined (Sack and Mitchell, 1985:150). 
Within the white-collar group, professional employeesc19 are 
accorded separate bargaining units where numbers warrant. In hospitals, 
for example, registered nurses are invariably grouped into their own 
units. Elsewhere, the Board's policy is less settled. Librarians and 
social workers have sometimes been included in office units and other 
times in bargaining units of their own. Much depends on the history of 
the relationship, that is, on whether management has traditionally 
regarded the professionals as a distinct grouping (ibid.:151-2). 
Professional engineers, excluded from the Act until 1970, now have a 
statutory right to be recognized as a group appropriate for collective 
bargaining. 20 
The Board's policy also excludes part-time workers from a unit of 
full-time employees, with certain exceptions. When the part-timers are 
primarily students, as in grocery stores, the practice is to create one 
bargaining unit. Nor will they be excluded if there is no history of 
part-time work at the establishment;21 in fact, part-timers hired after 
bReed (1969:57), a former chairperson of the OLRB, explained that 
exceptions were rare. In a few cases, office workers have been included 
in a plant unit when exclusion would have deprived the lone white-collar 
employee of his or her right to union representation. 
CExcluded from the Act are architects, dentists, land surveyors, 
lawyers, doctors and persons who exercise managerial functions o~ are l 
employed in a confidential capacity with respect to labour relat10ns. 9 
By s.2 of the Act, elementary and secondary school teachers and employees 
of the provincial government are also excluded. 
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a union is certified are swept into the established full-time unit by the 
'all employee,d description (Sack and Levinson, 1973:70-1). 
Separate units reflect the Board's view that part-time employees and 
students do not generally share a community of interest with full-time 
workers. The former are 'primarily concerned with maintaining a 
convenient work schedule which permits them to accommodate the other 
important aspects of their lives with their work and with obtaining 
short-term immediate improvements in remuneration rather than with 
obtaining life insurance, pension, disability, and other benefit plans; 
extensive seniority clauses; and other long-term benefits' .22 
Accordingly, part-time workers are segregated at the request of either 
party (ibid.: 1973:70). 
Nor is the OLRB prepared to accept groupings smaller than its 
standard units. The evils of 'unnecessary' fragmentation are legion: 'a 
patchwork quilt of bargaining units is a recipe for industrial unrest,;23 
'each time one group goes on strike, other employees performing jobs that 
are functionally dependent upon the work normally done by strikers are 
brought to a halt' and the likelihood of a strike increases with the 
number of bargaining rounds and competition among bargaining agents;24 a 
viable and meaningful bargaining relationship may be impossible if the 
employer is 'faced with the possibility of lengthy, protracted and 
expensive bargaining and the further possibility of jurisdictional 
disputes,;25 piecemeal certification might 'unreasonably restrict the 
employer in the manner in which it has always carried on its business,;26 
dThe Board describes its units as 'all employee' meaning, of course, 
all employees of the same category: full- or part-time, office or manual. 
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certification of a segment of the total enterprise could 'seriously 
impair the totality of the business operations by inhibiting the shifting 
of employees between union and non-union segments of the enterprise' .27 
Fearing undue fragmentation, the Ontario Board ha~ rejected the practice 
of approving, as appropriate, 'random agglomerations of departments 
within an enterprise merely because they favour unionization' (Labour Law 
Case Book Group, 1974:140). Only if the group has a distinguishable 
community of interest or can demonstrate a history of bargaining 
separately and apart from other employees will the Board sanction units 
smaller than all the employees of one type at one location (Sack and 
Levinson, 1973:66). Accordingly, when a group of school secretaries and 
clerical assistants was found to have bargained separately through their 
own association for many years, the Board created a separate unit despite 
the employer's preference for the standard all-employee grouping. 28 
Generally, however, separate interests are difficult to establish. 
In one case, a group of physiotherapists were denied union representation 
because the Board felt their work-related concerns could have been 
accommodated in a wider, all-employee bargaining unit. 29 Similarly. the 
application of a union representing non-professional library workers was 
dismissed because the grouping requested would have impeded mobility and 
interfered with management's attempts 'to integrate and administer a 
common policy for the office, clerical and technical employees of the 
university as a whole' .3 0 And in another case, a group of cost 
estimators and analysts was not appropriate, primarily because four other 
bargaining units were already in place. Foreseeing even further 
fragmentation in the event that the security guards and professional 
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engineers sought union representation, the Board felt that an all-
encompassing, tag-end unit would be the appropriate structure. 3! Even a 
unit of craft workers has been rejected as an inappropriate grouping in 
an otherwise unorganized open-pit mine. 32 ,e 33 
Perversely, concern over fragmentation has caused the Board to rule 
single-establishment units inappropriate on occasion. In Usarco,3 4 the 
union had organized along the traditional, single-establishment lines but 
was blocked by the employer's claim that its two scrap yards formed an 
integrated operation. Noting that the employees at one yard were 
sometimes required to work at the other, the Board agreed. Similarly, 
because the employees at Bright Veal Meat worked alongside employees of a 
related company from time to time, the OLRB ruled the two companies 
constituted one bargaining unit even though it was the employer's choice 
'to present separate faces of its operation to the public' .35 
The OLRB refuses to shape its bargaining unit determinations around 
workers' preferences; in fact, the workers themselves are seldom 
consulted. Although the Act permits the Board to conduct a vote to 
ascertain their wishes, 36 this provision is used only when 'the evidence 
in support of two or more proposed bargaining units is so evenly balanced 
that the wishes of the employees themselves must be considered a factor 
of great weight' (ibid.:61). Likewise, the extent of organizing is 
rarely considered; indeed, its relevance is the 'most controversial 
consideration by labour boards in determining the appropriate bargaining 
eThe Act no longer requires the Board to carve craft workers out of 
established bargaining units as it did in 1948. However, the OLRB is 
still required to create a separate unit when a group is distinguishable 
because of its technical or craft skills, or commonly bargains ~epa~~telY 
and apart from other employees through the appropriate craft unlon. 
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unit' (Adams, 1985:320). In Goodyear Service Stores. 37 for example. the 
fact that the union had majority membership in all but one of the stores 
it sought to combine into a single bargaining unit was of interest but 
not determinative. And even when the pattern of organizing has been 
taken into account, it did not inform the Board's assessment of the 
workers' community of interest. Having noted the employees' wishes, the 
Board in Ponderosa Steak House38 then considered other pertinent factors: 
the workers' community of interest and the possibility of undue 
fragmentation. 
Nor does the Board feel bound by an agreement of the parties. Their 
requests are considered, but 'a unit agreed to by all concerned will not 
be accepted by the Board where to do so would violate fundamental policy 
considerations' .39 In fact, their motives may be suspect: a union may 
argue for a narrowly defined unit because small groups are generally 
easier to organize but if the union has sufficient support to warrant 
certification for a broader grouping, the larger, more powerful unit will 
be preferred. 40 An employer, on the other hand, may seek a unit so broad 
that certification is effectively precluded. In opposition to the wishes 
of both labour and management, two bargaining units were created at Ex-
Cell-O when one had been requested because the eleven employees of the 
engineering department were found to be a distinct and cohesive group 
with skills and responsibilities that set them apart from other office 
employees. 41 
Though flexible in theory, the Labour Relations Board is less so in 
practice. In the pursuit of consistency, the wider industrial relations 
setting has been almost forgotten. Of the criteria of appropriateness 
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considered by labour boards--the purpose of the legislation; the 
community of interest of the employees; the history and pattern of 
collective bargaining in the industry, firm, or unit; the desires of the 
employees, unions, and management; an agreement of the parties; and prior 
decisions on policies or principles (Herman, 1966:41-2)--most are 
disregarded by the OLRB. 
Even though it has acknowledged that 'different communities of 
interest will exist at one and the same time among different groupings of 
employees' ,42 the OLRB sticks rigidly to its standard units. But 
community of interest is neither so neatly nor so permanently defined as 
the Ontario Board supposes. Sources of conflict within a workforce are 
numerous and not limited to those institutionalized by its standard 
units. Men and women, senior and junior, immigrant and native born, 
skilled and unskilled may also have different needs and bargaining 
priorities but none of these is considered a distinct bargaining 
constituency. Moreover, work groups are willing to form alliances to 
augment their bargaining power when it is to their advantage to do so. 
From the workers' point of view, the elimination of wage differentials 
between groups is more than just equitable, it is a practical means of 
combatting employer whipsawing. In any event, it is the union, not the 
OLRB, that is charged with the responsibility of sorting out competing 
demands and priorities. Tough decision-making is the essence of 
collective bargaining: in Weiler's words, collective bargaining is 
'intrinsically valuable as an experience in self-government'. Workers 
'take their destiny into their own hands, deciding what kind of working 
conditions they want'. 'Choices must be made, priorities determined, 
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[and] compromises struck between the contrasting interests of different 
grouPS inside the bargaining unit'. 'Self-determination' and 'self 
discipline' are the core of the bargaining process (Weiler, 1980:32-3). 
Negotiating Units 
Narrowly described bargaining units do not preclude broader-based 
negotiating units. The Board's function is 'not to establish a final 
structure for collective bargaining but, instead, to act as a catalyst 
for collective bargaining by requiring the employers to negotiate with 
the union' (Herman, 1966:42). The parties are 'not obliged to 
incorporate into their collective agreement the bargaining unit contained 
in the certificate granted by the Board, but may amend, alter, extend or 
abridge the bargaining rights contained in the certificate, provided that 
in so doing they do not breach the duty to bargain in good faith or the 
duty of fair representation' (Sack and Mitchell, 1985:147). Accordingly, 
the unit for which ·a union is certified is no more than the 'critical 
starting point' for collective bargaining;4 3 'the basic building block 
from which more complex structures may be erected by the bargaining 
parties' (Herman, 1966:5). Once a collective agreement is negotiated, 
'the certificate has served its purpose and is, for all practical 
purposes, spent' .44 For this reason, the OLRB has refused to certify a 
union which already had bargaining rights by virtue of its collective 
agreement: a certificate would have added nothing to what the union 
already possessed (Sack and Mitchell, 1985:280). 
By certifying a union on a single-establishment basis, the task of 
building broader negotiating structures is reserved for the parties 
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(Herman, 1966:42). And the evidence suggests that workers do perceive 
their common interests more broadly. Of non-construction collective 
agreements covering 500 or more employees, 47 per cent covered more than 
one establishment in 1983, including 8 per cent covering more than one 
employer (Craig, 1986:170).f Though organized on a plant-by-plant basis, 
company-wide bargaining has long been the norm in the automobile, 
meatpacking, rubber, and agricultural machinery industries while multi-
employer bargaining has characterized the clothing, pulp and paper, 
printing, longshoring, and transportation industries. 
Yet, by comparison with other countries, bargaining in Canada is 
highly decentralized: 'too fragmented to operate efficiently' according 
to some (Davies, 1986:211). Moreover, because data are available for the 
largest groupings only, the extent to which bargaining appears to be 
centralized is undoubtedly overstated (Anderson, 1982:178). On the other 
hand, what is lacking in formal structure is made up for, in part, by 
strong pattern bargaining. In many industries--basic steel, steel 
fabrication, electrical products, education, and health care, for 
example--the bargaining process may appear fragmented but the result is 
not. Although negotiating units are commonly single-establishment in 
scope, a few 'key bargains' form the basis for settlements throughout the 
industry. 
The disparity between bargaining structure and bargaining practice 
is attributable, in some measure, to the law. Woods (1973:362) thought 
it 'not unreasonable to assume that [negotiating] units are smaller than 
fThe comparable data for 1984, including both construction and non-
construction agreements, were 54 and 18 per cent (Craig, 1986:170). 
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they would have been, that they tend to be confined more to the single 
plant. and that probably more experiments with regional. company-wide. 
and even industry-wide bargaining involving multi-employer units would 
have occurred, in the absence of the bias in the law'. The bias results. 
in part, from the practice of certifying unions on a single-establishment 
basis and. in part, from the fragmentation of responsibility for labour 
relations law and policy among eleven jurisdictions. As a result. 
negotiating units which span more than one province are 'extra-legal'. to 
use Craig's (1983:153) terminology. and beyond the capability of anyone 
labour board to create (or defend). The freedom of the parties is 
likewise restricted by provincial control over conciliation. still 
compulsory in most jurisdictions. and while this constraint can be 
circumvented by permitting one conciliation board to draw in 
establishments in other jurisdictions (Herman. 1966:26), in general. 'it 
is practically impossible for a union to strike several plants of one 
company at the same time because of the necessity for independent 
conciliation in each dispute situation. Each conflict is related to a 
particular bargaining unit and the legal bargaining unit is also the 
legal conciliation unit' (Woods and Ostry, 1962:502). 
The gap between law and bargaining reality has recently been widened 
and hardened by the Ontario Labour Relations Board in its Burns Meats45 
decision. For almost forty years. national bargaining 'took wages out of 
competition' in the meatpacking industry. The practice was for the three 
largest firms to meet the union in Toronto. at the same hotel but at 
separate tables. for negotiations. On 'policy' issues--wages. benefits. 
overtime, and so on--the union's negotiating committees presented common 
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demands formulated at a jOint bargaining conference. Any tentative 
settlement had to be recommended by the committees jointly and ratified 
by the members of the meatpacking group as a whole. If agreement proved 
difficult. one company was chosen as the 'strike target' and once a 
settlement was reached this agreement set the pattern for the industry. 
The result was three, identical company-wide agreements. 
In 1984. Burns Meats insisted on altering this arrangement. It 
refused to negotiate in Toronto and demanded plant-by-plant bargaining. 
When the union resisted, the company laid a complaint of bargaining in 
bad faith. 
The OLRB agreed. A company-wide negotiating unit has no legislative 
underpinning, the Board observed: the bargaining functioned 'without any 
statutory foundation, or perhaps more aptly. in spite of there being no 
statutory foundation for it'. Thus, even if the international union had 
been clearly recognized in the collective agreement as the bargaining 
agent for all of Burns's employees, the union's representation rights 
were circumscribed by the boundaries of the Board's jurisdiction. By 
refusing to bargain except in the context of a national agreement, 
therefore, the union wrongly sought to bargain beyond the limits of its 
exclusive bargaining rights: conduct inconsistent with the scheme of the 
Labour Relations Act. The demand itself was not unlawful, national 
bargaining could be 'raised and discussed', but could not be legally 
pressed to impasse. 46 . g The effect of this decision is to take 
gBurns complained to the Alberta and Manitoba Boards as well. Both 
ruled that the union had not met the good faith requirement, but on the 
narrower grounds that adopting an unyielding position on any subject was 
unacceptable. 
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bargaining structure off the table. The scope of the negotiating unit is 
no longer a mandatory subject of bargaining, to use the American 
terminology which, until recently, has had no place in Canadian law. 
With respect, the law of Burns Meats is suspect. The two purposes 
of the bargaining unit have been improperly melded. While the OLRB is 
clearly empowered to determine the bargaining unit for which a union is 
certified as the exclusive bargaining agent, its authority to shape 
negotiating structure is doubtful. The unit designated by the Board 
establishes the group for which the employer is minimally obliged to 
recognize a union. Consequently, an employer may not insist on altering 
the boundaries of the unit for which a union has been certified: indeed, 
if the extent of the union's bargaining rights remained a negotiable 
issue, certification would be a pointless procedure. And the proposition 
is reversible: in the absence of voluntary recognition, a union must 
obtain bargaining rights through certification. Thus, it was unlawful 
for the Carpenters union to strike in support of its demand to bring non-
union workers at unorganized sites under its collective agreement. The 
extension of bargaining rights was not an issue that could be taken to 
impasse, the employers complained, and the Board agreed: 
Just as an employer cannot use its economic leverage to bargain 
out of established bargaining rights, a trade union cannot use 
its economic leverage to attempt to extend bargaining rights. 
Such demands, in the Board's view, must be removed from the 
bargaining table once a strike or lock-out is imminent, or in 
progress. If such demands are not removed at this time, the 
party pressing such demand must be held to have breached the 
duty to bargain in good faith.47 
Burns Meats is the doubtful corollary to this principle. By the 
Board's reasoning, it is inconsistent with the scheme of the Act for a 
206 
union to seek to amalgamate one or more bargaining units into a single 
negotiating unit unless the employer 'voluntarily' agrees. In a 
subsequent case, the Board affirmed this interpretation by confirming 
that Eaton's was entirely within its rights to insist upon separate, 
albeit similar, collective agreements for each of thirteen bargaining 
units in six establishments. 48 The parties have the right to construct 
broader-based negotiating units but only by mutual consent. And having 
made a broader-based negotiating unit, they are stuck with it. With 
respect to an application to displace (or terminate) a union's bargaining 
rights, for example, it is the negotiating unit described by the 
collective agreement, not the bargaining unit originally designated by 
the OLRB,h that is relevant (Sack and Mitchell, 1985:195-6). But what 
the Board has failed to consider is how such units can evolve if 
employers have the right to refuse to bargain on a broader basis and it 
is in their interest to do so. 
The link between bargaining structure and bargaining power is 
frequently overlooked by the industrial relations community in Canada. 
Woods (1973:363-4), for example, spoke of the 'natural evolution' of 
bargaining structures and the 'most logical unit', that is, the unit that 
would stabilize labour-management relations over the widest area and 
eliminate, for both parties, the 'insecurities, uncertainties, and extra 
expense of small-scale bargaining'. Herman (1966:44-5) thought broader-
based bargaining would be the inevitable response to workers' demands for 
greater job security in the face of technological change. A similar 
assumption caused the Canada Labour Relations Board to dismiss a union's 
hSO long as the unit is entirely within provincial boundaries. 
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request for a revised unit embracing a number of bank branches. i The 
application was unnecessary, the CLRB reasoned, because both parties had 
an interest in avoiding chaos and in negotiating common terms and 
conditions of employment: 'It is common labour relations experience that 
bargaining parties, in their mutual interests, do develop a bargaining 
structure that minimizes the incidents of bargaining and meets their 
respective responsibilities'. Nor was the Board moved by the fact that 
it was the union's failure to achieve this objective that motivated its 
application for consolidation. 49 
According to Burns Meats, therefore, employers now have the right to 
veto bargaining structures more advantageous to unions than the narrowly 
based, fragmented units for which they are certified. But establishment-
by-establishment bargaining in multi-establishment firms is a 
particularly weak structure for unions: it 'both results from and adds 
to union weakness' (Greenberg, 1966:350). A union confined to one 
location is especially vulnerable to whipsawing; the impact of a strike 
is easily blunted by an employer's ability to shift production to other 
locations. For tactical reasons, therefore, unions prefer multi-
establishment negotiating structures. 
Bargaining Units and Bargaining Power 
The Board denies that its bargaining unit determinations are for the 
convenience of employers: 'the structure and policies that promote a 
maximization of the employer's business interests are not those that will 
iRevision of bargaining units already designated by the Canada Board 
is specifically permitted by the Canada Labour Code. 
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necessarily describe a viable bargaining unit, or the only viable 
bargaining unit--particularly since those interests may include a desire 
to avoid collective bargaining altogether, or limit its effectiveness' ,50 
All the same, groupings which might impede efficiency or enhance the 
effectiveness of strike action have been rejected in favour of units 
which promote uniformity and stability and minimize the possibility of 
whipsawing or disruption in the event that one part of an integrated 
operation goes on strike. When, for its convenience, an employer has 
chosen to treat its various establishments as distinct administrative or 
operational entities, the OLRB has accepted that arrangement as proof of 
the unique community of interest of the employees at each location. 
Conversely, when an employer has chosen to operate two establishments as 
an integrated unit, the Board has accepted the broader grouping as the 
one appropriate for collective bargaining. Incredibly, the OLRB has lost 
sight of the fact that discontent with the existing terms and conditions 
of employment is what propels workers to organize. 
When challenged, the Ontario Labour Relations Board has defended its 
standard units as the most viable groupings. On the one hand, larger 
units are more difficult for unions to organize and they may be more 
difficult for unions to represent. If too much attention is paid to 
sectional interests, it may be 'more difficult for a union to formulate a 
coherent package of proposals or make necessary concessions' .5 1 At the 
other extreme, narrower structures may result in undue fragmentation, 
jurisdictional disputes, and unions too weak to negotiate effectively. 
The tension between the appropriate bargaining unit qua organizing 
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unit and the appropriate bargaining unit qua negotiating unit is not 
easily resolved: 
A common experience of labour boards is to find that these two 
uses of the 'unit' will point in opposite directions when the 
Board must determine the precise boundaries of the appropriate 
unit. The optimal structure for long-range negotiations is 
often quite different from any grouping within which the 
applicant union could obtain majority support in the short-run 
(Weiler, 1976:133). 
Canadian law conceives of the bargaining unit as a static structure, 
Herman (1966:9) complained, with little appreciation of the dynamics of 
bargaining. In most jurisdictions,j the legally designated bargaining 
unit is fixed at the time of certification and cannot be altered. k52 
Certainly, unions have found it easier to win bargaining rights for 
smaller units. Rates of success during the 1970s were highest among 
unions seeking certification for groups of fewer than 10 employees and 
significantly lower in groups of 100 or more. l The proportion of 
successful applications ranged from 75.0 per cent for bargaining units 
smaller than ten to 53.7 per cent for groups of 100 or more. 
jThe federal and British Columbia jurisdictions excepted. 
kAt least that is the Labour Board's interpretation of its mandate. 
For the views of the OLRB, see City of Toronto Non-Profit Housing 
Corporation. 52 
lThis conclusion is drawn from faulty data, however. Because 
information on bargaining unit size was missing for the 10 per cent of 
applications dismissed or withdrawn before the unit was described, the 
conclusion that certification was granted most frequently to smaller 
units is correct only if the applications for which there were no data 
were distributed fairly evenly by size and not clumped at the low end. 
From the Board's records, this was difficult to determine. 
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Table 5.1: Certification Outcome by Bargaining Unit Size 
Fiscal years 1970-71 to 1981-82 
Certified 
Not certified 
Total 
Proportion 
certified 
X2 = 152.0·· 
Fewer than 
10 employees 
2,020 
673 
2,693 
75.0% 
(3 degrees of freedom) 
··Significant at the .01 level. 
10 to 49 
2,889 
1,232 
4,121 
70.1% 
50 to 99 100 or more Total 
674 398 5,981 
408 343 2,656#1 
1,082 741 8,637 
62.3% 53.7% 69.3% 
#lThe 807 cases for which data on bargaining unit size were unavailable 
(i.e., applications dismissed or withdrawn before the bargaining unit was 
determined) have been apportioned in accordance with the overall 
distribution. 
A similar relationship between bargaining unit size and the outcome 
of certification applications has long been apparent in the United 
States. Reviewing the literature, Heneman and Sandver (1983:544 ) 
reported: 
Unit size has been the most thoroughly investigated predictor 
of election outcomes, appearing in fourteen of the twenty-one 
studies. In each instance, a negative relationship was found 
between unit size and the union victory rate ... For example, 
Rose found that the union victory rate consistently declined 
211 
from 66 per cent in units of nine or fewer employees to 52 per 
cent in units of 100 or more employees. 
The greater homogeneity of small units is advanced as the primary 
reason for their greater success in certification. Units of fewer than 
ten employees conform to Weber's notion of the informal work group 'whose 
members are unified by a set of common aspirations and common 
interpretation of their environment' (Weber, 1967:xviii). Perceiving the 
need for union representation, small groups are more likely to act 
cohesively, particularly when work relations are friendly and the groups 
cohesive. In smaller bargaining units, the influence of the majority's 
objectives and expectations on an individual's behaviour is more 
pronounced. Group solidarity can exert 'subtle pressures to conform on 
those employees who may have been ambivalent or apathetic toward the 
union' (Lowe, 1981:883). In his study of union growth in the Canadian 
chartered banks, Lowe reported that union activity emerged more 
frequently in branches in which the work group was well established, 
closely knit, and harmonious. Several older and part-time workers said 
they supported the union, not for their own advantage, but 'for the gals 
that are working here full-time,.m In other branches, the organizing 
drive collapsed when management was able to manipulate inter-personal 
frictions and rivalries to divide the employees into pro- and anti-union 
factions. 
Small bargaining units have an advantage under the Labour Relations 
Act as well. Because bargaining rights are generally granted without a 
representation vote if a union has enrolled more than 55 per cent of its 
mQuoted by Lowe (1981:884). 
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potential members. certification is more easily won for small bargaining 
units. In addition. anti-union petitions and unfair labour practice 
complaints were much less common in applications involving bargaining 
units of fewer than ten employees during the 1970s. 
Table 5.2: Incidence of Petitions by Bargaining Unit Size 
Fiscal years 1970-71 to 1981-82 
Petition 
No petition 
Total 
Proportion 
with petitions 
X2 = 220.0·· 
Fewer than 
10 employees 
293 
2.400 
2.693 
10.9% 
(3 degrees of freedom) 
··Significant at the .01 level. 
10 to 49 
945 
3.176 
4.121 
22.9% 
#1Data adjusted as described on Table 5.1. 
50 to 99 
275 
807 
1.082 
25.4% 
100 or more 
192 
549 
741 
25.9% 
Total 
1.705 
6.932111 
8,637 
19.7% 
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Table 5.3: Incidence of Unfair Labour Practices by Bargaining Unit Size 
Fiscal years 1970-71 to 1981-82 
Fewer than 
10 employees 
Unfair Labour 32 
Practice 
No Unfair 
Labour Practice 540 
Total 572 
Proportion with unfair 
labour practice 
complaints 5.6% 
X2 = 31. 9·· 
(3 degrees of freedom) 
··Significant at the .01 level. 
10 to 49 50 to 99 100 or more 
122 30 29 
710 209 146 
832 239 175 
14.7% 12.6% 16.6% 
Total 
213 
1,605 
1,818'1 
11. 7% 
#10ata based on a sample of 1,820 applications; however, data for 2 cases 
were not available. 
Paradoxically, the predominance of small establishments in the 
unorganized sector is regarded as a major impediment to the growth of 
unions (Finn, 1977). Workers in small establishments are thought to have 
a lower propensity to unionize, in part, because labour-management 
relations are more personal and less formalized than in larger 
workplaces. As a result, workers are more likely to identify with their 
employer. In addition, the higher costs of organizing, bargaining, and 
administration make smaller units less attractive to trade unions (Sain, 
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1970:73). By contrast, the greater propensity to unionize among workers 
in large establishments has been linked principally to their 
'bureaucratic' work environment. Impersonal and standardized 
relationships, Lockwood (1958:137-143) argued, foster a sense of common 
identity and so create 'a set of conditions extremely favourable to the 
growth of collective action'. As work relations become more concentrated 
and bureaucratized, individuals 'find that they have less and less 
ability to influence the making and the administration of the rules by 
which they are governed on the job'. To rectify the situation, 'they 
join trade unions and engage in collective bargaining' (Bain, 1970:188). 
In fact, union density is generally higher among employees in large, 
rather than small, establishments: 
In the united States, studies by the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, Cleland, Meyers, and Steele and McIntyre have found 
a strong positive relationship between the size of 
establishments and the extent to which they are unionized. 
Studies in Norway, Sweden, Austria, and Japan indicate that the 
level of unionism is higher in larger than in smaller offices 
(ibid.:74). 
Comparable data for Canada are sparse and not especially reliable. Using 
unpublished data from a 1977 Labour Canada survey, White (1980:49) 
reported that manufacturing establishments employing 700 or more workers 
were almost twice as likely to be organized as those employing between 20 
and 100; however, the actual percentages were wildly inaccurate. Due to 
the over- and under-representation of large and small establishments 
respectively, union density was estimated at 60.3 per cent in 
manufacturing, more than ten percentage points higher than the more 
reliable estimate of Bain and Price (1980:118). 
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Small bargaining units and small establishments are not necessarily 
synonymous, however (Bain, 1981:15). Given the OLRB's practice of 
dividing the workforce into units of office and manual, and full- and 
part-time employees, small bargaining units are sometimes found in 
relatively large establishments. It is not uncommon, for example, to 
find five units in a nursing home (two full- and two part-time units for 
both the nurses' aids and cleaning staffs plus a unit of clerical 
workers), and even more in a hospital where laboratory technicians are 
sometimes grouped separately. Furthermore, the dictomony between large 
and small suggests some confusion of small establishments with small 
businesses. It is the entrepreneur-run firm that is characterized by 
'simple control', to adopt Edwards's (1979) topology. Typically, the 
entrepreneur has an informal and unstructured approach to management. 
Work rules and discipline are arbitrary and erratic, decisions are prone 
to favouritism. But not all small establishments are small businesses; 
they may, in fact, be branches of large national or multi-national 
corporations. Thus, while impersonal and standardized terms and 
conditions of employment may well be characteristic of large 
establishments, there is no guarantee that small establishments are not 
bureaucratically managed (Bain, 1981:15). 
Bureaucratic management was precisely what spurred union growth in 
the Canadian chartered banks. Despite an average size of only 25 
employees, organizing drives were successful in a number of branches 
because employees had no voice in wage, benefit, or promotion policies, 
some of which discriminated against women. At the same time, local 
management was all-powerful in day-to-day matters and abused its 
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decision-making authority by acting capriciously and arbitrarily. Th us, 
it was not bureaucracy per se that the workers objected to, but the 
combination of inequitable rules and unfair application. In Lowe's 
(1981:881-2) opinion, the employees turned to unionization 'as a means of 
achieving a greater degree of bureaucracy'. The rules and regulations 
contained in a collective agreement were thought necessary to 
counterbalance the arbitrariness and uncertainty which defined employee 
relations in the banks. 
The combination of bureaucracy at the top and 'particularistic 
administration' below was cited as a source of frustration by employees 
in many certification cases involving small bargaining units,n 5354555657 
suggesting that the tensions which cause workers in large establishments 
to organize may also be present in small workplaces. The desire to curb 
the power of foremen and supervisors, to eliminate discrimination and 
favouritism have loomed large in the accounts of many organizing drives. o 
No matter how systematic the rules and regulations imposed from above, 
their implementation is always 'prone to arbitrariness [and] to abuse of 
authority, whether for reasons of personal gain, discrimination, 
retaliation, or just plain thoughtlessness' (Weiler, 1980:30-1). 
nSee, for example, Goodyear Tire Stores53 . McDonald's Restaurants54 , 
T. Eaton Company Limited55 , Tip Top Tailors56 , and Canada Trustco 
Mortgage Company57. 
° As a case in point, the United Steel Workers Union's most 
determined supporters during the 1946 strike against Stelco were the non-
Anglo Saxon immigrants who complained of discrimination and poor 
treatment (Roberts, 1981). Dofasco, by contrast, was never organized. 
probably because of its more enlightened personnel policies. The ~ower 
of the foremen to hire and fire was curbed by upper management dur1ng the 
1930s and European immigrants, who at Stelco were automatically placed in 
the hottest and most dangerous mills and never promoted, were employed 
throughout the works at Dofasco, occasionally as foremen (Storey. 1983). 
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But propensity to unionize is not the sole consideration. Union 
density is not simply a measure of the desire for union representation. 
Collective bargaining exists where workers have been able to assert their 
demand for union recognition, even in the face of employer opposition. 
And in this respect, large groups of workers are likely to succeed where 
small groups would fail. 
This, in fact, was the experience in Ontario during the 1970s. On 
the one hand, unions were more likely to be certified for units of fewer 
than ten employees; on the other hand, these groups fared less well in 
bargaining. p Overall, collective agreements were negotiated by 84.6 per 
cent of certified unions, but by only 79.5 per cent of the unions 
representing units smaller than ten workers. Moreover, the likelihood of 
negotiating a collective agreement rose steadily with size. Agreements 
were settled by 85.3 per cent of the unions with bargaining units of 10 
to 49 employees, by 91.5 per cent with units 50 to 99 employees, and by 
94.0 per cent with units of 100 or more employees. 
Experience in the United States has differed somewhat. The lone 
published study investigating first agreements found that bargaining 
units sizeq was a statistically significantr predictor of the likelihood 
of negotiating a first agreement based on a sample drawn from one state; 
however, the same variable was neither positive nor statistically 
PThese data are more reliable because only certified unions were 
counted and for these bargaining unit size was known. 
qThe variable used was the natural log of bargaining unit size 
multiplied by the percentage of workers voting for the union in the 
certification election. 
rAt the .05 level. 
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significant when employed in an analysis of a larger, nation-wide sample 
(Cooke, 1985a.1985c). 
Smaller units are easier to organize but larger units are more 
powerful: this is the dilemma in which the Labour Relations Board finds 
itself--a dilemma aggravated by the Board's unnecessarily rigid adherence 
to its standard units. Only in the tertiary sector has the Board shown 
flexibility. Recognizing that its standard. municipality-wide units were 
impeding organizing. the OLRB reconsidered its practice and agreed that a 
single-establishment unit would be appropriate in the retail and finance 
industries when local managers exercise control over day-to-day 
employment relations. there is little or no interchange of employees 
Table 5.4: Bargaining Outcome by Bargaining Unit Size 
Fiscal years 1970-71 to 1981-82 
Fewer than 10 to 49 50 to 99 100 or more Total 
10 employees 
Collective 
agreement 1.594 2.450 615 374 5,033 
negotiated 
No collective 
agreement 412 421 57 24 914 
negotiated 
Total 2.006 2.871 672 398 5.947 
Proportion with 
collective agreements 79.5% 85.3% 91.5% 93.4% 84.6% 
X2 = 93.7·· 
(3 degrees of freedom) 
"Significant at the .01 level 
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between locations, and the union has organized on a one-location basis. 
More recently still, the OLRB has accepted, as appropriate. one 
bargaining unit composed of seven, unrelated branches of National Trust58 
in Toronto. Summing up the policy as 'bigger is better' except when 
bigger poses an obstacle to bargaining, the proposed multi-establishment 
unit was considered appropriate because the seven branches were in a 
recognized geographic area, the workers had common terms and conditions 
of employment, and there was a history of movement between branches. 
All the same, workers are being cautioned against presuming that any 
grouping would be accepted as appropriate simply because it accorded with 
their wishes (Adams, 1985:326-7). Had there been evidence of greater 
independence in the formulation of labour-relations policy at the 
regional level, the Board said that it might have described the unit 
along the company's regional lines as the employer requested. 59 
The OLRB remains blind to the structural imbalance of power its 
decisions engender by fragmenting workers into small single-establishment 
groupings of office and manual, full- and part-time workers. And while 
the effect of the National Trust decision may have been to put more 
bargaining power on the union's side of the table the result was 
inadvertent. The Board's criteria were the conventional ones: community 
of interest and the employer's administrative structure. The issue of 
bargaining power per se was deliberately set aside: 'Whether the oft-
used term "viable" bargaining unit in the case law of the various Labour 
Boards was meant to specifically include the "bargaining strength" 
question need not be decided here'. Even so, the greater flexibility 
demonstrated by this decision might have given cause to hope for change 
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were not the potential benefits already nullified by the OLRB's growing 
inflexibility on the issue of negotiating structure. 
Conclusion 
The Ontario Labour Relations Board has hard and fast rules about 
what constitutes an appropriate bargaining unit. The single-
establishment unit is the cornerstone of its policy, but equally well 
entrenched is the Board's practice of separating office from manual 
employees and part-time from full-time employees. The result is that 
newly certified unions are small, averaging fewer than forty persons. 
Units of this size are defended as more readily organized than broader, 
more disparate groupings. At the same time, however, smaller groups are 
much less likely to negotiate collective agreements. 
Greater stability in collective bargaining will be difficult to 
achieve because the OLRB firmly believes that its bargaining units, 
determined for the purpose of granting certification, simultaneously 
define the constitutency for which both parties are legally obliged to 
negotiate a collective agreement. Only by mutual agreement can the 
bargaining unit be broadened or narrowed. And for either labour or 
management to insist on a different grouping is a breach of the duty to 
bargain in good faith if the dispute is pursued to impasse, an 
interpretation of the Act formalized in the recent Burns Meats decision. 
Burns Meats suggests that the Labour Relations Board is blind to 
industrial relations reality. The small, fragmented groups for which 
unions are certified as bargaining agents are not a firm foundation for 
collective bargaining. Single-establishment unions have a weak economic 
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base, especially in multi-establishment firms where establishment-by-
establishment bargaining leaves workers vulnerable to whipsawing and 
other divide-and-rule tactics. The Board should know that where 
collective bargaining has flourished, negotiations are commonly industry-
wide in scope, if not formally then by way of strong pattern bargaining. 
By allowing employers to veto the creation of more extensive negotiating 
units, units that would add appreciably to the economic power of workers, 
it has entrenched a structural imbalance of power between labour and 
management -- an imbalance that is all the more acute because of the 
severe legal constraints imposed on the use of sanctions by workers. 
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Chapter 6 
BARGAINING TACTICS 
Not only bargaining structure but bargaining tactics are shaped by 
the dictates of the Labour Relations Act. First and foremost are the 
strict constraints on the timeliness of strikes and lock-outs. The law 
gives workers a right to strike only when there is no collective 
agreement in force and then only after the conciliation process has been 
exhausted. At other times, all forms of collective conduct that have the 
effect of interfering with production are unlawful. And while it is an 
unfair labour practice for an employer to dismiss workers for 
participating in a lawful strike, they may be replaced. The only 
statutory protection for strikers permits them to apply within the first 
six months for reinstatement on a individual basis on terms agreed to 
with the employer. There are no protections whatsoever for workers whose 
strike is unlawful. Discipline, up to and including dismissal, is an 
acceptable response to an illegal work stoppage. And if union officials 
have called or encouraged or simply failed to bring a halt to an unlawful 
strike, a claim for damages may be pressed against the union. 
The right to picket is also severely constrained. At bottom, 
effective picketing is unlawful. Workers who trespass on private 
property, carry defamatory picket signs, or block the movement of goods 
or people, almost certainly break the law, in which case their activities 
will be enjoined. Similarly unlawful is picketing at a secondary 
location which threatens to broaden the scope of a dispute. Unless a 
third-party employer has allied itself with the struck company, the 
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picketing of a site separate from the site of the primary dispute is 
unlawful. 
The overall effect of these constraints is to severely restrict the 
bargaining power of workers. Employers, by contrast, face no similar 
legal impediments. They are free to operate during a strike, are 
entitled to replace strikers with other employees or newly hired 
replacements, and have the right to move goods and people without 
restriction. 
Strikes 
Although the Labour Relations Act does not confirm the right to 
strike explicitly, it can be implied from the assurance that every person 
is free to join a trade union of his own choice and to participate in its 
lawful activities. 1 Accordingly, it is an unfair labour practice for an 
employer to discriminate against or dismiss a worker for participating in 
a lawful strike or to engage the services of a professional strike-
breaker. 2 The law also provides that strikers retain their status as 
employees3 and, in certain circumstances, requires their reinstatement 
following a strike. 4 Read together, and in conjunction with judicial 
pronouncements that 'no statutory permission is necessary to participate 
in the lawful activities of any organization', these sections implicitly 
recognize the right to strike (Adams, 1985:621).a 
Not all strikes are lawful, however. Unlawful are strikes which are 
untimely: in Ontario this includes a strike for recognition; a strike 
aExcept for workers -- police officers, fire fighters, provincial 
government employees, and hospital and nursing home employees -- for ~hom 
strikes are always unlawful in Ontario. 
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during the lifetime of a collective agreement; and when no collective 
agreement exists, a strike before the completion of the conciliation 
process, including a 'cooling-off' period of seven or fourteen days. It 
is also unlawful to threaten to call or authorize an untimely strike or 
to counsel, procure, support or encourage an untimely strike. 5b 
The ban on mid-agreement strikes is imposed not only by the Labour 
Relations Act but also by the collective agreement. By law, every 
agreement must provide that there will be no strike or lock-out for its 
duration, and any agreement without such a provision is deemed to contain 
the following clause: 'There shall be no strikes or lock-outs so long as 
this agreement continues to operate,.6 As a counterweight to the bar on 
mid-term stoppages, every collective agreement must also provide for the 
final and binding settlement by arbitration of differences arising from 
the interpretation, application, administration, or alleged violation of 
a collective agreement without stoppage of work. In the absence of such 
a provision, an agreement is deemed to contain the model clause specified 
in the Act. 7 
In the event of an untimely strike, an employer may lay a complaint 
with the Labour Relations Board, or, if the strike is during the term of 
an agreement, an employer may file a grievance against the union, or 
both. c8 Where a collective agreement exists, arbitration is the most 
obvious forum. An arbitrator has the authority to issue declaratory 
bThe same time constraints apply to lock-outs. 
CIn some provinces, the courts have maintained, to varying degrees, 
their traditional jurisdiction with respect to strikes. In Ontario. 
however, their role has been narrowed considerably by the immunities for 
collective action written into the Rights of Labor Act. 8 
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judgments and affirmative directions, and to award compensatory damages. 
However, the delays inherent in the process mean that arbitrators' 
remedies, apart from damages, have little practical value. Partly in 
response to this problem, the jurisdiction and remedial authority of 
labour boards was expanded (Adams, 1985:626). In 1975, the OLRB was 
empowered to issue unlawful strike declarations and directions, 
affirmative and negative, to the parties. The Labour Relations Board 
also has the authority to consent to the prosecution of a union and may 
have the power to order the payment of damages under its general 
authority to remedy breaches of the Act (ibid.:627); usually, however, 
claims for damages are referred to arbitration (Sack and Mitchell, 
1985:504). Decisions of arbitrators and the Labour Board are final and 
binding on all concerned and enforceable as judgments of the Supreme 
Court of Ontario when filed with the registrar. 9 
Before either board, (that is, the Labour Relations Board or board 
of arbitration), the central questions are whether the action constituted 
a strike and, if so, the extent of the union's liability. In Ontario, a 
strike is defined to include a cessation of work, a refusal to work or to 
continue to work by employees in combination or in concert or in 
accordance with a common understanding, or a slow-down, or other 
concerted activity on the part of employees designed to restrict or limit 
output. 10 So broad a definition invites a wide prohibition and the OLRB 
does not disappoint. Only two conditions are essential for the Board to 
find that a strike has occurred: some concerted employee activity and 
disruption of the employer's operations. There is no implied requirement 
that the purpose of the activity be taken into account (ibid.:502): 
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The Labour Relations Act treats any collective work stoppage as 
being, in essence, an economic weapon and restricts its use to 
certain collective bargaining situations -- the final stages of 
the negotiation and renewal of a collective agreement. To 
avoid disruption in production and to promote industrial 
relations harmony, all work stoppages occurring outside this 
limited period, whatever their underlying motive, are 
prohibited. 11 
Accordingly, it was unlawful for union officials to urge members to 
absent themselves from work in support of the National Day of Protest 
sponsored by the Canadian Labour Congress to protest against the 
imposition of wage and price controls. Despite its political purpose, 
the threatened stoppage constituted a threat to strike. The union's 
argument, that a strike of necessity involves some attempt to win 
concessions from an employer, was rejected by the Board because to do 
otherwise would have left it powerless to remedy breaches of the 
contractual peace obligation so long as the union could establish that 
the stoppage had no collective bargaining purpose.d,12 As a practical 
matter, therefore, most forms of collective activity are unlawful if 
untimely: 
Numerous cases in Ontario have held that a concerted refusal to 
work overtime constitutes a strike. Similarly, a refusal to do 
certain work, in purported reliance on the collective 
agreement, was held to be a strike, as was a boycott of 
material emanating from a 'strike' operation. Likewise, a 
refusal to work because of the company's reintroduction of 
piecework, and a refusal to work (presented as a mass 
resignation) until a union steward was reinstated were both 
held to be strikes. A concerted refusal to cross a picket line 
may also be a strike (Adams, 1985:618). 
An overtime ban is a strike, even when the hours in question are 
voluntary under the terms of the collective agreement (England, 
dIn other jurisdictions, e.g., Manitoba, where the labour code 
incorporates a collective bargaining purpose in the definition of a 
strike, workers' support for the National Day of Protest was not unlawful. 
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1980:556). In Canada Packers Limited13 , the OLRB issued an unlawful 
strike declaration because the union was urging its members to refuse 
extra hours. Embroiled in a strike at a newly purchased subsidiary, 
Canada Packers was diverting work to its Toronto abattoir. Neither the 
fact that the hours in question were voluntary (because they were in 
excess of the statutory maximum) nor the employer's failure to comply 
with the terms of the permit issued by the Ministry of Labour altered the 
Board's assessment. e 
Similarly, transit drivers who refused to cross a picket line were 
found to have participated in an unlawful strike. Because the union had 
endorsed the line and recommended that its members not cross, the Board 
concluded that the individual refusals were really concerted. Past 
practice was of no significance: even though management had previously 
accommodated drivers who felt an obligation to respect picket lines, it 
was not required to continue to do so.14 Indeed, not even a permissive 
clause in the collective agreement would have protected the union. 
Clauses which permit workers to refuse to cross picket lines (or handle 
struck goods) cannot sanitize collective activity. An agreement of the 
parties cannot make lawful conduct that would otherwise be unlawful; 
thus, any clause that purports to create an exception to the no-strike 
provision in the Labour Relations Act is invalid and without effect. 15 
However, properly drafted, such a provision can shield workers from 
discipline for refusing to cross a picket line (or handle struck goods), 
even when instructed by their employer to do so. Unions may be similarly 
eIn another case, in which the employer failed to obtain the 
necessary permit from the Ministry of Labor, the stoppage was not 
considered a strike. 15 
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protected against an employer's claim for damages (Brown and Beattv 
~ , 
1984:457, 661). 
Arbitration boards have adopted a similarly broad construction of 
the strike bar. Unless the collective agreement provides its own 
description of prohibited conduct f , arbitrators generally take the 
statutory definition as their starting point (Palmer, 1983:725) and are 
usually prepared to accept the OLRB's unlawful strike declaration as the 
foundation for any subsequent claim for damages (Brown and Beatty, 
1984:20-1). Even those (few) arbitrators who have stressed that, to be a 
strike, concerted activity must have some collective bargaining purpose 
have defined the self-interest of the group involved sufficiently broadly 
so as to align their decisions with those of the OLRB. Accordingly, most 
arbitrators ruled the National Day of Protest constituted a strike. And, 
in line with other rulings of the Labour Relations Board, arbitrators 
have found a wide array of activities to be strikes when done in concert: 
refusing to work overtime, refusing to handle certain goods, refusing to 
accept work, refusing to cross a picket line, leaving work early without 
authorization, even taking a vacation at a certain time (Palmer, 
1983:726-7). 
The necessary element of collectivity is also readily found. Unless 
the employees can give credible and convincing evidence of individual 
decision-making, concerted activity will normally be inferred (Sack and 
Mitchell, 1985:510). No less a body than the Supreme Court of Canada was 
willing to find the required element of concerted activity in the union's 
fWhich, to be consistent with the Labour Relations Act, could only 
be more encompassing. 
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very existence. The thrust of the decision in the Longshoremen's case16 
was that 'personal beliefs having their "common root in labour 
organization" would constitute a "common understanding'" (England, 
1980:533). So sweeping an indictment has not found favour with the OLRB, 
until recently, anyway: 
The proposition that the prinCiples or philosophy of a 
particular group of individuals can, if implemented on an 
individual basis, make actionable an otherwise lawful activity, 
without any evidence of an agreement, either tacit or express 
between the individuals in question, is not a sound theory upon 
which to base a statutory violation, especially one which 
entails the risk of criminal prosecution. 17 
Now, however, the Board is prepared to accept that, in the construction 
industry at least, refusals to cross a picket line are concerted if they 
flow from a common understanding 'based upon sentiments of sympathy or 
solidari ty' . 1 8 
The second criterion, that the concerted activity be 'designed to 
restrict or limit output', has been construed as imposing on objective 
test. The OLRB, arbitrators, and the courts have adopted the view that 
if the action has the effect of impeding production, it was 'designed' 
for that purpose (ibid.:534): 'If conduct produces the proscribed 
results, and might reasonably be expected to do so, it is "designed" to 
do 50.,19 Accordingly. the defence that its motive was the pursuit of 
union solidarity and not an attempt to extract bargaining concessions 
failed to protect the Longshoremen's union. 
Where a strike is on-going or the rights of the parties are unclear, 
a dispute will likely come before the OLRB rather than an arbitrator. 
hearing will be convened as soon as is practicable and a remedy granted 
A 
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within a few days of the commencement of a strike (MacDowell, 1977:223).g 
The Board's principal remedy is an unlawful strike declaration granted 
when it finds that a union has called or authorized an untimely strike, 
took active steps to promote a work stoppage, or failed to take steps to 
stop a strike. A declaration is not granted in every case, however. The 
Board's purpose is not to punish, but to inform the parties of their 
rights and bring the strike to an end (Sack and Mitchell, 1985:510). 
Consequently, its policy is to refuse to issue a declaration if the 
employees are back at work by the hearing date. Declarations have also 
been refused when the unions sought to persuade their members to return 
to work or when an employer provoked the walk-out, for example, by 
adopting an interpretation of the collective agreement that the wording 
could not reasonably bear (ibid.:505,513). Declarations are granted when 
there has been a pattern of illegal strikes, there is a reasonable 
likelihood that the strike will recur, or if the failure to issue a 
declaration might prejudice an employer's claim for damages in a further 
proceeding (Adams, 1985:658-9). 
A declaration may be supplemented with a direction, that is, an 
injunction-like order by which the Board directs the conduct of the 
parties. The OLRB has ordered union officials to refrain from 
threatening, counselling, and encouraging strikes, and required them to 
inform employees that a strike was unlawful and not officially supported. 
Employees have been directed to cease and desist from an illegal strike 
gThe Board's usual practice is to abridge the time limits for ~iling 
pleadings in an unlawful strike case and put the matter on for hear~ng 
qUickly, usually within two or three days2 2 -- quite unlike the Board's 
less hurried response to a union's complaint of an unfair labour practice. 
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and to return to work. Using its power to issue directions. the Board 
has prohibited picketing and ordered employers to post copies of its 
directions around the workplace (Sack and Mitchell, 1985:515). 
Calling, authorizing, or encouraging an unlawful strike leaves a 
union open to prosecution for violating the Labour Relations Act. 
Although a union has no legal personality, it may be prosecuted in its 
own name and is vicariously liable for the acts of its officers and 
agents. Conversely, if a union has been found guilty of an offence under 
the Act, every officer, official, or agent who assented to the commission 
of the offence is deemed to be guilty. The organization may be ordered 
to pay a fine of not more than $10,000 per day, each day constituting a 
separate offence; union officials and employees may also be fined not 
more than $1,000 per day.2o Proceedings may not be instituted without 
the Board's consent, however. 21 In granting consent to prosecute the 
OLRB considers 'whether, by granting its consent, it will advance the 
purpose and intent of the Act and thereby promote a sound relationship 
between the parties' .22 The Board seeks to determine whether prosecution 
would serve the parties' interests, whether the issues can be resolved by 
the courts, and what other avenues might be pursued to settle the 
dispute. 'Usually, leave to prosecute has been refused where no useful 
purpose would be served thereby, as where the strike was short, there was 
no violence, the employees had returned to work and those responsible had 
been disciplined, or the union had taken steps to settle the strike and 
had disciplined the business agent responsible for calling it' 
(ibid.:527). 
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Vicarious liability may also entangle a union in a claim for 
damages. h23 Although a union does not automatically assume absolute 
liability for the illegal strikes of its members, in the end, the members 
are the union and so their decision to strike or continue to strike, if 
adopted at a properly constituted meeting, gives rise to liability, even 
if the officers opposed the strike and in spite of the 
unconstitutionality of the resolution (Palmer, 1983:741). Furthermore, 
'at least one arbitrator has expressed the view that the union's 
liability can be premised on this basis even in the absence of a formal 
resolution and vote by the membership' (Brown and Beatty, 1984:665). 
Damages will also flow if the officers, including stewards and committee 
persons, encouraged, instigated or actively participated in the work 
stoppage (Palmer, 1983:743). And although stewards would not be expected 
to order strikers back to work, their presence on a picket line or in a 
demonstration, unless explained away, suggests the union was encouraging 
the continuation of the strike. 24 
In the event of a spontaneous strike, a union is liable for the 
inaction of its officers. The onus is on the union to show that it took 
all reasonable steps to terminate the walk-out. To exculpate the 
organization, union leaders must make more than a nominal effort to bring 
the strike under control. There must be prompt attempts to get the 
employees back to work: 
It may well be necessary for the Union, if uncoordinated 
efforts by its stewards and officers to terminate the stoppage 
are unsuccessful, to make concerted efforts and to obtain the 
hWhere no collective agreement exists, the Labor Relations Act 
provides for the arbitration of a claim for damages once the Board has 
declared a stoppage unlawful. 23 
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permission of management to call a meeting on the premises for 
that purpose. It may be necessary to threaten, and even to 
take disciplinary measures against particular members of the 
Union. At all events, it would seem that the initial 
obligation of the Union should be to make known to management 
that the union has not authorized or encouraged the stoppage 
and thereafter to give continued evidence of this position by 
manifest steps to bring the stoppage to an end. It may, of 
course, be finally necessary for the Union to report to 
management that it cannot control its members or other 
employees, thus leaving it to management to take such action as 
it sees fit.25 
In one case, the union was liable because the local president did not 
instruct the membership to return to work, but rather allowed them to 
vote on the issue; however, unions have not been held accountable when 
the vote favoured a return to work or the strike was attributed to a 
faction within the union (Brown and Beatty, 1984:665). 
Damage awards! are compensatory in nature: the arbitrator seeks 
to put 'the innocent party, so far as can reasonably be done, in the 
position in which he or it would be if the particular rights had not been 
violated' .26 Thus, unless the collective agreement specifically provides 
for punitive damages, an employer is entitled to compensation for 'those 
proven losses that were occasioned by, and attributable to, the unlawful 
strike for which the union was found to have been responsible', including 
overhead expenses, depreciation, and lost profit (Palmer, 1983:749). 
Apart from any expenses directly connected to the strike, arbitrators 
have been unwilling to award damages where total production and revenue 
were no different over the relevant fiscal period than they would have 
been if work had continued uninterrupted. And some arbitrators have 
iDamages may be assessed against the union but not against 
employees. 
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exercised their discretion not to award damages where to do so would have 
been unfair to the union (Brown and Beatty, 1984:660-70). 
The overall effect of these constraints on strikes and lock-outs is 
far from even-handed; nor are they consistent with the presumptions which 
underlie industrial relations policy. The ban on mid-agreement strikes 
is far too broad, England (1980:526) argued: 
The crucial point in all instances is that the system 
visualizes the strike as the ultimate determinant of interest 
disputes between the parties, and statutory definitions of 
'strike' should be construed in that light. Mid-term work 
stoppages that are not concerned with obtaining employment 
concessions -- such as honoring picket lines and hot cargo 
declarations, refusing to obey management orders promulgated in 
breach of provisions of the agreement, slowdowns to preserve 
employment opportunities, concerted fishing trips and protest 
stoppages against government legislation -- belong to the 
domain of collective agreement arbitration, not to the 'strike' 
ban as the term is properly understood in the system. 
Weiler (1980:59) also thought that 'the effort to spread the net of 
Ontario strike law beyond its normal collective bargaining reach 
quite unsound as a'matter of policy'. 
But construing the word 'strike' more purposefully would change 
little. No doubt the law would better reflect the underlying policy, but 
the policy itself is unsound. According to Weiler (ibid.:91), the 
purpose of the no-strike policy is to give employers the 'benefit of a 
strike ban as and when they enter into a collective agreement, and give 
employees the benefit of binding arbitration of their grievances during 
the term of that collective agreement'. But this description is 
deceptive in its simplicity. As Weiler (ibid.:67) himself has pOinted 
out, the right to strike is not the workers' equivalent of the employers' 
right to lock-out; the right to strike counter-balances the employers' 
right to alter terms and conditions of employment. 'If the law is to be 
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fair', he concluded, 'it must accompany any ban on strikes with an 
adequate alternative by which the union and its members may challenge 
that basic management prerogative of capital'. 
Ontario law does not provide such an alternative. A ban on mid-
agreement strikes supposes both that disputes over the interpretation of 
the collective agreement are clearly distinguishable from interest 
disputes and that only the former arise during the course of a collective 
agreement. But this does not accord with reality; the categories collide 
and overlap with the result that interest disputes are commonly treated 
as though they are rights disputes simply because they arise during the 
lifetime of a collective agreement. 
The grievance arbitration procedure is fundamentally unsuited for 
settling disputes over issues not specifically addressed by the parties 
in writing. An arbitrator derives his or her authority from the 
collective agreement as written and if there is no violation of the 
agreement there is no grievance. And when an agreement is silent 
arbitrators have decided that management retains the right to act 
unilaterally: there is no obligation to bargain, no obligation to 
consult, no obligation to even inform a union of changes. The industrial 
relations community is not a democracy, arbitrators emphasize: 
It is a relationship created and governed by contract. The 
respective rights and obligations of the parties are expected 
to be set forth in a collective agreement. In that contractual 
relationship, management retains all the rights that are not 
bargained away to the union in the course of collective 
bargaining (Public Employers of British Columbia, 1980). 
By the residual rights view of management's rights, therefore, 
employers retain the right to sub-contract work, introduce new 
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technology, require workers to work overtime, and so on, as long as there 
is no constraint imposed by the collective agreement. 
And few agreements impose such constraints. j At the same time, any 
attempt by employees to block management's course of action is undercut 
by the illegality of mid-agreement strikes. 
The no-strike policy has other implications as well. By designating 
when strikes over interest disputes are lawful, the timing of most 
strikes is highly predictable. Thus, not only are workers denied the 
right to act when action seems most appropriate, the effectiveness of 
lawful strikes can be undermined by their anticipation. And because 
work-to-rule campaigns and overtime bans are unlawful if untimely, the 
law makes it difficult for workers to interfere with an employer's 
attempt to stockpile in anticipation of a stoppage. Finally, the no-
strike policy makes it impossible for workers to ally themselves with 
others. Even when they may be affected by the outcome of a dispute, 
workers may not assist the strikes of others by refusing to handle struck 
goods, refusing to cross picket lines, or even refusing to work overtime. 
Strong groups. therefore, cannot aid weaker groups in their struggle to 
negotiate acceptable terms and conditions of employment. 
JApproximately 70 per cent of collective agreements covering 500 or 
more employees (excluding the construction industry) expressly permitted 
(16.9 per cent) or had no provision (53.0 per cent) respecting 
contracting-out in 1985. No collective agreements prohibited the 
introduction of new technology; furthermore, only 38 per cent required 
employers to give advanced notice, 31 per cent obligated employers to 
retrain those displaced, and 22 per cent provided for some sort of wage 
and/or job guarantees. With respect to overtime work, management ~ad a 
free hand to require extra hours in all but 38 per cent of collect1ve 
agreements covering 500 or more employees (Canada, Labour Canada, 
Provisions in Major Collective Agreements in Canada Covering 500 or More 
Employees, 1985). 
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Job Security 
Legally, employees on strike are simply absent from work and since 
the Labour Relations Act draws no distinction between lawful and unlawful 
stoppages, all strikers retain their status as employees. 27 Merely 
engaging in a strike, even an unlawful strike, by itself, does not 
terminate the relationship, 'rather, some affirmative act on the part of 
the employer is required to actually sever the employment relationship' 
(Brown and Beatty, 1985:655). And while it is an unfair labour practice 
to dismiss workers for exercising their right to engage in a lawful 
strike,28 participation in an unlawful strike is generally considered 
just cause for discipline. Anyone who causes or perpetuates an unlawful 
strike does so at the risk of his or her job (Palmer, 1983:734). In the 
words of one arbitrator, 'If participation in an unlawful strike and 
picketing is not cause for discharge there can hardly be any dereliction 
of duty to an employer in respect of service that would be' .29 
The employer's right to discipline and dismiss is constrained by the 
requirement that workers be treated equally. It is improper for an 
employer to discipline strikers randomly: 'equality of treatment is a 
necessary component of just cause':3 0 
The concept of 'just cause', which governs all matters of 
discipline, has as its basis the evaluation of individual 
conduct and circumstances; the idea of collective 
responsibility or view that one could 'make an example' being 
foreign to this concept. 31 
It is not permissible for employers to 'shoot every 10th man as an 
incentive to the remaining nine' .3 2 Thus, unless management is able to 
identify those who led a walk-out, there is no basis for disciplining 
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some workers but not others. And, by parity of reasoning, arbitrators 
have ruled that it is improper for an employer to discipline the entire 
workforce when there is no evidence to substantiate the claim that all 
the workers participated in the stoppage (Brown and Beatty, 1984:663). 
Arbitrators also require that the discipline bear a reasonable 
relationship to the strikers' conduct (ibid.:662-3) and so have approved 
of the practice of dismissing those who instigated or actively 
participated in a stoppage in conjunction with lesser penalties for those 
who merely followed along. But if the designation of the leaders was 
indiscriminant or arbitrary, the dismissals will be over-turned. 33 
Arbitrators also consider mitigating circumstances. And 'the more severe 
the discipline imposed, the greater the emphasis that has been placed on 
questions such as similarity of seniority, work record, previous 
discipline imposed on the griever, comparable incidents of discipline and 
so on' .3 4 
Arbitrators are divided in their assessments of the responsibility 
of union officials in the face of an unlawful strike. Earlier awards 
accepted that union officers and stewards owed a higher degree of loyalty 
to their employer than did ordinary employees. As a result, officials 
were saddled with a greater responsibility to refrain from participating 
in, or give leadership to, an unlawful walk-out and were expected to 
counsel others as to the proper procedure for processing grievances. 
Failure to meet the higher standard justified the imposition of 'more 
severe disciplinary sanctions on union officials when they actively. and 
indeed passively, participate in an unlawful walk-out, or other forms of 
misconduct' (ibid.:649). The soundness of this approach has been 
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questioned in more recent cases, however. While it is agreed that a 
union may be liable for the actions of its officials, stewards and other 
officers are now thought to have no responsibility to their employer 
apart from their responsibility as employees. In Douglas Aircraft,35 the 
Supreme Court of Canada affirmed this view: 
The total fabric and structure of labour relations is 
predicated on the integrity in law and in fact of the 
representatives of both sides of the bargaining process. That 
integrity is not promoted, and in fact would be defeated, if 
the law were to place in the representative of the employees a 
duty enforceable by the company, or indeed a duty, the failure 
to exercise which would expose the employee representative to 
punitive action of any kind by the company against the employee 
in his status as employee. 
None the less, the fact that a steward's presence among the strikers 
might encourage others to participate in an illegal strike, simply by 
virtue of his or her recognized role as a leader, suggests to some 
arbitrators that more severe punishment might be justified after all 
(ibid.:652). 
Employees may 'also be disciplined for action taken as individuals. 
Arbitrators assume the employer's interest in uninterrupted production 
ranks ahead of a worker's desire to follow his or her conscience. Apart 
from its power to discipline employees for participating in an unlawful 
strike, an employer retains the right to discipline workers for breaches 
of their obligations to attend work; to obey reasonable orders; to work 
with diligence, care, and honesty; and, while not at work, to act in a 
manner consistent with continued employment (Palmer, 1983). Thus, even 
minor initiatives. such as refusing to work overtime to prevent 
stockpiling or in support of striking co-workers, may be acts of heroism. 
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The wording of the collective agreement is critical. Unless 
overtime is expressly voluntary. management retains the right to require 
employees to work overtime and refusing to work constitutes 
insubordination unless the employee offers an acceptable excuse. For 
most workers. overtime (not in excess of the statutory limit of 48 hours 
per week) is compulsory. And. while taking a pregnant wife to the doctor 
was considered a reasonable excuse by one arbitrator. refusing to work 
because the employee did not want to. had arranged a family outing, was 
scheduled to participate in a bowling tournament. or because others were 
on lay-off were not considered reasonable excuses by other arbitration 
panels (Brown and Beatty. 1984:456).k 
Workers may also be disciplined for refusing to handle struck goods. 
Acting as an individual. an employee commits no unlawful act, yet leaves 
himself open to discipline for insubordination. The arbitral rule is 
'work now. grieve later'. so that even if the worker can point to a 'hot-
cargo' clause in the collective agreement, he or she is required to 
perform the task as assigned and grieve the propriety of the order 
subsequently. Failure to follow the procedure constitutes 
insubordination (ibid.:457). So sweeping a rule is justified on the 
grounds that a 'plant is not a debating society': 
Its object is production. When a controversy arises. 
production cannot wait for exhaustion of the grievance 
procedure. While that procedure is being pursued, production 
must go on. And some one must have the authority to ~irect the 
manner in which it is to go on until the controversy 1S 
settled. That authority is vested in supervision. It must be 
kThe precise issue of refusing to work overtime in order to avoid 
stockpiling or to support another strike has not been reported but wou~d 
likely embroil a worker in a controversy over whether or not the activ1ty 
was undertaken in accordance with a common understanding. 
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vested there because the responsibility for production is also 
vested there; and responsibility must be accompanied by 
authority. It is fairly vested there because the grievance 
procedure is capable of adequately recompensing employees for 
abuse of authority by supervision. 36 
It is likewise an industrial offence to refuse to cross a picket 
line in defiance of management's direction to do so. While some 
arbitrators have stuck to the 'work now, grieve later' principle, others 
have ruled that workers may be shielded from discipline if the collective 
agreement permits such refusals (ibid.:457). But most agreements contain 
no such clause and in the absence of such a clause workers may refuse to 
cross a picket line only if they fear for the safety of their person or 
their property. Whether the fear was reasonable is a matter of evidence, 
however. In one case, the arbitrator felt that congestion at the plant 
gates, pushing and shoving on the picket line, and the rocking of one car 
from side to side were not sufficient to justify the workers' absence. 
Finding themselves unable to gain entry at the normal time, the grievors 
were expected to have kept trying throughout the day.37 Moreover, if an 
arbitrator suspects that the refusal to cross the picket line was 
motivated by support for the striking employees, discipline will be 
considered appropriate, even if the collective agreement permitted 
workers to refuse to cross when there was a possible safety risk. 38 
In no circumstances is respect for a picket line established in 
conjunction with an unlawful strike justified. So grave was the offence 
committed by a hospital employee who, on her own, refused to cross a 
picket line of co-workers (organized by a different union) participating 
in an illegal strike, the arbitrator refused to consider re-instatement 
until he was convinced that she understood the seriousness of her error 
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and promised not to repeat the offence, and then the order was without 
back pay.39 
Despite the protections of the Labour Relations Act employees may 
also find their jobs in jeopardy when they participate in a lawful 
strike. While it is an unfair labour practice to dismiss or discipline 
workers for exercising their right to strike, it is perfectly acceptable 
for employers to replace them. The law guarantees strikers their status 
as employees, but not necessarily their jobs: 'a legal distinction 
without a factual difference' said Weiler, (1980:76). In Ontario, 
employers are obliged to reinstate only those who apply, unconditionally 
and in writing, within the first six months of a strike on terms agreed 
upon by the employer and employee, although an exception is made when the 
work is no longer being performed or work has been suspended or 
discontinued in all or part of an employer's operations. 40 Apart from 
this limited protection, reinstatement following a strike is a negotiable 
issue. 
That the protection provided by the Act falls short of guaranteeing 
the jobs of strikers who return to work without invoking section 73 is 
considered 'an integral feature of the balance of power in collective 
bargaining' .41 For powerful groups, the absence of statutory protection 
for the jobs of strikers presents few problems. But when a union is weak 
or the strike has been lost, employers may insist that replacements hired 
during the strike be retained, in which case the strikers are recalled on 
an 'as-needed' basis. In these circumstances, the use of replacements is 
frequently accompanied by picket-line violence leading to the dismissal 
of strikers for picket-line activities. On occasion, serious offences 
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are involved but not all relate to violence. Pickets are constantly in 
danger of committing acts of trespass, defamation, and obstruction which 
employers may use as grounds for dismissal. Nor do employers accept the 
argument that the civil and criminal law provide adequate penalties, or 
that dismissal is a reprehensible form of double jeopardy. 
Employees dismissed for picket-line activities mayor may not have 
access to the grievance-arbitration procedure. Once a collective 
agreement and/or statutory freeze have expired, the bargaining 
relationship evaporates: all that remains is the 'bare skeleton of the 
employment contract fixing the wage/work bargain, which the employer is 
free to renegotiate by individual "bargaining" with his employees' 
(England, 1976a:441). The employer is no longer bound by the negotiated 
terms; workers are no longer entitled to the regular rate of payor the 
established scale of benefits. The collective agreement has ceased to 
exist and with it goes the 'just cause' provision and the right to 
challenge management through the grievance procedure. Nor is an 
employer's refusal to arbitrate strike-related dismissals a violation of 
the Labour Relations Act in the opinion of the Ontario Board (Sack and 
Mitchell, 1985:425). 
For the strong, the legal lapse poses few difficulties. At the end 
of the strike, the union will negotiate a 'no-victimization' clause 
calling for an orderly return to work. A less powerful group may have to 
settle for the employer's commitment to process any dismissals through to 
arbitration, in which case the memorandum of settlement must be worded 
very carefully. A retroactivity clause is essential to bridge the legal 
hiatus between the old and new agreements; otherwise, the strikers' 
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grievances will not be arbitrable (England, 1976a:444). Furthermore, 
unless the terms of settlement specifically prohibit further discipline, 
workers may be discharged for strike-related offences after the 
memorandum of agreement has been signed, in which case their grievances 
would not be arbitrable unless a retroactivity provision has already been 
agreed to. At arbitration, picket-line incidents or infractions away 
from the site of the dispute can be relied upon to justify dismissal. 
Penalties can be for something as amorphous as conduct that harms the 
firm's reputation or would make it difficult for co-workers to get along 
after the stoppage (Vector Union Report, August, 1985). 
For the weak, the situation may be perilous. Even if a collective 
agreement is signed, many strikers may remain dismissed; many others may 
never be recalled. Moreover, because strike replacements are legally 
employees in the bargaining unit, they have the right to participate in 
any ratification vote or to initiate an application to terminate a 
union's bargaining' rights and to vote in a representation election. 42 
The law does not mirror reality when it treats the expiration of a 
collective agreement as the termination of the bargaining relationship. 
The relationship does not cease to exist in law or in fact. The union 
remains the legally recognized bargaining agent with which the employer 
is legally obliged to bargain. And ordinarily, both parties expect to 
reach a settlement of their dispute. Clearly, the bargaining 
relationship remains intact, in which case a worker should have recourse 
to those elements of a collective agreement required by law in Ontario, 
most importantly, the final and binding settlement by arbitration of 
rights disputes, particularly because a dismissed worker is relying on 
248 
the universally required standard of 'just cause' and not a right that 
flows from the specific wording of a collective agreement. 1 During a 
strike, a union retains its status as the workers' exclusive bargaining 
agent; thus, the fact that employers are allowed to negotiate with 
workers individually is a contradiction, whether they are strike 
replacement (who are, after all, employed at jobs in the bargaining 
unit), or strikers exercising their right to return to work within six 
months. 
England (1976a) argued that arbitrators and labour boards have got 
the law wrong: the statutory protection of strikers as employees 
parallels the doctrine of suspension at common law and so entitles them 
to reinstatement. None the less, tapping our way back through the legal 
maze in which industrial relations are now imprisoned poses enormous 
problems for those who sit on these boards. The simplest way to cut the 
Gordion knot would be to legislate a ban on the use of strike 
replacements. Strikers would then be assured of their jobs unless they 
were dismissed for strike-related activities; at the same time, the 
absence of strike replacements would mean less violence on the picket 
line and fewer dismissals. 
Some noted scholars vigorously oppose this solution, however. While 
he thoroughly supported the protection of strikers' jobs from usurpation 
by strike replacements, Weiler (1980:78) felt this had been accomplished 
in Ontario with the guarantee of individual reinstatement during the 
first six months of a strike. To go further would radically alter the 
lEven when a collective agreement does not restrict an employer's 
right to discipline or dismiss for 'cause' or 'just cause', arbitrators 
read this restriction into the agreement (Craig, 1986:241). 
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balance of power. A legislative ban on the use of strike replacements 
would stray 'much too far from the competitive economic struggle which, 
in the final analysis, does underlie our system of free collective 
bargaining'. England (1983:283), by contrast, found the existing 
legislative scheme a paradox. Not only do workers have a legal right to 
strike 
matter 
indeed, sometimes, they may have no practical choice in the 
but strikes and lock-outs are integral to the collective 
bargaining process. It is 'illogical and unfair' he argued to penalize 
anyone for participating in a lawful strike. No worker should bear the 
burden for action that is essential to the functioning of the society in 
which he finds himself and from which the public derives the benefits. 
At most, employers have an interest in hiring temporary replacements. 
Thus, by permitting the permanent displacement of strikers, the existing 
legal framework tips the balance of power in management's favour. 
Elsewhere, England (1976b:606) has argued that a ban on strike 
replacements would be more even-handed and have the desirable effect of 
reducing picket-line violence, 'an objective very much in line with the 
public interest' . 
A ban on strike replacements would also correct the anomaly which 
leaves lawful strikers exposed to permanent replacement while protecting 
the jobs of workers who defy their union and cross a lawful picket line 
of striking co-workers. Anti-union conduct may lead to expulsion from 
membership, but ostracism is as far as a union can go. It is unlawful for 
a union to require an employer to dismiss a worker pursuant to a union 
shop clause for the reason that a worker was suspended. expelled or 
denied membership because he or she was engaged in activity against a 
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union or engaged in reasonable dissent within the a union,m unless the 
conduct was instigated or procured by the employer. 43 
Picketing 
In most jurisdictionsn , picketing is regulated by the courts, not 
the Labour Relations Board. Although picketing constitutes watching and 
besetting under the Criminal Code, workers have seldom been prosecuted 
since 1934 when the Code was amended to permit peaceful picketing for the 
purpose only of obtaining or communicating information.o While criminal 
prosecutions declined rapidly, actions in tort increased concomitantly: 
As the criminal sanctions were eased, the civil sanctions were 
imposed: criminal conspiracy was abolished, for example, and 
civil conspiracy took its place. The judiciary developed a 
number of tort doctrines to curtail labour activities 
considered 'offensive' in the eyes of the judges. Inducing 
breach of contract and conspiracy joined the traditional torts 
of defamation, assault, nuisance and intimidation (Tacon, 
1980:132). 
On the principle that a combination to do an unlawful act, or to do 
a lawful act by unlawful means, constitutes a civil conspiracy, judges 
reasoned that picketing that goes beyond communicating information can 
found an action in tort. Traditionally, the tort was grounded in means 
wrongful in themselves, either criminal (e.g., assault) or tortious 
mOther protected forms of dissent are membership in another trade 
union, activity on behalf of another trade union, and refusal to pay 
unreasonable initiation fees, dues or assessments. 
nBritish Columbia is the exception. 
0In 1876, peaceful picketing was made lawful but the protection was 
eliminated in 1892 when the qualification, that attending merely to 
obtain or communicate information did not constitute watching besetting, 
was omitted from the codification of the criminal law (Woods and Ostry, 
1962:36-7). 
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(e.g., inducing breach of contract); nowadays, however, the courts also 
recognize breach of a statute, breach of a collective agreement, or 
secondary action as grounds for liability (Tacon, 1980:17,23). Thus, 
even though some judges have required that the picketing be assessed 
independently of the striking, the weight of authority is that picketing 
in conjunction with an unlawful strike is itself unlawful. Recognition 
picketing is similarly prohibited: the judiciary has inferred from the 
provision of certification machinery that picketing for recognition is 
contrary to the spirit of the Labour Relations Act. Also unlawful is 
peaceful picketing before or during conciliation, even in the absence of 
a strike, because the union has failed to follow the procedures laid down 
by the Act and so failed to meet its obligation to bargain in good faith 
(ibid.:34, 54-5). 
The courts are also quick to find unlawful conspiracies to injure. 
'Token' or 'signal' picketing is frequently enjOined because the pickets 
are providing information to those who already possess it, a fact which 
suggests the presence of an ulterior objective to judges: 'Where 
information picketing does not touch the public but reaches only those 
who already have the information the purpose of the picketing is not 
merely to convey information but to accomplish some injurious purpose' 
(Carrothers, 1956:69). And, by parallel reasoning, picketing at a 
location other than the site of a dispute is suspect: not necessarily 
unlawful, but the further the picketing is removed from a labour dispute 
the more likely that it will be enjoined as secondary. Troublesome 
distinctions between cases were eliminated when the Ontario Court of 
Appeal discovered in 1963 that secondary picketing was unlawful per se. 
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The union in that case was unable to negotiate a collective agreement 
with Deacon Bros., a clothing manufacturer. But instead of calling a 
strike, it chose to embark on an 'educational campaign' to persuade 
retailers to boycott Deacon Bros.'s products. Hersees, a retailer of 
menswear in another city, refused to partiCipate in the boycott and was 
picketed by workers whose placards asked consumers to look for the union 
label. On Hersees's application, the picketing was enjoined: 
Appellant has a right lawfully to engage in its business of 
retailing merchandise to the public. In the City. of Woodstock 
where that business is being carried on, the picketing for the 
reasons already stated, has caused or is likely to cause damage 
to the appellant. Therefore, the right, if there be such 
right, of the respondents to engage in secondary picketing of 
appellant's premises must give way to appellant's right to 
trade. 44 
The arbitrariness of the 'per se' doctrine has been repeatedly 
ridiculed by academic lawyers. In a sharply critical comment, Arthurs 
(1963)P derided the court's application of the traditional tort doctrines 
and exploded at the bald assertion that the workers' right to picket must 
always give way to a third-party employer's right to trade. So stark a 
pronouncement was completely at odds with provincial labour policy. Not 
long before, the Ontario Legislature had specifically rejected the 
blanket prohibition of secondary picketing recommended by the Select 
Committee on Labour Relations, choosing instead to outlaw acts, other 
than acts done in connection with a lawful strike, the reasonable or 
probable consequence of which would be an unlawful strike. 
PThe judges got it wrong, he claimed. By the 'algebra' of torts --
if C has a contract with A, etc. -- the defendant, Goldstein, was liable 
to Deacon Bros. if to anyone. 
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The courts have not been completely insensitive to workers' rights, 
however. An otherwise unlawful conspiracy may be protected if there is 
just cause or excuse for the injury caused. A central problem, 
therefore, is the court's assessment of the object of the combination. 
Even so, Canadian courts have rarely appreciated the legitimacy of a 
union's objectives. In his reading of the cases, Carrothers (1956:100) 
could discover 'no clear meaning of object and no clear test for its 
determination'. Nor have the courts appreciated the possibility of mixed 
motives, or that harm is rarely the union's sole objective. In practice, 
consequently, the plea of economic self-interest has not been a 
successful line of defence, notwithstanding its acceptance by British 
judges. 
In Ontario, the Rights of the Labour Act45 has protected unions from 
conspiracy charges. But the judiciary has been difficult to deter: the 
tort of inducing breach of contract has replaced conspiracy actions in 
the regulation of picketing (Mandel, 1961:126). Inducing breach of 
contract is unlawful whatever the nature of the contract and whatever the 
union's motive or object, unless liability is removed by statute or the 
defendant can establish justification. And while British courts have 
emphasized the need to demonstrate that the pickets (or their union) had 
knowledge of the contract, intended and advocated the breach of contract 
and damages resulted from the breach, and that the breach was the 
necessary consequence of the picketing (ibid.:125), Canadian courts have 
been less rigorous in their analysis: 
There are instances of liability despite lack of proof of a 
contract or knowledge thereof contractual breach, and 
inducement of breach. The ac~ion may succeed even though it 
was the plaintiff who breached the contract. The distinction 
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betw~en dire~t persuasion and indirect inducement, which 
requ~res an ~llegal act apart from the inducement itself has 
been blurred or gone unnoticed. In picketing cases the' 
element of causation has been inferred; the courts have 
judicially noticed the 'rule of the picket line'. That is a 
picket line is regarded as an 'invisible barrier', invariabl 
respected by other trade unionists, around the premises of t~e 
struck employer. In the judges' view, the picketers then are 
said to have 'caused whatever consequences follow, i~cludi~g 
breaches of employment contracts of workers respecting the line 
(Tacon, 1980:28-9). 
Liability is almost a certainty because the defence of economic self-
interest is rarely accepted. Although he could find numerous dicta 
stating that there can be justification for inducing breach of contract, 
Mandel (1961:121) could find only two labour cases in which justification 
was successfully advanced. 
Picketing is also wrongful if it involves any of the nominate torts: 
assault, battery, trespass, defamation, intimidation or nuisance. Apart 
from any criminal liability, pickets must not threaten or commit bodily 
harm. They may not enter private property without permission, including 
shopping plazas,q and must beware of placards that bear opinions rather 
than facts. Describing the offending goods as 'hot cargo' constituted 
defamation in one case: such a designation was a matter of opinion and 
carried a sinister meaning, the judge said (Carrothers, 1956:28). Mass 
picketing is frequently tortious and likely to be enjoined because it is 
inherently intimidatory (Tacon, 1980:30) for although the courts have no 
qAs the law now stands, pickets can be charged under the Petty 
Trespass Act and evicted from shopping malls. No less a body than the 
Supreme Court of Canada has affirmed the right of mall owners to evict 
pickets despite the defence that the property rights in question were, in 
the words of an American court 'worn thin by public usage' (Ulmer. 
1975:880). Where peacefully picketing might be lawfully conduct~d is. 
open to question: if removed to the perimeter of the mall the p1cket1ng 
would likely be construed as illegal secondary pressure against all the 
businesses, no matter how explicit the signs (Arthurs, 1965:363) 
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firm rule respecting numbers. they are inclined to regard picketing as a 
form of intimidation when the number of pickets exceeds what the judge 
believes is necessary for the union to convey its message. usually three 
or four at an entrance. To avoid an 'atmosphere of intimidation'. 
picketing in one instance was limited on days on which large numbers of 
workers received their strike pay at a trailer parked adjacent to the 
struck premises (Armstrong. 1970:474). And finally. picketing may be 
enjoined if it constitutes a legal nuisance. 
Prior to 1951, judges were inclined to accept that picketing was 
always a nuisance: some cases said watching and besetting was a form of 
nuisance while others said nuisance was present in watching and 
besetting; in any event, all agreed it was unlawful (Carrothers. 1962:6). 
Unions were issued a momentary reprieve when the Supreme Court of Canada 
determined that peaceful picketing, unencumbered by other wrongful acts. 
was not an unreasonable interference with the enjoyment of private 
property. That picketing inevitability mixes persuasion with 
communication was finally acknowledged, and the court could find no 
objection so long as the persuasion was carried out by means of rational 
argument. 46 But as has been noted, the Aristocratic Restaurants doctrine 
led a 'short, unhappy life' (Palmer, 1960:166). Although never over-
turned, the decision has been steadfastly avoided. 'The old notions were 
gradually revived: picketing was unlawful if it sought to compel or 
persuade even peacefully' (Tacon, 1980:18). Glaring at customers. 
stopping customers' cars in a parking lot, jeering and defamatory 
placards, and picketing before recourse to conciliation have been 
declared nuisances (ibid.:21), confirming Carrothers's (1964:6) 
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observation that picketing that is an irritation or nuisance in the 
colloquial sense is frequently found to be a nuisance in the legal sense. 
The law of picketing is 'a marvel of confusion that would not be 
tolerated in any other area' (ibid:3,5). Unions are at the mercy of a 
common law 'of unknown content' which they are admonished to obey. Only 
if picketing can pass unscathed the batteries of form, object and result 
is it lawful; 'if not it is unlawful, and enjoinable to the extent of the 
unlawfulness' (Carrothers, 1956:27). 
In any event, the real purpose of actions in tort is the injunction; 
indeed, the evidence is that few cases proceed to trial (Krever, 1966:22-
3). Whether the injunction is perpetual, interlocutory (until trial), or 
interim, and whether it is all-encompassing or merely limits numbers, 
restriction of picketing invariably undercuts the union's bargaining 
power: 'By the time the matter comes to trial (if, indeed, the employer 
pursues the action), the granting of the injunction may well have served 
to defeat the strike' (Adams, 1985:655). Before 1970, judges often 
granted ex parte injunctions without notice to the union, and not 
infrequently in the middle of the night. However, the worst abuses of 
the system were eliminated by changes to the Judicature Act47 ,r ,48 
prohibiting the granting of injunctions in labour disputes without notice 
(with certain exceptions for interim injunctions) and not until the court 
has been satisfied that reasonable efforts were made to obtain police 
assistance and the police were unable to assert control. 
rSection 20 of the Judicature Act was replaced by s.115 of the 
Courts of Justice Act48 in 1984. 
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The purpose of an injunction is not to preserve the peace but to 
protect property rights pending a trial on the merits of the dispute. 
Consequently, an injunction should be granted only when the complainant 
can demonstrate that the defendant's activity is likely to result in 
irreparable and substantial injury that cannot be remedied in damages. 
In practice, however, the requirements of a strong prima facie case and 
evidence of irreparable harm not compensable by damages are rarely 
applied (Krever, 1966:7-29). In balancing the employer's risk of loss if 
the picketing were to continue against the union's risk of loss if the 
picketing were restrained, the weight of the employer's immediate 
financial losses is invariably heavier than a union's less tangible loss 
of bargaining power. Similarly, the doctrine of 'clean hands' is not 
usually considered so that an employer's provocative behaviour seldom 
stands in the way of issuing an injunction (Southin, 1970:81-2). The 
defence, that only unlawful acts are enjoined (McKelvey, 1968:116), fails 
to consider the problems of proof and the pressures of time: 'the court 
simply does not have the docket time to adequately consider each 
application for a labour injunction' (Tacon, 1980:8). 
In Ontario, the role of the common law and the courts have been 
narrowed by the recent attempts of the Ontario Labour Relations Board to 
regulate picketing by way of its authority to regulate strikes. The 
Labour Relations Act provides that no person shall do any act if he or 
she knows, or ought to know, that as a probable and reasonable 
consequence of the act, another person will engage in an unlawful strike 
or lock-out, with the exception of an act done in conjunction with a 
lawful strike or lock-out. 49 Read in conjunction with the section which 
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prohibits calling or authorizing, or threatening to call or authorize, an 
illegal strike the OLRB believes the Act establishes 'a comprehensive 
framework for the regulation of picketing', and creates in the Board a 
parallel forum to which the Ontario courts may defer (Adams, 1985:653-4). 
In fact, actions in tort add little to what is now available from 
the OLRB. The doctrines of civil conspiracy and inducing the breach of 
contract are now unnecessary because the OLRB will issue a cease and 
desist order to restrain picketing in conjunction with an unlawful strike 
(Sack and Mitchell, 1985:509) and can order an end to picketing for 
recognition or before the conclusion of the conciliation process on the 
grounds that such activity is likely to cause an unlawful strike. The 
OLRB has also prohibited picketing in conjunction with a lawful strike. 
In the construction industry, common site picketing has been declared 
unlawful when the work of the striking tradesmen was not being performed 
and separate entrances had been provided for the employees of the 
contractors not involved in the dispute. 50 
The tort of conspiracy to injure is likewise unnecessary to protect 
third-party employers. Initially, the Ontario Labour Relations Board 
drew no distinction between primary and secondary sites. Confident of 
its power to restrain unlawful work stoppages, it refused to interfere 
with picketing in connection with a legal strike at any location. In 
Canteen of Canada51 , strikers from Toronto were allowed to picket 
locations of their employer in Windsor and Cambridge. But such sweeping 
protection is no longer given. In a subsequent case, a union was 
directed to stop picketing because the party performing the struck work 
was not an ally, but a competitor, of the principle employer. 52 How 
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far the protection will be narrowed is unclear. Speculating, the Board 
has said that the transfer of struck work would undoubtedly justify 
expansive picketing. At the other extreme, the picketing of the premises 
of a geographically removed, secondary employer would not be protected. 
Asking without deciding whether its approach in Canteen of Canada was too 
generous, the OLRB said that the legitimacy of picketing a functionally 
separate location might have to rest on the rationale that the employees 
are entitled to picket an employer's entire economic domain. 53 
Canteen of Canada makes a great deal more industrial relations sense 
than the 'per se' doctrine. By outlawing secondary action the law 
indemnifies third parties by confining the scope of a dispute to those 
immediately involved. Logically, therefore, the distinction between 
primary and secondary picketing should not be locational, Beatty (1974) 
argued. Of interest is the relationship between the parties. If there 
is no functional relationship, picketing, even at the site of the 
dispute, should be enjoined. But when the secondary employer is 
functionally integrated with or economically dependent upon the primary 
employer picketing should be permitted. Only picketing that involves 
third parties differently or to a greater extent than would a simple 
strike should be outlawed. 
With frequent missteps the courts were wending their way the 
direction of 'functional analysis', Beatty (ibid.:411-414) concluded. In 
one case, picketing was described as primary because the third party had 
involved itself in a labour dispute by agreeing to perform struck work. 
Similarly, a firm that rented its premises to a struck employer for the 
purpose of continuing its operations was considered a legitimate target 
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for picketing. And in the Aristocratic Restaurants case, the Supreme 
Court of Canada agreed that the union representing the employees at one 
location was entitled to picket other restaurants in the same chain (so 
long as the picketing was informational and free of other tortious or 
criminal conduct): 'The fact that two of the restaurants were not within 
the unit of employees for which the Union was authorized to act does not 
affect the question; the owner's economic strength is derived from his 
total business; and it is against that the influence of information is 
being exerted. 54 ,s 
The tort of inducing breach of contract is equally redundant 
nowadays; indeed, it is difficult to see how it has any relevance at all 
in the face of comprehensive labour relations legislation. A union can 
hardly be said to have induced lawful strikers to break their contracts 
of employment. t Picketing might be said to induce workers not involved 
in the strike to break their contracts of employment but whether the 
breach should fallon the heads of the pickets is arguable. In any 
event, the Board will exercise its power to order workers to stop 
picketing where their activities are causing, or are likely to cause, an 
SJudges were sometimes too permissive, Beatty (1974:413) thought. 
The use of common ownership and control to categorize picketing away from 
the site of the dispute as primary allowed unions to expand a dispute 
beyond 'what is acknowledged by all to be legitimate consequences of an 
effective strike'. The doctrine of common ownership and control was 
irrelevant to, and often in conflict with, functional analysis. Thus, he 
objected to the finding that the picketing of a second plant, physically 
removed from the site of a labour dispute, was lawful. The site, a wet-
process salt mine owned by the employer of the strike-bound, dry-process 
mine, was functionally independent and, therefore, uninvolved in the 
dispute. 
tAccording to the s.1(2) of Labor Relations Act, strikers are employees. 
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unlawful strike and order strikers back to work once their stoppage is 
declared unlawful. And while it might technically be possible for 
pickets to induce unorganized workers to break their contracts of 
employment, this is rarely (if ever) the union's objective. Ordinarily, 
the persons concerned are managerial personnel and, on occasion, strike 
replacements whose refusals to cross a picket line can safely be 
attributed to their inability to do so. 
In most circumstances, the Board's remedial authority is adequate to 
protect contracts to purchase or supply goods or services as well. A 
third-party employer has a ready remedy against its own employees if they 
engage in an unlawful strike by refusing to handle struck goods or, if 
striking workers attempt to procure a breach of contract indirectly by 
picketing (or by threatening to picket) the premises of a third party, 
the OLRB will direct the workers and the union to cease and desist unless 
the third party is allied with the primary employer. In addition, 
employers can lodge a grievance against a union that supports an unlawful 
strike and may discipline workers who refuse to work as directed. 
Those who advocate extending the Labour Relations Act to include 
picketing do so on the assumption that the Labour Relations Board 
understands and is sympathetic to the policy of encouraging collective 
bargaining. The courts, by contrast, are known to be hostile. Judges, 
Carrothers (1964:5) said, have a 'defective perception of the nature of 
the industrial conflict and [a] bias against both collective action and 
the institutions of collective action'. But while the OLRB has a more 
enlightened view of industrial relations, unions will find little comfort 
in its picketing decisions. Whether regulated by the Board or the 
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courts, effective picketing is unlawful. Thus. whether it is an 
injunction issued by an anti-union judge or a cease and desist order 
issued by a more sympathetic Labour Board is of little consequence. The 
result is the same: unions are denied an important sanction at a 
critical time. 
The lawu respecting secondary boycotts. Weiler (1985:352) concluded. 
is unfair and one-sided because it 'hampers the waging of an effective 
strike, especially by a new, weak bargaining unit struggling to achieve a 
first contract'. The economic contest is particularly unequal when 
workers are bound by the narrow confines of the single-establishment 
bargaining unit while their employer has access to the financial and 
productive resource of the firm as a whole. For collective bargaining to 
work effectively, there must be a distribution of power which, 'while not 
necessarily equally balanced between the two sides, at least is not so 
unequal as to induce either side to feel it is being coerced' (Fox, 
1985:144). Yet, not infrequently, the law pits small groups of 35 
employees against large, multi-establishment (if not multi-national) 
firms. The workers, furthermore. are legally isolated, unable to call 
upon the resources of other, more powerful, groups. Corporations, by 
contrast, have 'deep pockets'. Goods and people may be moved from place 
to place while the losses sustained at anyone location may be spread 
across the business as a whole. 
The critical importance of this difference was illustrated by Craypo 
(1976) who described how Trailways, a major firm in the American inter-
h Am , law whl.'ch restricts unions uWeiler was analyzing t e erl.can 
somewhat less than Canadian law. 
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city bus industry, was able to use the full extent of its considerable 
financial power to resist workers' demands. Historically, Trailways 
paid lower wages and provided poorer benefits than its principal 
competitor, Greyhound. Understanding the source of its advantage, 
Trailways successfully resisted a joint petition from its unions 
requesting the National Labour Relations Board to conduct a 
representation vote which, if successful, would have resulted in the 
consolidation of the firm's many divisions into a single, national 
negotiating unit. By judicious use of whipsawing, Trailways undercut the 
union's bargaining power by diverting work from high to low-wage 
subsidiaries. In addition, the company was able to absorb substantial 
strike-related losses by subsidizing the cost of resistance in one 
subsidiary out of the earnings of another. A three-year strike against 
one division had no effect on operating profits because, the president 
explained, 'We just make 'em up from the other subsidiaries'.v 
Trailways also used its corporate structure to isolate local decision-
makers. More than once, negotiators concluded agreements only to 
discover the subsidiary was about to be cut-back or shut-down. 
The Board's approach in Canteen of Canada makes industrial 
relations sense because it permits unions to picket the firm as a whole. 
But whether its acceptance would make any practical difference is 
arguable. Picketing is lawful only if it has no impact. Effective 
picketing, that is, picketing that interferes with the movement of goods 
and people, would still be unlawful and quickly enjoined. Consequently, 
unless the right to picket were accompanied by a right in employees to 
vQuoted by Craypo (1976:286). 
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refuse to cross a lawful picket line or handle struck goods without fear 
of reprisal, the change would be ephemeral. 
Conclusion 
The law is far from even-handed in its regulation of bargaining 
tactics. Legal constraints on the right to strike and picket sharply 
curtail the effectiveness of workers' actions while employers are 
virtually unfettered. The ban on untimely stoppages means that workers 
cannot lawfully bring economic pressure of any kind to bear on their 
employers during the lifetime of a collective agreement: slow-downs, 
work-to-rule campaigns, and overtime bans are all unlawful if they 
restrict or limit output. Picketing is also unlawful if a strike would 
be untimely. Employers, by contrast, are free to run their firms as they 
see fit. Technically, of course, they are obliged to observe the terms 
of an agreement or face a grievance but even when an agreement has been 
breached employees are required to 'work now and grieve later'. When 
exercising their residual rights employers can act with impunity. 
Despite what may be massive changes, workers are shackled by the ban on 
mid-agreement strikes even when they have no recourse through the 
grievance-arbitration process. Workers whose anger goes untempered may 
find themselves in a precarious position as discipline and dismissal are 
considered appropriate penalties for those who lead or participate in 
unlawful strikes. 
Constraints on the timeliness of strikes undercut the effectiveness 
of lawful stoppages as well. Their predictability allows employers to 
warn their customers, build up stockpiles, or even relocate equipment and 
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machinery. During the course of a strike, employers have every right to 
maintain full-scale production and are entitled to restrain pickets who 
trespass on private property or interfere with the movement of goods or 
people. Employers are equally free to post other employees to strikers' 
jobs or hire strike-replacements. Strikers are not even assured of 
returning to work after a dispute is settled. Their right to 
reinstatement under the Labour Relations Act is a slim guarantee, 
generally useful only when a union has been utterly defeated. 
The effect of the law is to leave workers divided and isolated. 
They may not solicit the support of others sympathetic to their cause. 
Any attempt to broaden the parameters of a strike, even within the same 
firm, is almost certainly unlawful. Secondary picketing is banned unless 
a third-party has allied itself with the struck employer. In any event, 
lawful sympathetic action is virtually impossible. Workers who attempt 
to support the strikes of others will find themselves accused of 
participating in an unlawful strike if they refuse to cross a picket line 
or handle struck goods in combination or in concert with others. Acting 
as individuals, they are liable to be disciplined for insubordination. 
The law, quite obviously, institutionalizes a power imbalance. 
Small, fragmented groups of workers frequently negotiate with large, 
powerful employers for a first agreement. And many of the tactical 
advantages that workers might have are undercut by the severe constraints 
on the right to strike and picket. If the bargaining becomes a contest 
of strength, in these circumstances, it is a contest that many unions 
cannot hope to win. 
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Chapter 7 
THE DUTY TO BARGAIN IN GOOD FAITH 
Critical opinion is sharply divided over the wisdom of using the law 
to force labour and management to bargain in good faith. Those who 
champion voluntarism and 'free' collective bargaining consider the duty 
to bargain in good faith, at best, a fiction. Because economic power is 
the driving force in collective bargaining, intervention by a labour 
board is useless, if not positively harmful. No less a body than the 
Task Force on Industrial Relations considered the duty to bargain in good 
faith to be a mere platitude: 
We see no reason why the subject matter of bargaining should not 
include anything that is not contrary to law. As to tactics, the 
highest duty that should reasonably be placed on either party to a 
bargaining situation, in which each has a claim to preserve its 
freedom respecting its bargaining position, is to state its position 
on matters put in issue. But we cannot envisage such a duty being 
amenable to legal enforcement, except perhaps to the extent of an 
obligation to meet and exchange positions (Woods, 1968:163). 
The contrary opinion holds that the duty to bargain in good faith is 
the very linchpin of the Labour Relations Act to which all else is 
ancillary. Certification is no more than a preliminary step; it merely 
gets the union to the bargaining table. The real purpose of the Act is 
collective bargaining and for this reason the duty to bargain in good 
faith is vital. Nor should the Board be reticent about intervening to 
advance the fundamental purpose of the statute. Undue reverence for 
abstract principles like freedom of contract distorts rather than 
reinforces the policy of encouraging the growth collective bargaining. 
In practice, the Ontario Board falls somewhere between these 
extremes. On the one hand, it is quite prepared to supervise the conduct 
of the parties to ensure that they meet with regularity and pursue their 
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obligation to make every reasonable effort to make a collective agreement 
with diligence. On the other hand, the Board draws the line at 
regulating the content of bargaining. The parties are not, it 
emphasizes, obliged to make a agreement, only try. There is nothing in 
the Act which gives the Board the right to judge determine the demands of 
the parties or to force them to make concessions. Hard bargaining is 
perfectly lawful even when the result is no bargaining. 
Whether the OLRB should be more aggressive in its application of the 
law is the subject of this chapter. Its reluctance to intervene only 
sharpens the disparity in bargaining power rooted in the law. In any 
event, the Board's standard remedy for a breach of the duty to bargain is 
a predictably weak order directing the parties to bargain in good faith. 
Even the new measure of first-agreement abitration is unlikely to work 
where the failure to conclude an agreement results from an employer's 
unwillingness to accept collective bargaining. 
Good Faith 
The Labour Relations Act requires the parties to bargain in good 
faith and make every reasonable effort to make a collective agreement,1 
but it does not require them to agree. So long as they bargain in good 
faith, 'the collective agreement which they ultimately reach, or whether 
they conclude any collective agreement at all, must ultimately depend 
upon the ability and economic power which they can bring to bear in 
bargaining,.2 Fruitless negotiations are no more than 'an indicator that 
the parties have not met the obligation'3; failure to agree 'may be a 
simple function of unreasonable demands' (Adams, 1981a:154). 
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As interpreted by the OLRB, the duty to bargain in good faith is 
first and foremost procedural. The Board demands 'good bargaining 
practice', that is, the parties must attempt to resolve their difference 
through a rational, informed process in order to minimize the potential 
for 'unnecessary' industrial conflict: 'Rational discussion is likely to 
minimize the number of problems the parties are unable to resolve without 
the use of economic weapons thereby focusing the parties' attention in 
the eleventh hour on the "true" differences between them'.4 Central is 
the obligation to engage in full and frank discussion. Decisions which 
may 'precipitate strike or lock-out obviously require, as a matter of 
public policy, open and full discussions'.5 Bargaining, particularly 
bargaining for a first agreement, must be pursued with reasonable 
diligence and may obligate the parties to attend conciliation or 
mediation meetings. However, the exhaustion of the conciliation process 
does not extinguish the duty, although 'the nature and extent of the 
bargaining in which· a party is required to engage may change as the 
collective process progresses and will depend on such factors as whether 
one of the parties has requested the other to resume negotiations, 
whether the party making the request has indicated that it is prepared to 
make significant concessions, and whether a strike or lock-out is in 
progress' (Sack and Mitchell, 1985:463). The premature use of sanctions. 
or threat of sanctions, is both unlawful in itself and a breach of the 
duty to bargain in good faith. 
Conduct which inhibits or undermines the decision-making capability 
of the other party is a breach of the duty. An employer's failure to 
.. . . ges 6 or to detail how explain the rationale for 1tS f1nal pos1t1on on wa , 
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the spending guidelines of the Ministry of Health impinged on 
management's wage decisions7 , constituted bad faith. In the Board's 
opinion, full discussion might have convinced the employer that it ~as 
not in the financial straitjacket it assumed. But even if the 
constraints were absolute, the obligation to discuss remains because 
collective bargaining is an exercise in decision-making and to make 
informed choices the union must have the necessary information. 8 Full 
and frank discussion was similarly precluded when an employer asserted 
its own interpretation of the anti-inflation guidelines and refused to 
discuss any other. 9 And by extension, it was unlawful for a council of 
trade unions to insist on resolving a jurisdictional dispute before 
proceeding to other issues: 'the duty to discuss fully does not permit a 
party to discuss the issues of its choice to the exclusion of all 
others' .10 
Following from the obligation to engage in full and frank discussion 
is the obligation to provide information. It was 'patently silly', the 
Board said, for the union to be 'in the dark' because the employer 
refused to provide wage and job classification data. 11 Information of 
this sort is now a basic requirement for employers, particularly when the 
union is a newly certified bargaining agent. 12 The full extent of this 
aspect of the duty to bargain has yet to be adumbrated, although in one 
case the OLRB ruled that 'disclosure and explanation of an employer's 
financial position will, in some circumstances, be as necessary to 
informed bargaining as the disclosure of employee wage data' .13 
It also follows that if the employer is obliged to engage in full 
and frank discussion and to provide the union with necessary information, 
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the information must not be false. 'It is self-evident to the Ontario 
Board that misrepresentation, which is the antithesis of good faith, 
destroys the rational basis upon which bargaining decisions are made' and 
so alien to the collective bargaining process and contrary to the Act.14 
Accordingly, reneging on a tentative agreement constituted bad faith 15 as 
did the last minute tabling of sixteen new demands,16 but not the 
withdrawal of one previously agreed-upon item. 17 For the same reason, an 
employer must take the initiative to inform a union of 'those decisions 
already made which may have a major impact on the bargaining unit' and 
must respond honestly when questioned, but is not obliged to reveal on 
its own initiative, 'plans which have not become at least de facto 
decisions'. Accordingly, it was not unlawful for Westinghouse18 to 
withhold information about tentative plans to relocate its factory to 
another city. 
The substantive elementa of the duty to bargain is less readily 
described. Good faith in this sense is the 'absence of the intention to 
destroy the union's bargaining rights' (Adell, 1980:19). Thus, conduct 
which undermines the union's status as exclusive bargaining agent is a 
breach. It was unacceptable for an employer to refuse to bargain though 
it honestly believed the union had lost its claim to represent a majority 
of the employees in the bargaining unit. 19 Impugning the union's 
credibility by disparaging its bargaining proposals and inviting workers 
to approach management directly were also violations of the Act,20 as was 
an attempt to interfere with the right of a union to structure its own 
aThe categories of procedural and substantive are not meant to. 
suggest completely separate compartments, merely the Board's emphas1s 
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bargaining committee and choose its own spokespersons. 21 And an obvious 
violation was the infiltration of a union during a strike. Such conduct 
trespasses on the exclusive domain of the union.22,b23 
It is the process, not the content, of bargaining that the Board 
primarily seeks to judge; nevertheless, it has occaSionally felt 
compelled to restrain the parties from preSSing 'illegal' demands. 
Unlawful are demands which conflict with other legislation such as the 
Ontario Human Rights Code (which prohibits discrimination on the basis of 
age, race, sex, religion, nationality, or place of origin) or the 
Employment Standards Act (which prescribes, among other things, minimum 
wages and maximum hours). Also improper are demands the Board believes 
are inconsistent with the scheme of the Labour Relations Act. Thus, it 
was unlawful for a union to strike in support of its demand to bring 
carpenters at unorganized sites under its collective agreement because 
the route to collective bargaining in Ontario is certification. 24 
Similarly, a strike over a jurisdictional dispute was unlawful because 
the Act prescribes the procedure for adjudicating disagreements over work 
assignments. 25 And, in the Burns Meats26 case, the OLRB decided that a 
refusal to bargain except in the context of a national agreement was a 
breach of the good faith obligation. The demand itself was not unlawful, 
national bargaining may be raised and discussed, but not pressed to 
impasse. 
Also suspect are bargaining demands which suggest an employer's 
unwillingness to recognize a union. An offer of lower wages for 
bThe case was quickly followed by an amendment to the Act 
prohibiting the use of professional strike-breakers. 23 
275 
unionized workers was unacceptable because of the implicit promise of 
preferential treatment for its non-union employees. It was 'plainly 
unlawful' for an employer 'to punish a group of employees because they 
have chosen union representation or to reward another group because they 
have not' .27 Radio Shack violated the duty to bargain in good faith when 
it advanced 'patently unreasonable' demands lacking 'any semblance of 
business justification'. Its offer to the union provided for no increase 
in wages above the statutory minimum and no fringe benefits. More 
importantly, the company insisted on an open shop -- a demand the union 
felt would expose its supporters to harassment -- and a disciplinary code 
that prescribed harsh penalties without arbitral review. c28 In the 
Board's opinion, there was 'little doubt that the employer's positions on 
wages, transfer, union security and rules of conduct cut to the very 
heart of a collective agreement' and were advanced for the purpose of 
provoking an untenable strike. Radio Shack was engaging in surface 
bargaining, 'going through the motions', with no intention of signing a 
collective agreement. 29 
But Radio Shack had been egregious in its disregard for workers' 
rights. Two ex-police officers had been hired to infiltrate the union 
and photograph its supporters. Five employees were dismissed; two were 
reinstated by the OLRB. When one had the temerity to return to work, he 
was removed from his regular job and assigned to work in an otherwise 
empty storage shed. This provoked a further complaint and a second 
reinstatement order. Throughout the organizing campaign, the company 
CWhen a collective agreement contains a specific penalty for the 
infraction that is the subject-matter of a grievance, the arbitrator may 
not substitute another penalty.28 
276 
called meetings during working hours to explain how disruptive a union 
would be, threatened to 'move out west' if the plant were organized, and 
distributed T-shirts which read on the front, 'I'm a f company ink', and 
on the back, 'and proud of it'. 
But what about the employer that has 'a fixed resolve to avoid an 
agreement yet is prepared to go through all the bargaining motions, 
including the full, free and rational discussions of positions'? 
(Armstrong, 1976:35) What about Eaton's? 
Eaton's was exceedingly careful not to commit overt unfair labour 
practices and adhered scrupulously to the procedural requirements of the 
duty to bargain: the union was frequently acknowledged as the bargaining 
agent, requests for information were satisfied, there was no attempt to 
interfere with the composition of the union's negotiating committees, and 
so on. At the same time, the talks were fruitless: long, drawn-out and 
repetitive. 30 In the end, Eaton's offered nothing at all: no increase 
in wages, no increase in benefits, no job security, and contract language 
'so outmoded as to be more relevant in the 1940s' (Financial Times of 
Canada, 3 December, 1984). The principle of seniority was rejected: 
suitability for promotion was based, among other things, on the 
employee's compatibility with the image and customer profile being 
attracted by the merchandise (The Globe and Mail, 4 December, 1984). 
Absent from the proposed agreement were wage scales and a job 
classification scheme. Benefits could be altered by the employer at any 
time and certain disciplinary disputes were not subject to arbitration. 
In principle, demands of this sort are lawful. Hard bargaining, 
even if accompanied by harsh words or insults, is not a breach of the 
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Labour Relations Act. Thus. despite Eaton's admission that higher wages 
and benefits 'would simply encourage employees in our other stores to 
organize'. the Board concluded that the company's bargaining stance, 
though hard. was lawful. d To ensure an agreement contains favourable 
terms. even 'terms which will retain for management most of the 
flexibility it currently enjoys and which will not result in any increase 
in operating costs'. was a legitimate bargaining objective.31 
The law does not require either party to put reaching an agreement 
ahead of maintaining its bargaining position. Thus, proposals which are 
unacceptable. even predictably unacceptable. are not necessarily a breach 
of the good faith obligation: '''best'' offers are sometimes made in the 
knowledge that they may not be sufficient to avoid an economic 
confrontation' .3 2 The 'trade-offs and compromises which parties are 
prepared to make are matters to be determined within their own 
judgment' .33 So long as an employer is prepared to sign a collective 
agreement. though only on its own terms. it is within the law. 34 
The OLRB is reluctant to deduce bad faith from bargaining proposals 
alone. Divorced from anti-union behaviour. therefore. bad faith is an 
elusive concept. Surface bargaining, though unlawful, is readily 
disguised as hard bargaining so difficult to detect. An inflexible 
position on issues central to the negotiations is but one of the factors 
the Board considers relevant. 35 Bendel (1980:30) concluded that, absent 
other unlawful conduct. a finding of failing to bargain in good faith is 
unlikely. Yet. hard bargaining may be all that is needed to defeat a 
dEaton's demand to write into the collective agreement a clause 
prohibiting all union activity on company property was found to be a 
violation of the Act. 
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union. An employer that scrupulously avoids aggressive behaviour may 
nevertheless be relying on its overwhelming bargaining strength to evade 
collective bargaining: a tough stance 'may well have a secondary (or not 
so secondary) purpose of disillusioning the employees about what a union 
can do for them' (Adell, 1980:19). 
What can be said of an employer that seeks to retain its managerial 
prerogative intact, demands a free hand in discipline, rejects the 
principle of seniority, and offers a wage increase 'so small as to be 
tailor-made for union and employee rejection'?3 6 Certainly not that it 
accepts the principle of collective bargaining. An employer like Eaton's 
is not prepared to engage in joint decision-making and takes every 
opportunity to by-pass the union when dealing with employees. Its 
willingness to sign an agreement indicates little when the proposed terms 
are no more than a catalogue of the existing terms and conditions of 
employment. To have any meaning, collective bargaining must produce 
something more than a booklet of rules dictated by the company. 
Particularly in the context of negotiations for a first agreement. 
hard bargaining is suspect. Unwillingness to compromise on issues which 
go to the heart of the union's role in the workplace is, itself, 
indicative of anti-union animus. The difference between the employer 
that seeks to avoid signing a collective agreement and one that agrees to 
'~o Sign only on its own terms -- terms that it dictates -- is semantic: 
employer ever sought to reserve complete unilateral control unless he 
expected the negotiations to fail' (Cox, 1958:1425). For collective 
bargaining to work, Fox (1985:145) observed, management must acknowledge 
that the union has 'proper and legitimate function within the 
279 
organization and that these include mobilizing employees to challenge its 
prerogative in respect of certain categories of decision' . In Canada, 
issues such as the use of seniority in promotl'on and 1 ay-off decisions, 
full third-party review of disciplinary actions, and the concept of equal 
pay for similar work are central to the function of trade unions. An 
employer that adopts uncompromising positions on these issues goes beyond 
hard bargaining. 
In a decision that opens to question the established, limited, 
interpretation of the duty to bargain, the Canada Labour Relations Board 
accepted the lawfulness of hard bargaining, yet argued that an employer 
that interferes with the right of employees to participate in 
'meaningful' collective bargaining fails to bargain in good faith. The 
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce was such an employer: it rejected the 
concept of seniority; refused to submit disputes over promotion, lay-off, 
or recall to third-party arbitration; and declined to negotiate over wage 
and merit increases. The bank was determined to keep the union impotent, 
the Board concluded, by denying workers their 'fundamental right to 
participate in meaningful collective bargaining': 
Without meaningful collective bargaining the attraction for the 
system disappears and the possibility for revocation of the 
union's bargaining rights are heightened. Much more important 
to the bank, an ineffective union practically guarantees that 
collective bargaining will not spread to other areas of its 
establishment. In short, what we saw was the bank's 
uncompromising yet skillfully camouflaged rejection of the 
principles of the freedom of association upon which the [Canada 
Labour] Code is founded. 37 
The OLRB's conception of good faith is either too restrictive or too 
permissive. If voluntarism and freedom of contract are of paramount 
importance, the Board has no business telling the parties how to bargain. 
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As Cox (ibid.:1436) noted, 'The technique t d mos con ucive to reaching some 
agreement often excludes tactics most conducive to getting agreement on 
one's own terms'. The Board's promotion of collective bargaining as a 
rational process of persuasion is not self °d 1 
-eV1 ent y essential; nor are 
there criteria readily available or eaSily established with which to 
judge the parties' conduct. Why the Board should object to one party 
insisting on resolving some issues before others38 or why it should feel 
the need to direct an employer to justify its wage offer39 if freedom of 
contract is of paramount importance is difficult to comprehend. 
Similarly, the Board's refusal to see that directing an employer to 
provide wage and financial data40 or announce plans for major changes 41 
alters the balance of power is perverse. In fact, it is not primarily 
the principle of freedom of contract that informs the Board's concept of 
good faith, but public policy. While it might be an intrusion on the 
parties' freedom to insist on 'good bargaining practice', it is certainly 
not inconsistent with Canada's activist labour relations policy. That 
the Board believes its intervention reduces the incidence of industrial 
conflict is sufficient grounds for intrusion. 
What is inconsistent with public policy is the OLRB's insistence 
that hard bargaining is lawful even when it means no bargaining. England 
(1983:230) argued that, in a pluralist system, the bottom line 'must be 
that collective bargaining is not replaced by unilateral regulation'. 
However, this is precisely the strategy of an employer like Eaton's. By 
refUSing to compromise on any of the issues central to collective 
bargaining, the employer retains its right to act unilaterally even 
though it meets the Board's benchmark criterion of willingness to sign a 
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collective agreement. References to freedom of contract by employers 
like Eaton's invite its use as justification for refusing to bargain 
collectively, an objective clearly contrary to the policy which underpins 
the Labour Relations Act. 
Remedies for Bargaining in Bad Faith 
Prior to 1975, the courts, not the Labour Relations Board. enforced 
the duty to bargain in good faith. Responding to the criticism that 
quasi-criminal penalties were inappropriate, even counter-productive. for 
resolving labour-management disputes, the Ontario Legislature broadened 
the OLRB's remedial authority to embrace any breach of the Labour 
Relations Act, including a breach of the duty to bargain in good faith 
(Bendel, 1980:3). Initially rather timid, the Board's intervention has 
grown bolder over time; none the less, its standard remedy remains an 
order directing the parties to bargain in good faith, frequently with the 
assistance of a mediator. 
When the parties are truly uncertain about the propriety of their 
conduct, a bargaining order may be all that is required to start 
negotiations afresh. In other circumstances, an order is far less 
useful. Indeed, it is a particularly inadequate response when one 
party's intention is to frustrate the founding of a bargaining 
relationship. A direction to bargain in good faith operates only 
prospectively and does nothing to redress past wrongs. And although an 
employer effects sizeable savings by delaying or resisting serious 
bargaining, a bargaining order does nothing to compensate the employees 
or their union for their losses; nor does it restore their confidence in 
the effectiveness of the bargaining process. In any event. there is no 
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guarantee that the direction will be obeyed: 'the premise that simply 
ordering employers to bargain in good faith will succeed bears a dubious 
logic' (Backhouse, 1980:499-500). But other remedies have been too 
punitive or incompatible with the principle of voluntarism. 
'Make whole' orders were initially rejected as too speculative. 
Because the OLRB would have to guess at what the terms of settlement 
might have been, such an order was an unwarranted violation of freedom of 
contract. Twice, the OLRB considered whether it had the power to impose 
a collective agreement and twice avoided the issue by arguing that the 
remedy was not appropriate in the circumstances. In one case, the Board 
felt the parties were 'quite capable of arriving at their own agreement 
provided the employer immediately commences to bargain in good faith and 
makes all reasonable efforts in the direction of making a collective 
agreement' .42,e In the other, both parties were found guilty of bad 
faith. 43 ,f ,g,44,45 Accused of putting its most effective remedy beyond 
its reach, the Board finally addressed the question squarely in Radio 
Shack. 46 The answer was a resounding no. Though sorely tempted, the 
eNo agreement was ever reached. 
fIn this case, an agreement was negotiated; however, the bargaining 
relationship was a long-established one. 
gIn another case 44 an employer was directed to sign an agreement 
on terms it had already agreed to. The employer was refusing to finalize 
the agreement because it felt that to do so would prejudice other legal 
proceedings in which it was challenging the union's right to 
certification. Noting that the agreement would be invalid if the 
certification were struck down by the courts, the OLRB directed the, 
employer to sign. And in a fourth case, 45 the Board directed a unlon to 
Sign an agreement on the terms approved by a vote of its members. The 
Act provides that an employer may request a vote on its last offer and 
though the section makes no mention of the result of the vote, the OLRB 
ruled that its binding effect could be deduced from the Legislature's 
intent. 
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OLRB concluded that its jurisdiction did not encompass the impOSition of 
a collective agreement. Radio Shack's dismissive attitude had enraged 
the Board. Its orders had been flouted: 'treated as a licence fee for 
continued violations'. But the Board could do no more, it said: the Act 
had been pushed to its limits. 
At the same time, the need for a remedy stronger than a simple 
direction to bargain in good faith was apparent. h To ensure that wrong-
doers do not benefit from their unlawful conduct, the OLRB was prepared 
to issue a general damages award. Radio Shack was directed to pay 
employees all monetary losses that could reasonably be established as 
arising from the loss of an opportunity to negotiate a collective 
agreement, plus interest. The union was awarded all of its negotiating 
costs to the date of the decision and all of its extraordinary organizing 
costs resulting from the employer's unlawful conduct (but not its legal 
costs). Such an order did not amount to the dictation of terms and 
conditions of employment, the Board concluded: 
While we admit that monetary relief based on the collective 
agreement that would have been negotiated had there been good 
faith bargaining requires the assumption that an agreement 
would have resulted, awarding no monetary relief is tantamount 
to assuming no agreement would have arisen out of good faith 
bargaining. Clearly, reality is usually somewhere in between 
in the sense that either proposition may be valid in any 
particular case. What trade unions like the Complainant and 
the employees it represents lose in cases of this kind is 'the 
loss of opportunity' to negotiate a collective agreement or the 
loss of an opportunity to achieve an agreement at an earlier 
point in time. 47 
hThough 
prosecution. 
seminal work 
(1985:473). 
technically possible, the Board almost never cons:nts to 
So rare is the remedy, it is not even discussed ln ~he 
on law and practice before the OLRB. See Sack and Mltchell 
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The Board was confident that sufficient data were available for the 
parties to make an informed estimate of the amount of wages and benefits 
forgone as a result of the employer's failure to bargain in good faith. 
In addition, Radio Shack was ordered to bargain in good faith with 
the assistance of a mediator, to make a full proposal of the terms and 
conditions it would consider acceptable as a collective agreement, and to 
drop its demand for a voluntary dues check-off; ordered to cease and 
desist from all activities found to be in violation of the Act, 
specifically, engaging in surveillance of employees, intimidating and 
coercing employees into quitting the union, causing employees to act as 
informers, communicating directly with employees, and any other acts of 
interference with the workers' statutory rights; ordered to post for 
sixty days, and to mail out, publish, and read aloud to the assembled 
workforce, a notice explaining the violations of the Labour Relations Act 
and a commitment by the company's officers to respect its employees' 
rights in future; and ordered to provide the union with an updated list 
of employees' names and addresses, allow the union access to company 
bulletin boards, and notify the union of any meetings with employees, and 
to give union representatives full opportunity to respond, all for a 
period of one year. 48 The award was, The Globe and Mail editorialized, 
'a landmark, detailing the most comprehensive set of remedies for bad 
faith ever given by a labour board in Canada' i The cost to Radio Shack 
was $180,000 in payments to employees and another $150,000 in payments to 
the union (Meltz, 1985:324). 
i Quoted by Backhouse (1980:519). 
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All of these initiatives were confirmed on review. Though slightly 
scandalized by the direction to have the company's officers read the 
notice aloud. the Ontario Court of Appeal nevertheless accepted the 
OLRB's assessment that the measure was 'essential to restore the union to 
the position that it occupied before it was weakened by the unfair acts 
of the company'. The objection that the order to refrain from its 
position on union security was tantamount to imposing a contractual term 
was likewise dismissed. The court ruled that Radio Shack's rigidity on 
this issue was integral to its strategy to avoid collective bargaining; 
hence, the order was reasonable and within the Board's jurisdiction to 
award. The remedies, as a whole, were compensatory and not punitive and 
flowed from the scope, intent and provisions of the Act: novelty alone 
was not grounds for finding the Board's directions unreasonable. 49 
Refining its damage awards to fit other circumstances, the Board 
later distinguished between net and gross claims. Only the former, that 
is, damages amounting to the difference between what the employees would 
have received had they worked and what they would have agreed upon had 
the employer bargained in good faith were awarded, when the employees 
struck illegally in the face of bad faith bargaining or the employer 
violated the Act after the commencement of a strike (Sack and Mitchell, 
1985:471-2). In Fotomat,5 0 for example, the Board considered the union's 
decision to strike premature so decided the employees were entitled to 
net damages while the strike was in progress and gross damages for the 
b ., d subsequent period during which the employer's failure to arga1n 1n goo 
faith was wholly responsible for their losses. 
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Truly effective remedies would compensate the injured, deprive the 
offending party of the benefits of its unlawful conduct, and discourage 
further breaches of the law (Backhouse, 1980:501). And while the efficacy 
of the OLRB's remedies is difficult to measure, it seems likely that none 
of these goals has been accomplished. There was no shift in the rate of 
bargaining success after the Board's remedial authority was broadened in 
1975. Collective agreements were negotiated by 84.9 per cent of the 
unions certified during the years 1970-1975 j compared with 84.4 per cent 
for the years 1976-1982,k although the rate of bargaining success was 
slightly higher after the Radio Shack award. 
Bad faith bargaining makes economic sense. The deterrent value 
of bargaining orders, notices, even the occasional damage award is 
minimal. Though the amounts sound impressive, damages (when ordered) 
fall well short of the cost of the higher wages and benefits unions 
typically negotiate. Freeman and Medoff (1984:46,62) reported a 'pure' 
union effect l of 20-30 per cent for wages and as high as 50 per cent for 
fringe benefits during the 1970s in the United States. Though less 
comprehensive, the data suggest that the wage effect is of the same 
magnitude in Canada (Gunderson, 1982). Statistics Canada estimated the 
unadjusted union/non-union wage differentialm at 30 per cent in 1984 (The 
j For 1970, the months of March through December are included. 
kOnly the first quarter of 1982 is included. 
IThe pure union effect refers to the size of the union/non-union 
compensation differential taking into account confounding factors such as 
education, industry, sex, and so on. 
m Unadjusted meaning that the effects of education, industry, 
location, and so on have not been screened out. 
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Windsor Star, 23 October, 1985). Thus, the savings are large for anti-
union employers and on-going. 
Monetary compensation inevitably falls short of the mark. Workers 
can never be fully recompensed for the loss of union representation. 
Monetary compensation is no substitute for what Weiler (1980:30) has 
called the 'civilizing' effect of unions on the working life and 
environment of employees. All the frustrations of powerlessness, low 
wages, and whimsical management that frequently drive workers to unionize 
remain unchanged. In any event, monetary compensation is rare. Only 
flagrantly unlawful behaviour warrants 'make whole' awards in Ontario. 
Whether the law demands so laisser faire a response is a point of 
contention. As Palmer (1966:410) observed, there is a tendency for 
labour boards in Canada to 'ape the U.S.' despite marked differences in 
labour law and policy. It is notable that much of the reasoning that 
underpins the Ontario Board's refusal to impose a collective agreement in 
Radio Shack51 was drawn from a decision of the United States Supreme 
Courtn52 in which the court expressly relied on s.8(d) of the Taft-
Hartley Act which makes it clear that the duty to bargain does not 
'compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a 
concession'.o The comparable Canadian statutes merely exhort the parties 
to bargain in good faith and make every reasonable effort to make a 
collective agreement. Consequently, Bendel (1980:14-5) has argued that 
the OLRB's reverence for freedom of contract is a foreign import. The 
nH.K. Porter Company Inc. v. N.L.R.B5 2 
oQuoted by Bendel (1980:13). 
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Table 7.1: Percentage of Unions Negotiating Collective Agreements 
by Year of Certification 
Collective Agreement N. Collective Percentage with Negotiated Agreement Negotiated Collective Agreemen 
1970 288 70 80.5% 
1971 278 47 85.5~ 
1972 339 69 83.1% 
1973 488 67 87.9~ 
1974 514 80 86.5~ 
1975 438 85 83.8% 
1970 -
1975 2,345 418 84.9% 
1976 316 87 78.4% 
1977 344 64 84.3% 
1978 363 74 83.1% 
1979 505 89 85.0% 
1980 546 78 87.5% 
1981 524 89 85.5% 
1982'1 90 15 85.7% 
1976 -
2,688 496 84.4% 1982 
lithe months of January, February, and March only. 
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Ontario Board has 'chosen to espouse the American reverence for freedom 
of contract', refusing to infer bad faith bargaining solely from the 
substantive bargaining proposals of one of the parties or to impose a 
collective agreement on the parties as a remedy for the violation of the 
duty to bargain in good faith. A more interventionist approach, he 
concluded, would not be at all inconsistent with labour relations policy 
in Canada. p53 
In fact, voluntarism was not always the predominant policy concern 
of the Ontario Labour Relations Board. Thirty years ago, the duty to 
bargain in good faith was described as the 'very keystone' of the Act to 
which all other provisions were ancillary.5 4 In New Method Laundry,55 
the Board argued, 'If the bargaining between the parties is characterized 
by good faith and reason, they will succeed in negotiating and executing 
a collective agreement'. It was 'inconceivable that the Legislature 
intended that, once the conciliation procedure has been exhausted, 
differences between employers and trade unions are to be resolved by 
brute force alone, and we should strive to avoid a construction of the 
Act which leads to such an untoward result unless that construction is 
forced upon us by clear and unequivocal language'. 
PThe American statute differs from Canadian legislation in other 
important ways as well. In the US, for example, the duty to bargain is 
on-going whereas, in Canada, there is no obligation to bargain once a 
collective agreement has been signed. Also different is the notion of 
'mandatory' and 'voluntary' subjects in bargaining. Mandatory are 
matters related to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of . 
employment (rather narrowly construed to exclude issues like contractlng-
out) which may be pursued to impasse. Voluntary matters, by co~trast, 
may be raised and discussed but may not be the subject of a strlke.or 
lock-out. Until quite recently, the distinction had no resonance ln 
Canadian law; now, the Ontario Board appears to be moving in that 
direction with its Burns Meats award. 53 
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By its reasoning in New Method Laundry, the Board sought to align 
the policy of encouraging collective bargaining with that of maintaining 
industrial peace. Giving weight to both, the conclusion that economic 
power alone should dictate the outcome of bargaining was untenable. 
Finkelman, the Board's chairperson at the time, had previously been the 
registrar of the Ontario Labour Courtq and was acutely aware of the 
imbalance of bargaining power that underlay the enactment of the 
legislation. To subsequently argue that nothing had changed, that the 
superior bargaining power of employers could continue to frustrate 
workers' demands for union representation, would have nullified the 
primary purpose of the statute. 
The courts, however, held to a different tradition. Judges knew 
when the duty existed -- after conciliation, during a strike or lock-out, 
and so on -- but were unwilling to give it much content. Beyond the 
obligation to meet, the duty was described in generalities (or 
tautologies): 'Bargaining in good faith must involve making every 
reasonable effort to make a collective agreement,.r Applying concepts 
derived from contract law, the judiciary interpreted the duty to bargain 
as a necessarily limited obligation. It was unfortunate that the parties 
could not reach an agreement but 'there is no requirement of the law 
which says they must'. They are obliged to 'try honestly' so that 'even 
if they are stupid about it, so long as there is good faith in their 
beliefs and honest effort, and the procedures laid down by the Act have 
qThe Ontario Labour Court had the functions of the Ontario Labour 
Relations Board under the Collective Bargaining Act of 1943. 
rDecision of the Ontario Court of Appeal quoted by Palmer (1966:410). 
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been complied with, it cannot be said they have acted in bad faith and 
failed to make every reasonable effort to make a collective agreement'. 
Inheriting this tradition, the OLRB did not, as the [then] 
chairperson later claimed, begin the task of defining the duty to bargain 
'with a clean slate' in 1975 (Carter, 1978:2). Its initially expansive 
interpretation had been over-ridden by the court's narrower construction. 
Yet, neither voluntarism nor freedom of contract has been a compelling 
principle of labour-relations policy in Canada. Both have frequently 
given way to the perceived need for greater industrial relations 
stability. 
Canada is the only western nation with an absolute ban on work 
stoppages during the lifetime of a collective agreement (Weiler, 
1980:107) and a highly constrained right to strike at other times. Many 
workers have no protected right to organize and others, while organized, 
have no right to strike. Back-to-work legislation, though still rare, is 
an increasingly resorted to means of settling public sector and 
transportation disputes (Panitch and Swartz, 1985). Freedom of contract 
is further diminished by the statutory requirements respecting the 
contents of collective agreements: there must be a clause recognizing 
the union as the exclusive bargaining agent; there must be no strikes or 
lock-outs for the duration of the agreement; the collective agreement 
must be for a fixed term and valid for a minimum of one year; it must 
provide for compulsory dues check-off at the request of the union; and 
there must be provision for the final and binding resolution of disputes 
I , , adm1'nistration or alleged violation over the interpretation, app 1cat1on, 
of the collective agreement. 56 'Freedom of contract competes with 
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industrial peace as a goal of labour policy d an an uneasy tension bet ... ·ee:~ 
them is inevitable' (Bendel, 1980:14). 
Labour relations policy in Canada is utterly pragmatic: voluntarism 
is a fine principle so long as it does not interfere with the more 
pressing goal of maintaining industrial peace. It is hardly surprising, 
therefore, that Canada has pioneered the remedy of first-agreement 
arbitration to bridge the legal impasse resulting from, on the one hand. 
the Labour Relations Board's acceptance of hard bargaining (even when the 
result is no bargaining) and, on the other, the Board's refusal to impose 
a collective agreement as a remedy for bargaining in bad faith. In 
British Columbias , where first-agreement arbitration was first 
introduced, trade unionists decried the measure as the 'thin edge of the 
wedge' and vowed never to make use of the remedy. They even persuaded 
the Manitoba Federation of Labour to oppose a similar provision in 1973. 
However, by the time the federal government was prepared to enact first-
agreement arbitration, the Canadian Labour Congress was willing to admit 
the measure had proved useful, although it continued to voice a 
preference for less rather than more government intervention (Backhouse, 
1980:543). By contrast, the enactment of an equivalent amendment in 
Ontario in 1986 was at the urging of the labour movement. Stung by many 
defeats, trade unionists were willing to bend their voluntaristic 
principles for greater equity. 
Employers, however, remain adamantly opposed. t They fear that 
SFirst-agreement arbitration is provided for in the British . 
Columbia, Manitoba, Quebec, Ontario, and federal labour codes cover1ng 
approximately 80 per cent of the Canadian labour force (Sexton, 1987:1). 
tBut not in Quebec, apparently (Sexton, 1987). 
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bargaining power will be pushed aside and an agreement imposed when 
management adopts a tough stance motivated by legitimate business 
concerns. A union without the bargaining 'clout' can 'ask the province 
to arbitrate and a binding contract will be imposed' (The Globe and ~ail. 
2 January, 1986). The real cure for bargaining failure. employers 
insist, is not compulsory arbitration but compulsory representation 
votes: 
The perceived problem is the refusal of an employer to 
recognize the bargaining authority of the trade union. The 
underlying problem, however, rests with the certification 
process itself, whereby certification is automatic if more than 
55 per cent of the total number of persons in the bargaining 
unit have joined the union. The automatic and often minimal 
nature of the certification process can result in the 
certification of a union that does not enjoy the true support 
of the people in that bargaining unit. Employers similarly are 
often left with the impression that the true wishes of the 
employees have not been represented by the process and that the 
union does not have the support of the employees. Both these 
factors contribute greatly to difficulties in negotiating a 
collective agreement (Canadian Manufacturers' Association, 
1986:3). 
Indeed, employers' hostility to outright certification is evident from 
the significantly lower likelihood that collective agreements will be 
negotiated when unions are certified without a vote. Despite the 
generally higher level of membership support in outright certification 
cases, collective agreements were concluded only 83.9 per cent of the 
time compared to 89.0 per cent when bargaining rights were granted 
pursuant to a vote. 
As conceived in British Columbia, first-agreement arbitration was to 
be an extraordinary, not a universal remedy. 'We did not contemplate 
binding arbitration as the standard response to a breakdown in first-
contract negotiations'. said Weiler (1980:51-3), then the chairperson of 
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the BC Labour Relations Board. It was fashioned for the 'truly 
exceptional cases': 'a sharp surgical instrument for lanCing those 
running sores in the body of industrial relations', the kind of dispute 
that 'deteriorates into an emotional and messy confrontation, in which 
the parties not only are inflicting disproportionate harm on each other, 
totally out of line with the negotiating issues which divide them, but 
their willingness to escalate the dispute is drawing others into the 
melee -- sympathizers, the police and public authorities, or third-party 
employers'. The immediate objective was to put an end to the dispute 
and, more generally, to provide a yearU of 'trial marriage' during which 
the Board assumed experience would dispel the employer's paranoia about 
collective bargaining. 
But the problem of first-agreement bargaining failure goes well 
beyond the messy strike. There are few causes celebres of the sort 
described by Weiler. In Ontario. most unions die quietly: no strike, no 
picket line, no violence. Of those unions unable to negotiate first 
agreements during the 1970s, only one union in tenV was involved in a 
work stoppage. 
It is this broader problem which the recent amendment to the Ontario 
Act appears to address. The Labour Relations Act now provides that when 
the parties are unable to effect a first collective agreement (and the 
conciliation process has been exhausted), either union or management may 
UThe BC statute provides for a one-year agreement only. The 
Manitoba, Ontario, and federal Acts stipulate two-year agreements; the 
Quebec Code allows for three years. Weiler now believes that one year is 
too short a time to allow the bargaining relationship to mature. 
VThe precise figure was 10.5 per cent. 
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apply to the OLRB to direct a settlement of the outstanding issues by 
arbitration. In considering the request, the Board determines whether 
bargaining has been unsuccessful because of the employer's refusal to 
recognize the bargaining authority of the union, the respondent's 
uncompromising bargaining position taken without reasonable 
justification, the respondent's failure to make reasonable or expeditious 
efforts to conclude a collective agreement, or any other reason the Board 
considers relevant. If arbitration is directed, no employee may strike 
and no employer may lock-out an employee or if a strike is in progress 
Table 7.2. Method of Disposition of Certification Applications, 
by Outcome of Bargaining 
Collective agreement 
negotiated 
No collective'1 
agreement negotiated 
Total 
Proportion with 
collective agreements 
x2 = 13.9** 
(1 degree of freedom) 
Fiscal years 1970-71 to 1981-82 
Certification granted Certification 
without vote (11) after vote 
4,318 715 
826 88 
5,144 803 
83.9% 89.0% 
··Significant at the .01 level. 
granted Total 
5,033 
914 
5.947 
84 
#1 Includes 44 cases in which the union was certified without a vote as a rl 
for unfair labour practices.1 
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the employer is directed to reinstate the strl.°kers, t °th no Wl. standing the 
presence of replacements. The arbitrated agreement is of two years 
duration. 57 
Had the grounds for intervention been limited to those associated 
with the duty to bargain in good faith refusal to recognize the union 
and failure to make reasonable efforts to make a collective agreement __ 
the legislation could be said to have had in mind a Radio Shack, not an 
Eaton's. The Minister of Labour, however, said the amendment was 
intended to provide broad relief. Eaton's was precisely the sort of 
bargaining impasse the government sought to remedy: 'There are times 
when intransigence in negotiations is symptomatic of a more basic 
resistance to collective bargaining', he said. While not proposing 'a 
risk-free alternative to the present system', the expectation was that 
'certification should lead to a collective agreement' (Ontario, 
Legislative Assembly, Debates, 1985:1809-1817). 
The Ontario Act appears to go considerably further than Weiler 
contemplated but whether the Board will impose an agreement to remedy 
hard bargaining of the sort practiced by Eaton's remains to be seen. 
Within six months of the enactment of the amendment, the OLRB received 
30 applications for a direction to arbitrate: 4 of which were granted 
and 7 refused. There were, in addition, 2 cases pending and 17 instances 
in which an agreement was negotiated and/or the application was 
withdrawn. w In its first published decision58 , the Board granted the 
union's request for an arbitrated agreement because the employer refused 
to accept collective bargaining. In this case, however, hard bargaining 
WData provided by the Ontario Labour Relations Board on request. 
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was coupled with unlawful dismissals and a tainted anti-union petition. 
To date, no straightfoward Eaton's-like case has been decided. 
But how successful is arbitrat1·on? D th . I oes e tr1a marriage work?X 
Does an arbitrated agreement lay a sound foundation for a mature 
bargaining relationship? Of the experience in British Columbia, Weiler 
(1980:54) concluded: 
By and large, these collective bargaining relationships did not 
mature. The unions were decertified after the expiry of the 
contract which we had imposed. These bargaining units tended 
to be small, employee turnover was high, the union was not able 
to retain or to rebuild its support, and the employer remained 
hostile throughout the entire experience. 
Of the 12 agreements imposedY by the previous NDP government, the 
majority failed to negotiate a second agreement. The unions were either 
decertified or the companies went out of business (Financial Post, 11 
January, 1986). A change of government coupled with the fact that 
applications come to the Board by way of the Minister of Labour has 
resulted in no referrals since 1979. Elsewhere, the experience with 
first-agreement arbitration has been equally mixed. Between 1978 and 
1987, the Canada Board intervened in only 19 disputes and imposed a first 
agreement in 10z. In Manitoba, arbitration was imposed 12 times between 
1982 and 1986; in another 11 cases, the dispute was settled and an 
agreement negotiated with the Board's assistance. Seven of the imposed 
XOr , in the idiom preferred by the Canada Board, Does the transplant 
take? 
YThere were 30 applications in total. 
l · Bard The Canada ZData supplied by the Canada Labour He at10ns 0 . 
Board does not follow the history of the agreements it imposes. 
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agreements have expired and only 4 were subsequently renegotiated 
(Korpesho, 1986:4). 
In terms of the volume of cases at least, Quebec's experience has 
been quite different. The amendment came into force in 1978 and by the 
end of 1984 there had been 376 requests for arbitration addressed to the 
Minister of Labour, 205 of which were granted. But only 88 agreements 
were imposed by arbitration because, in 63 cases, the parties negotiated 
an agreement before the arbitration board finished its work. In 12 other 
cases, the Board decided not to intervene, in 13 cases the request was 
withdrawn, and in 8 the union's certification was cancelled. aa Following 
up the 88 agreements imposed by arbitration, Sexton (1987:11-2) found 
that of the 72 for which information was available, the union's 
bargaining rights were terminated or the plant shut down in 26. A 
newspaper report of another study stated that of 26 agreements imposed 
between 1978-81, only 11 were renewed. (Financial Post, 11 January, 
1986). 
Despite an equivocal record of success, commentators have argued 
that first-agreement arbitration is a most valuable deterrent to anti-
union employers (Weiler, 1980:54-5; Muthuchidambaram, 1979:20; Sexton, 
1987:15) and that the intervention of a Board has often spurred the 
parties to settle. As a remedy for bargaining in bad faith, first-
agreement arbitration is far superior to the Board's conventional 
measures which typically fail to compensate, cure. or deter. The 
improved terms and conditions of employment deprive an employer of some 
aaOf the rema1n1ng 21 cases, in 8 the plant was closed, in one the 
arbitration board decided it had no jurisdiction to proceed, and in 12 
arbitration was underway when the data were compiled. 
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of the benefits of its anti-union behaviour, h h even t oug arbitrators ~a\'e 
generally been quite conservative in their monetary awards. Their non-
monetary awards have been more generous (Sexton, 1987:13), however, and 
the availability of grievance arbitration protects union supporters from 
victimization. 
As a counter-weight for hard bargaining, however, first-agreement 
arbitration falls short of the mark, principally because it cannot 
correct the imbalance of power which often underpins a union's inability 
to negotiate an acceptable collective agreement. From her study of 
organizing in the banking sector, Lennon (1980:236) decided that first-
agreement arbitration as presently administered could do a little to aid 
the growth of unions but is 'not the answer to inequities of bargaining 
power embedded in the structure of an entire economic sector'. The 
problem is deep-seated and long-term and 'cannot be solved by a procedure 
grounded on the assumption that the system is basically viable and calls 
for state intervention only rarely in exceptional situations'. A union 
too weak to negotiate acceptable terms and conditions of employment in 
the first instance can be defeated by hard bargaining in the second 
round. So long as there are weak unions, Cox (1958:1413) warned, 'there 
will be employers who are tempted to engage in the forms of collective 
bargaining without substance' . 
Conclusion 
Critical opinion remains sharply divided about the usefulness of a 
Most severe l°n his criticism was Palmer legally imposed duty to bargain. 
(1966:417-8) who thought the concept a contradiction in terms: 
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In fa~t, 'good fait~' is ~ot a part of the bargaining process 
and, lndeed, seems lmposslble of attainment under the 
conditions of the existing economic system. Unions and 
companies are bodies actuated by self-interest and their 
conduct reflects this fact. Thus, to impose the concept of 
good faith into their mutual activities is to introduce a 
fiction. Unfortunately, it is a harmful fiction because it 
distracts the parties from the central purpose of working out 
an agreement and stimulates the negotiators to build up a case 
for an unfair labour practice or to go through the charade of 
adhering to the objective tests of good faith then prevailing. 
Others have been less troubled by fundamentals. Identifying the problem 
as primarily one of enforcement, these commentators thought the 
difficulty largely resolved when the remedies of labour boards were 
substituted for the penalties of the courts. 
As interpreted by the OLRB, the duty to bargain in good faith does 
little to correct the imbalance of power institutionalized by the law. 
The Labour Relations Act requires only that the parties make every 
reasonable effort to make a collective agreement; it does not oblige them 
to agree, or even to make a concession. As a practical matter, 
therefore, the duty to bargain in good faith is primarily a procedural 
standard. The parties must meet regularly, exchange proposals and 
counter-proposals, provide essential data, discuss their disagreements 
fully and frankly, and so on. Otherwise, however, the parties are 
largely free to determine their own demands and bargaining strategies. 
Certain demands are unlawful per se, but for the most part the 
restriction is a relatively narrow one that precludes demands which, if 
granted, would punish workers for joining a union or violate other 
statutes. 
Although the Board has, on occasion, rejected demands which it 
considered patently unreasonable, it has no desire to judge the substance 
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of bargaining and apart from other obviously anti-union conduct. has no 
criteria by which it would make these determinations. The less 
intervention, the better, the OLRB believes. In a system of free 
collective bargaining the parties must stand or fallon the strength of 
their own bargaining power. The duty to bargain in good faith was never 
intended to redress an imbalance of power and should not be used as an 
equilibrating mechanism. 
In the Board's decisions, bargaining power is often discussed as 
though it were a naturally occurring, fixed commodity unaffected by 
public policy. In fact, however, the law does much to shape the relative 
power of the parties. The practice of certifying unions on a single-
establishment basis and even smaller groupings of office, manual. full 
and part-time employees, fragments the bargaining power of workers. 
Coupled with the legal constraints on the right to strike and picket, the 
result is that small, legally isolated unions are frequently bargaining 
with large, powerful corporations. And even though the contest is 
clearly unequal, when bargaining fails the Board responds with pieties 
about the virtues of free collective bargaining. 
The Eaton's dispute illustrates the problem workers sometimes 
encounter when they confront an employer unwilling to negotiate an 
agreement on anything other than its own terms. With less than 3 per 
cent of the workforce organized, the union was unable to exert the 
pressure required to force Eaton's paternalistic owners to accept 
collective bargaining. Those who survived the six-month strike won a 
victory of sorts, but the agreement was on terms dictated by the company. 
Not long afterwards, the union's bargaining rights were terminated for 
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all but four of its bargaining units (Windsor Star, 6 June, 1987). Even 
first-agreement arbitration, much touted as the necessary antidote to 
anti-union employers, would have been of questionable help had it been 
available. bb In Manitoba, arbitration was imposed to end a first-
agreement dispute at the Eaton's store in Brandon. The company soon 
retaliated, cutting back its operations because, it said, the higher 
wages made the store unprofitable. Not surprisingly, the workers 
responded by circulating a decertification petition and the union was 
forced to agree to a reduction in wages to save its bargaining rights. 
Even so, the Manitoba Labour Relations Board has ordered a representation 
vote. 
Whether the law can impose an effective obligation to bargain in 
good faith may ultimately depend less on the willingness of the Labour 
Relations Board to intervene or on the remedies it imposes and more on 
the way in which the law shapes the bargaining power of the parties. At 
present, the law in Ontario helps create and entrench an imbalance of 
power. The structural weakness of unions rooted in the law coupled with 
their unequal access to resources leaves many ill-equipped to pressure 
reluctant employers to bargain seriously. Unless these fundamental 
imbalances are redressed, neither bargaining orders nor damage awards, 
nor even compulsory first-agreement arbitration, is likely to induce 
anti-union employers to accept collective bargaining. 
bbThe amendment to the Labour Relations Act was made a year later. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Chapter 8 
DO THE OLD LAWS STILL WORK? 
The growth of unions in Canada is inextricably linked to the 
extension of collective bargaining. And for unions to grow in the 1980s, 
collective bargaining must take root in the trade, finance and services 
industries. Traditionally a hostile environment for unions, the tertiary 
sector may now be organizable. Women and part-time employees are seeking 
union representation in unprecedented numbers. But the desire for 
collective bargaining is not enough. Unless workers can overcome the 
ingrained anti-unionism of tertiary sector employers their organizing 
efforts will flounder and fail. 
In the past, PC 1003 was a firm legal foundation for the growth of 
collective bargaining. Following its introduction in 1944, union 
membership doubled in the space of ten years. But since the mid-1950s 
unionism in the private sector has been stagnating. The dominant firms 
in the resource, manufacturing, and transportation industries have been 
brought under collective agreement, but beyond these boundaries union 
membership is sparse. Nor is change likely. Far from encouraging the 
growth of unions, the effect of the law today is to exaggerate the 
obstacles in the path of unions. This is particularly true of the 
tertiary sector where workers are scattered in small groups and the 
ordinary economic sanctions are less effective. To overcome these 
barriers, the right to bargain collectively will have to be reinforced 
and the ability of employers to refuse recognition undercut. 
By shifting the balance of power in labour's favour, changes to the 
law may encourage the growth of unions in the tertiary sector. But there 
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are limits to the effectiveness of the law. No amount of legal 
intervention can eradicate the fact that collective bargaining is, 
ultimately, a voluntary relationship and functions well only when workers 
have the power to curb management's ability to make decisions 
unilaterally. The effectiveness of the law, therefore, depends largely 
on the balance of power between labour and management, a balance which is 
influenced by the law but is even more fundamentally shaped by the labour 
market. 
Collective Bargaining and the Law 
Prior to 1939, workers were free to organize, but the law recognized 
no right to do so. In any event, most forms of collective activity 
remained unlawful. Even after the Criminal Code was amended to prohibit 
dismissal for union activity, the right to organize was more nominal than 
real. The ineffectiveness of the criminal enforcement mechanism and the 
absence of suitable industrial relations remedies left anti-union 
employers unprosecuted or with risible fines while workers dismissed in 
violation of the law were neither compensated nor reinstated. The right 
to strike was equally vague. Apart from the minority of workers covered 
by the Industrial Disputes Investigation Act and its provincial 
equivalents, workers could rarely strike with impunity as there was no 
immunity from the common law torts of civil conspiracy, breach of 
contract, nuisance, and so on. 
The advent of World War II extended to most industrial workers the 
limited right to strike embodied in the IDIA. The unlawfulness of 
untimely stoppages under the Act established, by implication, the 
legality of strikes preceded by tri-partite conciliation. There can be 
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no doubt that the rights of industrial workers were thus greatly 
enhanced. In less than two years, union membership increased by more 
than 25 per cent. Yet, by itself, this change was far from decisive. Of 
much greater importance was the shift in the balance of power between 
labour and management resulting from the growing labour shortage. 
Canada's early entry to the war meant that by 1941 factory workers were 
in short supply. So dire was the situation that the federal government 
found it necessary to impose strict constraints on the mobility of 
labour, including constraints on management's right to hire and fire. In 
these circumstances, strikes were an effective threat. 
Still, workers were thwarted in their attempts to organize. 
Employers either refused flatly to recognize trade unions or, like Ford. 
dissembled: negotiating collective agreements under duress but otherwise 
acting as though collective bargaining were a war-time necessity that 
would not survive the return to peace. Public policy, meanwhile, 
encouraged but did not require collective bargaining. Uninterrupted 
production was the over-riding goal of the federal government to which 
all other considerations were ancillary. Labour relations policy, 
consequently, was ad hoc and focused almost entirely on the prevention of 
work stoppages. While the government professed a preference for 
collective bargaining, it did nothing to ensure its adoption. Indeed, 
whenever workers successfully increased the pressure on employers, it 
responded by placing more obstacles in the way of lawful strikes. New 
orders-in-council further impeded strikes by adding industrial inquiry 
commissions to the already lengthy conciliation process and, in 1943, 
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compulsory strike votes. So many were the delays and interventions tha~ 
labour's new-found bargaining power was often frittered awa y. 
But the push from below was relentless. 
wage controls, workers flocked into unions. 
Even with strictly enforced 
By 1943. the crisis in 
industrial relations was palpable. The government's temporizing could no 
longer provide the desired level of economic and social stability. It 
was forced to concede that coercion was an ineffective policy and that 
compulsory collective bargaining was the only workable alternative. The 
balance struck combined the American ideas of certification, duty to 
bargain in good faith, and prohibition of unfair labour practices with 
the Canadian pre-occupation with constraining strikes and lock-outs, an 
amalgam which fell well short of truly 'free' collective bargaining, yet 
gave labour considerably more scope for the use of economic sanctions. 
Thus, even though Privy Council Order 1003 was not inspired by a desire 
to encourage the growth of unions, it did provide a workable framework 
for the extension of collective bargaining to manual workers in the mass-
production industries. 
The PC 1003 framework remains the standard model and continues to 
provide a firm legal base for the practice of collective bargaining. In 
Ontario, the Labour Relations Act gives employees the right to join a 
union and participate in its lawful activities, and employers are 
forbidden from engaging in conduct, such as dismissal for union activity, 
designed to thwart that right. Once organized, workers may apply to have 
their union certified. Before certification is granted, however, a union 
must demonstrate that it has, as members, a majority of the employees in 
a unit that is appropriate for collective bargaining. Under the Ontario 
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Act, a union is granted certificat1'on t au omatically, without a 
representation vote that is, if more than 55 per cent of the employees 
are members. A vote is necessary if membership falls between 45 and 55 
per cent and an application is automatically dismissed if less than 45 
per cent of the employees are members. Once certified, a union is 
legally entitled to compel an employer to bargain in good faith with the 
object of making a collective agreement and it is unlawful for an 
employer to refuse to negotiate or to indicate in any other way that it 
does not recognize the union's status as exclusive bargaining agent. The 
obligation to bargain in good faith also requires the parties to discuss 
their differences fully and frankly, make proposals and counter-
proposals, and, most importantly, be willing to sign a collective 
agreement. 
Detracting from the effectiveness of the law is the complexity and 
length of the certification process. Certification in Ontario is far 
from an informal, quick check of a union's claim to represent a group of 
employees. Time-consuming verification procedures and full-scale 
hearings to investigate allegations that the Board's strict rules have 
not been followed make delays in the processing of applications 
inevitable. Disputes over the size and composition of a bargaining unit 
or the weight to be attached to an anti-union petition may also require 
lengthy mediation and/or adjudication. There are, in short, many 
opportunities for employers to delay the proceedings and interfere with 
the outcome of certification. And such interventions have been highly 
effective. During the 1970s, the likelihood of certification was 
significantly lower when the Labour Relations Board took longer than five 
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weeks to process an application. The likelihood of success was similarly 
lower when a union's application for certification was opposed by a 
petition that was signed by enough union members to force a 
representation vote and which the Board accepted as a voluntary statement 
of the employees' true wishes. Delays and petitions affected the outcome 
of bargaining as well. A union whose application for certification took 
longer than five weeks to process was less likely to negotiate a 
collective agreement. And the likelihood of an agreement was markedly 
lower when a union's application was opposed by a petition that was 
rejected by the Labour Board because it was abetted by management. 
The effectiveness of the law is also undermined by the inability of 
the Labour Relations Board to prevent anti-union conduct. Its remedies 
are simply not effective. By dismissing a union supporter, an employer 
clearly and forcefully demonstrates to all employees that they organize a 
union at their economic peril. The Board's standard response, 
reinstatement with compensation, offers little reassurance; even its most 
powerful remedy, certification without a representation vote, has proven 
ineffective. A further problem is the Board's willingness to accept, as 
lawful, employer conduct which adversely affects the right to associate 
but which is motivated by economic self-interest. So long as there is no 
evidence of anti-union animus, an employer has the right to dismiss or 
lay workers off, cut-back or sub-contract bargaining-unit work, or 
introduce new technology during an organizing drive. 
In these circumstances, the most effective defence of the right to 
associate is outright certification. By granting bargaining rights on 
the basis of membership cards rather than representation votes, the Board 
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minimizes the possibility that anti-union employers can undercut an 
organizing drive. The protection is short-lived, however, because there 
is no equivalent procedural protection for collective bargaining. 
Consequently, even though the use of unfair labour practices had no 
apparent effect on the likelihood of winning certification, unions that 
complained of unlawful conduct were substantially less likely to 
negotiate collective agreements during the 1970s. 
The problem of bargaining failure among newly certified unions was 
far more pervasive than the incidence of employer interference could 
explain, however. Most of the unions which failed to negotiate 
collective agreements did not file unfair labour practice complaints, 
were not opposed by anti-union petitions, and had their applications for 
certification processed in fewer than five weeks. Unrealistic demands by 
unions are commonly thought to be the source of the difficulty, but 
excessive demands by employers bent on frustrating collective bargaining 
are more likely to blame. By advancing proposals which leave their right 
to manage unfettered, anti-union employers can ensure rejection of a 
proposed agreement by the union and force employees into an untenable 
position: strike or accept terms that effectively negate the union's 
purpose. 
Hard bargaining of this sort is quite lawful. While the right to 
bargain is integral to the Labour Relations Act, workers have no 
assurance that the process will result in negotiated changes. The duty 
The Board to bargain in good faith is primarily a procedural constraint. 
demands good bargaining practice, so requires the parties to meet 
d b t beyond this the OLRB is not regularly, exchange proposals, an so on, u 
314 
prepared to go. The duty to bargain in good faith does not require the 
parties to make a collective agreement, or even a concession. 
Conciliation and mediation are available to help them resolve their 
differences but, in the end, there is no obligation to compromise. So 
long as an employer is prepared to sign a collective agreement, albeit 
only on its own terms, it satisfies its legal obligation. The Labour 
Relations Board is unlikely to detect any anti-union intent and, in any 
event, its standard remedy for bargaining in bad faith is a predictably 
ineffective order to bargain in good faith. 
Such a strategy of passive resistance to unionization can be highly 
effective because unions have few defences. Hard bargaining is a 
particularly effective strategy against weak unions and many newly 
certified unions are weak. Because the law obstructs the ability of 
workers to organize and execute effective, lawful strikes they lack the 
power necessary to force determinedly anti-union employers to bargain 
seriously. Not only are stoppages highly predictable, their impact is 
undercut by the broad definition of strikes. It is impossible for 
workers to impede an employer's efforts to stockpile or otherwise prepare 
for a strike within the law. And during a stoppage it is unlawful for 
workers to interfere with the movement of goods or people. Picketing 
which goes beyond the simple communication of information is a violation 
of the Criminal Code or tortious if it is motivated by a wrongful 
purpose, encroaches on private property or interferes with access or 
egress, if the number of pickets is excessive, or even if the signs bear 
untruthful or opinionated messages. Also of dubious legality is 
picketing away from the site of a primary dispute. The right to trade 
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is held to be absolute so that unless an employer has allied itself ~ith 
a struck firm, picketing the premises of a third party violates the law. 
Equally unlawful are most appeals for active support directed to the 
employees of suppliers or distributors, or even other groups employed by 
the same firm. And even when the appeal itself is lawful, the employees 
appealed to are likely to find themselves accused of participating in an 
unlawful work stoppage if they refuse to cross a picket line or handle 
struck goods. Under the P.C.1003 framework, strikes are lawful only for 
resolving a dispute over one's own terms and conditions of employment, 
and then only if there is no collective agreement in force and the 
conciliation process has been exhausted. During the term of an agreement, 
any form of concerted activity which restricts or limits output is a 
strike in Ontario. Even threats to strike unlawfully constitute a breach 
of the Labour Relations Act. 
The impact of these constraints is intensified by the fact that 
newly certified unions are generally small and restricted to one 
establishment. Alliances with other groups employed by the same firm are 
impeded by an interpretation of the Act that permits workers to discuss 
broader-based bargaining but makes it unlawful for them to push the 
demand to impasse. In effect, therefore, employers have the right to 
veto bargaining structures more advantageous to unions than the 
fragmented units for which they are certified. 
Employers, by contrast, have few legal constraints on the exercise 
of their bargaining power. In response to a strike, they are free to 
continue production at struck locations and have the right to move goods 
and people unimpeded by pickets. The jobs of the strikers may be 
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performed by managerial employees or employees relocated from other 
establishments. Replacement workers may also be hired, even retained at 
the end of the dispute, subject to the terms of the settlement and the 
relatively narrow requirement for the reinstatement of lawful strikers 
imposed by the Labour Relations Act. Nor does the law curtail the 
ability of employers to move or sub-contract work, make up production 
shortfalls at other work sites, or cover strike-related losses out of the 
earnings of the business as a whole. 
Quite clearly, the effect of the law is to institutionalize an 
imbalance of power between labour and management. The narrow power-base 
of workers and unions stands in stark contrast to the broadly based power 
of employers. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that a substantial 
minority of newly certified unions fail to negotiate collective 
agreements. The limited sanctions that workers can bring to bear are 
readily deflected by powerful national and international companies 
willing to use the 'resources of the firm as a whole to isolate and defeat 
the organizing drive of a small group of workers at anyone location. 
Following the leads of four other jurisdictions, the Ontario 
Legislature has introduced first-agreement arbitration as a balancing 
measure. But whether its effect will be significant is, as yet, 
uncertain. On the one hand, workers whose bargaining position would 
otherwise be hopeless can expect to win some constraints on management's 
rights at arbitration. But whether hard bargaining of the sort practiced 
by Eaton's will justify the imposition of a collective agreement remains 
to be seen. In any event, the remedy is limited to first-agreement 
disputes. Once the initial agreement expires, employees must face the 
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prospect of hard bargaining for a second agreement with no more resources 
at their command. 
From the 1940s to the 1980s 
PC 1003 permitted but did not cause the growth of unions among 
industrial workers. The acute labour shortage brought on by World War II 
left employers with little choice but to concede recognition and 
negotiate collective agreements. The terms were rudimentary, however, 
and managements continued to make decisions without consulting their 
workers' representatives. Industrial conflict grew as a result. Workers 
suspected employers of expediency: negotiating agreements in conformity 
with the law while the labour market was tight but waiting for the war to 
end to rid themselves of troublesome trade unions. The denouement came 
in 1945. For two years, labour-management relations were chaotic as 
workers struck for bona fide collective bargaining and strong union 
representation on the shop-floor. 
Though they were legally constrained in the same ways as workers 
today, industrial workers in the 1940s wielded more economic power than 
unorganized workers in the 1980s, not because they were men or brawny 
blue-collar types but because they were more favourably placed. Despite 
the constraints imposed by the law, industrial workers were powerful 
enough to extract the necessary concessions from employers. Single-
establishment bargaining posed no insurmountable obstacles because in the 
key industries of automobiles, steel, and electrical products the major 
companies were dependent on one or two principal establishments where 
hundreds, even thousands, of workers were congregated. When they struck, 
production stopped. Even where the workforce was split, as it was at 
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Stelco, a strike had a powerful impact. Attempts to move raw materials 
in and finished goods out were determinedly resisted by mass picketing: 
in those communities at that time effective picketing could not be 
stopped. And once unions were firmly established at the main work sites, 
employers saw little advantage in challenging organizing drives at 
related facilities. 
In the circumstances of the mid-1940s, employers had little choice 
but to acknowledge the legitimacy of trade unions. Ford, Stelco, and 
Westinghouse were forced to accept that industry could not function 
efficiently without their employees' co-operation and that co-operation 
would not be forthcoming until unions were recognized as equals in the 
bargaining process. Subsequent disputes, some of them quite bitter, were 
confined to improvements in the level of wages and other terms and 
conditions of employment: neither the legitimacy of unions nor the 
desirability of collective bargaining was at issue. 
For unorganized workers in the 1980s, the same legal framework is 
impeding rather than permitting the growth of unions and collective 
bargaining. The economic predicament of tertiary sector workers today 
differs fundamentally from that of industrial workers forty years ago. 
Throughout the service sector small establishments predominate, each with 
a territorial claim to provide a uniform set of goods and services. As a 
result, no group of workers has the ability to impose a serious financial 
penalty on the firm by withdrawing their labour. 
Single-establishment certification and location-by-Iocation 
bargaining are a particularly weak structure for workers in the tertiary 
sector. A bid for recognition at anyone site, or even a group of sites. 
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is quickly rebuffed. Strikes are readily contained as appeals to 
consumers are notoriously ineffective. The strikers are easily replaced: 
skills are low, turn-over is high, training is on-going, and there is a 
ready reserve of labour in the managerial workforce. In any event, 
employers are willing and able to spread any strike-related losses 
incurred at a small number of establishments over the business as a whole 
to discourage further unionization. 
To be effective, collective bargaining needs to be on a much broader 
footing. But this is not practical. Organizing invariably begins with a 
small group of workers and spreads to the whole only when solid gains can 
be demonstrated. And this is precisely what the law makes difficult. 
Small groups of workers can be organized and their unions certified, but 
often they cannot make gains at the bargaining table. The combination of 
structural fragmentation and ineffective sanctions leaves them vulnerable 
to hard bargaining. Nor are they allowed to draw on the bargaining power 
of others. Were they able to solicit the active support of truck drivers 
and suppliers, tertiary sector workers might begin to match the power of 
their employers but, of course, this is not permitted. For unions to 
grow in the tertiary sector, the balance of power must be altered. Yet, 
apart from the highly controversial ban on the use of strike replacements 
in Quebec, no Canadian statute has attempted to redress the imbalance of 
power between labour and management that is inherent in the law. 
One source of the imbalance is structural and results from the 
practice of certifying unions on a single-establishment basis. If 
employers are permitted to marshall their bargaining power over the firm 
as a whole, to be even-handed, the law should recognize the right of 
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workers to mobilize their bargaining power on an equivalent basis. The 
solution may be to allow workers to amalgamate their bargaining units, at 
least to the extent of forming company-wide negotiating units. To bring 
the process under the Labour Relations Act, unions could apply to the 
Board for a vote to determine their members' preferences. In fact, the 
OLRB is already permitted to conduct a vote for the purpose of 
ascertaining employees' wishes as to the appropriateness of a bargaining 
unit, but as the Board believes it has no authority to restructure 
existing units an amendment to the Act would seem to be necessary. 
It would not be sufficient to simply give the Labour Relations Board 
the discretion to restructure bargaining units. Labour boards have 
frequently shown themselves to be purblind to the issue of bargaining 
power. The assumption, that by simply forming a union workers become an 
effective countervailing force, is clearly untenable, yet underpins much 
of their thinking. Neither the British Columbia nor the Canada Board 
(both of which are empowered to redraw the boundaries of bargaining 
units) has shown itself to be particularly sensitive to the problems of 
newly certified unions. The preoccupation of both has been the 
prevention of leapfrogging and whipsawing where collective bargaining was 
already well established. Generally, bargaining units have been 
consolidated when excessive fragmentation has resulted in 'unnecessary' 
strikes: 
Multiple and fragmented bargaining units are prone to 
'competitive bargaining' ... One trade union tries to obtain 
just a little better wage package than its fellow union 
achieved. One employer tries to obtain a slightly cheaper ~age 
settlement than its competitors accepted. Once the other slde 
resists, once it decides to take a stand, competitive 
bargaining can generate repeated and escalated work stoppages 
(Weiler, 1980:158). 
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When the unions involved cannot agree among themselves on a broader-
based negotiating structure, the British Columbia labour code empowers 
the Minister of Labour to direct the Labour Relations Board to determine 
whether it should compel the workers to form a legally binding council of 
trade unions. Railway workers, ferry crews, shipbuilding workers, and 
miners have been forced to accept all-encompassing negotiating structures 
whether they wanted them or not. The loss of self-determination was 
justified, Weiler argued, by the benefits for society as a whole. In any 
event, elite groups of workers should be required to share their 
bargaining power with those affected by its exercise (ibid.: 154-178). 
Ontario's lone experiment with consolidating bargaining units was 
similarly designed to bring order out of perceived chaos. Site-by-site 
bargaining in the construction industry afforded unions many 
opportunities for leapfrogging and whipsawing which they skilfully 
exploited during the building boom of the 1960s and 1970s. The solution 
chosen was to legislate province-wide bargaining by trade so that now if 
there is a work stoppage all the workers in a trade employed in the 
industrial, commercial and institutional sector are out. 1 
In other situations where workers were already organized on an all-
employee (though single-establishment) basis and there was no possibility 
of disruptive whipsawing, labour boards have not been persuaded of the 
need for extending the boundaries of the bargaining unit. Dismissing a 
union's application for the amalgamation of a number of bargaining units 
of the Bank of Montreal, the Canada Board failed to see the problem 
because collective agreements had been negotiated at each location, there 
were no allegations of bad faith, and no unfair labour practice 
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complaints. The fact that the employer would not agree to treat all the 
units as a single seniority district was not evidence that it was using 
its bargaining power to render the union impotent, the Board concluded. 
There was no critical imbalance of bargaining power as the union alleged; 
it was merely seeking to achieve through the Board what it could not win 
at the bargaining table. 2 
Company-wide negotiating units would partially redress the 
structural superiority of management over labour by eliminating the unit-
by-unit struggle for collective bargaining. Instead of a series of 
isolated demands for recognition, the employer would be confronted by a 
co-ordinated effort. Once a collective agreement was negotiated, its 
terms and conditions would automatically become available to any newly 
organized group that chose, by majority vote, to affiliate with the 
established union. If some issues remained outstanding--if, for example, 
the parties could not agree on a wage rate for a recently organized group 
of part-time employeesa--the matter would be deferred to the next 
bargaining round. There need be no right to strike or lock-out or refer 
the matter to final and binding arbitration. b 
aStrictly speaking, the employer is under no obligation to bargain 
at all once an agreement is signed. 
bBoth the British Columbia and Canada Boards have ruled that workers 
added to an existing bargaining unit have no right to strike apart from 
the rest of the workers. In the opinion of the Canada Board, a 
difference over a matter not included under the terms of the existing 
agreement--for example, wages for a newly included classification--cannot 
be referred to arbitration, except by mutual consent. The British 
Columbia Board, by contrast, is not averse to this masked form of 
interest arbitration (Dorsey, 1983:181-3). 
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Restructuring would be of particular importance in the retail trade, 
finance, and services industries where establishments are typically small 
and none is critical to the success of the business. Services are 
frequently duplicated so that in any community a large employer is likely 
to have more than one establishment. Single-establishment unions, 
consequently, are weak almost by definition, especially when they are 
unable to act in concert with other organized groups. Strikes are 
frequently ineffective because the stoppage is limited to a small 
minority of employees who are readily replaced. 
But whether the Eaton's employees would have benefited from 
restructuring is uncertain. Though they were divided into thirteen 
bargaining units, they struck as one group; thus, the collective 
agreement they negotiated reflected the workers' combined bargaining 
power. It is conceivable, however, that given the option of company-wide 
bargaining, the union's strategy might have been different: a long-term 
plan which emphasized organizing may have been preferred to a short-term 
plan that hinged on results. Knowing that it could build a more 
extensive negotiating unit over time, the union might have accepted 
Eaton's terms of settlement, minimal though they were, in order to 
concentrate its resources on recruitment while enthusiasm remained high. 
With leadership, the members might have appreciated the wisdom of a more 
calculated approach to organizing over the risks of an immediate 
confrontation. And if, for the sake of argument, a dozen more stores had 
been organized and brought within the coverage of the agreement before it 
expired, the union would have been better placed to negotiate more 
satisfactory terms in its second agreement. 
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Labour's bargaining power would also be greatly enhanced by a ban on 
the use of strike replacements. As implemented in Quebec, the 
prohibition against the use of replacement workers is absolute. 
Employers are not permitted to place managerial or other employees on 
strikers' jobs, hire outside replacements, or utilize the services of 
workers represented by a striking union. Such a ban has the added 
virtues of greatly reducing the likelihood of picket-line violence and 
more or less guaranteeing the jobs of strikers. 
Though it would be a sharp deviation from the past, the banning of 
strike replacements would be consistent with the general policy of 
limiting and controlling industrial conflict. Nor would such a change be 
fundamentally incompatible with the principle of freedom of contract as 
some have asserted. After all, the law isolates workers into small, 
fragmented groups while employers are entitled to mobilize their 
productive and financial resources over a wide front. A ban on strike 
replacements would partially undercut the ability of employers to 
deliberately use their economic superiority to frustrate the bargaining 
process. Alternatively, workers could be allowed to engage in full-
scale, that is, effective picketing. If employers have the right to 
operate during a work stoppage, to be even-handed, the law should 
recognize an equivalent right of workers to try to impede production and 
distribution. That the result of an expanded right to picket would 
undoubtedly be a dramatic escalation of picket-line violence suggests 
that a ban on strike replacements would be the more Canadian option. 
Another change that would encourage the growth of unions generally 
is the simplification of the certification procedure to eliminate 
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unnecessary delays and limit the ability of employers to intervene. 
Reform will be difficult to achieve, however. Ex .. h am1n1ng t e history of 
the industrial tribunals established in the United Kingdom to adjudicate 
unfair dismissal complaints, Dickens et ale (1985) described a body very 
similar to the Ontario Labour Relations Board. Like the OLRB, the 
tribunals were tri-partite boards separate from, but supervised by, the 
courts. Also similar was their freedom to make rules and procedures. 
Yet, like the OLRB, proceedings were court-like more often than not, a 
result the authors considered unavoidable when the chairpersons were 
lawyers: 'those trained in the legal profession are likely to see the 
procedure in which they are trained and with which they are familiar as 
the best or most appropriate' (ibid.:55). Given the adversarial nature 
of the hearings, informality was impossible they concluded. The process 
required the presentation of briefs, the submission of evidence, the 
calling of witnesses, and cross-examination (ibid.: 74). And though the 
right of appeal ensured consistency in decision-making, it was at the 
expense of informality: 
The creation of, and adherence to, guidelines and legal 
principles are to be expected in a system where higher courts 
are given appellate jurisdiction, ..• where lawyers play an 
important part (in chairing tribunals and representing people 
appearing before them) and where decisions are reported and 
available for citation (ibid.: 76). 
The impact of the legal rules and proceedings has been counter-
productive, Dickens et ale thought: decisions that were technically 
correct in law were not necessarily helpful in resolving labour relations 
problems. Accordingly, they recommended that unfair dismissal cases be 
heard by arbitration panels (which in the UK adopt an entirely 
accommodative approach) instead of the industrial tribunals. They 
326 
acknowledged. however. that the already established expectations of the 
parties posed something of an obstacle to reform: 
It is. we suggest. perhaps unlikely that arbitrators, or the 
parties to disputes. would be able now to distance themselves 
totally from the norms and values concerning fairness in 
dismissal which the industrial tribunal system has fostered. 
It is also likely that such safeguards against legalism as no 
right of appeal and discouraging legal representation at 
hearing would be argued to be a denial of justice, a 
deterioration from the industrial tribunal system, particularly 
by those in the legal profession (ibid.: 296). 
The expectations of the parties, and of employers in particular, 
present an even greater obstacle to the reform of the certification 
process in Ontario where the Board's procedure has evolved over a forty-
five year period. Despite sound industrial relations reasons for 
excluding employers as active participants in the certification process, 
any attempt to do so would. apart from the inevitable legal wrangling 
over the constitutionality of the change. provoke a serious crisis of 
confidence in the system. As long as unions are entitled to be certified 
without a representation vote so radical a reform is virtually 
unthinkable. 
A more modest procedural reform aimed at shortening the time 
required to dispose of certification applications would see the OLRB 
amend its regulations to require the party requesting a hearing to show 
cause why it is necessary as is presently done in the construction 
industry and. more generally. in British Columbia and under the Canada 
Labour Code. Whether the change would shorten the process significantly 
is doubtful. however. because the Board's willingness to entertain 
employers' challenges respecting the composition of bargaining units and 
so on would likely nullify most of the potential benefits. Indeed, the 
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initial, positive effect on the time required to process construction 
industry applications resulting from a similar procedural change seems to 
have been dissipated over the years. 
If attempts to curtail the role of employers directly are unlikely 
to succeed, what can be accomplished by way of procedural reform? Most 
obvious is the elimination of anti-union petitions. Petitions are not 
critical to the vitality of the certification process; the procedure is 
not necessary to ensure the free expression of employees' wishes. By the 
simple expedient of closing the gap between the application and terminal 
dates the Board could prevent the organizing of petitions. Neither the 
British Columbia nor the Canada Board entertains petitions for the simple 
reason that the union's membership support is assessed as of the 
application date. All the same, it must be admitted that the protection 
afforded by the elimination of petitions would be limited. While the 
likelihood of winning certification would probably increase, there is no 
guarantee that anti-union employers would change their ways. Employers 
bent on undermining their employees' enthusiasm for collective bargaining 
would not be frustrated simply because the vehicle of the petition is 
denied to them. 
The adjudication of unfair labour practices is another obvious area 
for reform. The Ontario Board is far too respectful of management's 
rights. The statutory freezes, for example, could be absolute. Once a 
union is organized, employers should be obliged to negotiate changes in 
terms and conditions of employment. Nor is an absolute freeze prior to 
certification too onerous a condition. Any change initiated during an 
organizing drive is bound to be interpreted by employees as a veiled 
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anti-union message. If the period is too long, a deep freeze may be the 
incentive employers need to forgo raising objections over the size and 
composition of bargaining units or the validity of a union's membership 
evidence. 
More generally, the Board should find unlawful, conduct which has 
the effect of disrupting support for collective bargaining. The legal 
requirement, that to be unlawful conduct must be motivated by anti-union 
animus, can be discerned from the foreseeable consequences of many 
employers' tactics. Ideally, for example, dismissal for any reason 
should be unlawful during an organizing campaign or, at the very least, 
the Labour Relations Board should judge a dismissal by the 'just cause' 
standard of arbitral jurisprudence. 
None the less, stricter enforcement of the unfair labour practice 
protections cannot be expected to affect the outcome of certification 
appreciably and it will have a positive effect on the outcome of 
bargaining only if employers are prepared to change their behaviour. 
There is little incentive to do so, however. Even if the OLRB were to 
increase its compensation awards to include, for example, a pain and 
suffering component, or were prepared to issue 'make whole' awards with 
greater frequency, the cost of committing unfair labour practices would 
seldom exceed the potential benefits. The Board might try reinstating 
dismissed employees pending the outcome of their complaints. But what it 
could do to discourage other forms of unlawful conduct is less clear. 
Whether a more aggressive, that is, punitive, response to unfair 
labour practices would be appropriate is hotly debated. The Ontario 
Board believes that 'two-fisted' enforcement would jeopardize its 
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mediating role and conflict with the policy of encouraging accommodation 
and compromise. It is also possible that the Board's legitimacy would 
suffer from a stricter construction of the law. Because enforcement 
procedures are fragile, the adoption of a more aggressive stance might be 
self-defeating. No good would result if, as a result, employers decide 
to defy the authority of labour boards as they appear to be doing in the 
United States. 
What effect these changes would have on union growth is, of course, 
uncertain. They should make certification easier to get and unfair 
labour practices a little less profitable. More importantly, by shifting 
the balance of power towards labour, changes of the sort proposed should 
eventually make it possible for workers in the tertiary sector to 
negotiate acceptable collective agreements. But the purpose of the 
proposals is merely tactical. It is the underlying social purpose that is 
critical. Workers in the tertiary sector are some of the most 
disadvantaged in Canada. Thus, if these changes fail to achieve the 
higher wages and better conditions to which these workers are entitled, 
more radical measures should be devised. 
Conclusion: The Limits of the Law 
No amount of labour law can overcome the fact that, in the end, 
collective bargaining is undertaken voluntarily. Even Canadian labour 
law, which is highly intrusive, rests on a voluntaristic base. Labour 
relations in Canada are highly 'juridified', that is to say, the conduct 
of the parties is profoundly shaped by the substitution of legal 
procedures for procedures of the parties' own making (Clark and 
Wedderburn, 1985:188); yet, for all that, the law can do no more than 
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encourage employers to bargain in good faith. Strong unions are the best 
defence of a collective bargaining regime. 
Central to the emergence of collective bargaining in the mass-
production industries was the tight labour market of the war years. The 
law played a vital, though distinctly secondary, role. As Kahn-Freund 
(1977:8) never tired of saying, important as the functions of the law 
are, 'they are secondary if compared with the impact of the labour 
market'. Collective bargaining has no firm base unless workers have the 
power to force employers to make collective agreements and adhere to 
their terms. 'Where labour is weak -- and its strength or weakness 
depends largely on factors outside the control of the law -- Acts of 
Parliament, however well intentioned and well designed, can do something, 
but cannot do much to modify the power relations between labour and 
management'. The threat of a strike may be far more powerful than the 
threat of legal action (Kahn-Freund, 1954:43). 
Voluntarism was much championed by Kahn-Freund. The absence of 
legal intervention was the hallmark of a 'mature' industrial relations 
system, he argued. And by this measure, industrial relations in Great 
Britain were fundamentally healthy: 'There is perhaps, no major country 
in the world in which the law has played a less significant role in the 
shaping of these relations than in Great Britain and in which to-day the 
law and the legal profession have less to do with labour relations' 
(ibid.:44). 
Industrial autonomy, to use Kahn-Freund's phrase, was never a 
politically acceptable option in Canada, however. For whatever reasons -
_ the fragility of the Canadian economy, extreme reliance on the export 
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of a few staple commodities, the size of the country, or its climate __ 
labour-management relations have never been regarded as a wholly private 
affair. The government representing the 'public' has long been 
recognized as a legitimate party of interest in the industrial relations 
system. And the government's role has been an active one. Since the 
turn of the century the defining characteristic of labour-relations 
policy in Canada has been its preoccupation with industrial peace. 
Strikes and lock-outs, particularly in the 'essential' industries of 
railways, mining, and public utilities, were considered unacceptable 
threats to economic growth and public safety. 
Nor did workers have strong objections to government intervention. 
The predicament of most unions in the first half of the century was 
precarious. Consequently, they were prepared to accept intervention if, 
as seemed the case with the Industrial Disputes Investigation Act, the 
result was a measure of recognition. Although some groups were adamantly 
opposed to the government's role as intermediary, opposition was 
generally confined to craft unions with strong economic bases. The 
official policy of the Trades and Labour Congress, by contrast, favoured 
compulsory conciliation; indeed, there was considerable support for 
compulsory arbitration along the lines of Australia's experiment until 
international unions threatened to revoke the charters of their Canadian 
branches. 
Until the end of the last century, labour law in Canada mirrored 
developments in Great Britain. Not only statutes but the judgments of 
the British courts, including Taff-Vale, were adopted, but not the Trade 
Disputes Act. Canadian workers were never accorded the immunities from 
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common law liability which underpinned the growth of unions in Great 
Britain. In any event, it is unlikely that unionists could have made 
much of the immunities. With the exception of World War I, labour was 
chronically weak vis-a-vis employers. The boom and bust economy, 
constant immigration, ethnic and linguistic divisions, and rivalry 
between the conservative craft unions of the east and the more radical 
industrial unions of the west made organizing difficult and effective 
strikes almost impossible. 
It was not until World War II that the habitual power equation 
between labour and management was upset. But the law that had given 
modest support to unions during the 1920s and 1930s was repressive in the 
circumstances of the 1940s. The acute labour shortage gave workers the 
bargaining power they needed, yet the law impeded its use. The strict 
constraints on strikes imposed by the IDIA and other war-time orders-in-
council helped employers keep unions at bay. PC 1003 was finally 
introduced only when the policy of voluntary recognition coupled with 
severe constraints on the lawfulness of strikes failed to provide the 
desired degree of social stability. 
PC 1003 proved to be a workable framework for the extension of 
collective bargaining to the mass-production industries not because it 
imposed a legal obligation to bargain on employers but principally 
because it permitted workers to organize effective strikes. For the 
first time, industrial workers had both the propensity to unionize and 
the ability to act on that desire. The limits of the new law were real 
enough. The constraints on the timing of strikes were far from ideal and 
favoured management over labour. But even with these constraints labour 
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was freed from its legal straitjacket sufficiently so that, in the 
relatively tight labour markets of the immediate post-war years, its 
bargaining power was felt. In fact, the desire for union representation 
among industrial workers was so intense that had PC 1003 failed to 
deliver further changes would have been unavoidable. 
World War II was both a blessing and a curse for organized labour. 
On the positive side of the ledger, the severe labour shortage which the 
war provoked made collective bargaining practically inevitable in large-
scale manufacturing. On the negative side, the legal framework that 
facilitated the growth of unions in the mass-production industries was 
deeply flawed. It was no more than a modest concession to labour and 
stabilized labour-management relations only because those who sought 
union representation had enormous bargaining power. For less powerful 
groups at other times, the law has been inadequate defence of the right 
to associate, most obviously in the tertiary sector where employers 
continue to reap the benefits of hiring those in the 'secondary' labour 
market, chiefly women, young people, and immigrants, whose terms and 
conditions of employment are set by reference to the statutory minima. 
No amount of legal intervention can insure that collective 
bargaining takes root in the tertiary sector, but it can have a profound 
effect on management's ability to resist unionization. By reshaping 
bargaining structure and altering the constraints on bargaining tactics, 
the law could partially redress the imbalance of power inherent in the 
unregulated labour market. But how these changes might be achieved leads 
to a pessimistic conclusion. Pluralist values have been a minor force in 
policy-making in Canada; the over-riding consideration has been the 
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preservation of industrial peace. Compulsory collective bargaining was 
not the government's policy by choice but conceded only when it was 
obvious that industrial workers could win recognition on their own. The 
callous pragmatism of this approach suggests that collective bargaining 
will be beyond the reach of most tertiary sector workers for some time to 
come. Changes to the law which would shift the balance of power 
significantly in favour of unions are unlikely to be made precisely 
because unorganized workers in the 1980s lack bargaining power, both 
economic and political. 
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